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Abstract
Thousands of people risk their lives daily by crossing borders in search of a 
better life. During 2015, over one million of these people arrived in Europe. 
Images of refugees in distress became headline news in what was con-
sidered to be the worst humanitarian crisis in Europe since 1945. This book 
provides a critical overview of recent migration flows and offers answers as to 
why people flee, what happens during their flight and investigates the various 
responses to mass migratory movements. Divided in two parts, the book 
addresses long-running academic, policy and domestic debates, drawing on 
case studies of migration in Europe, the Middle East and the Asia Pacific. 
Coming from a variety of different fields, the contributors provide an 
interdisciplinary approach and open the discussion on the reasons why 
migration should be examined critically.
v 
Acknowledgements
First of all, we would like to thank all the contributors to this book. We tried to 
gather scholars and practitioners from different academic fields and from 
different stages in their careers in order to provide a more interdisciplinary 
narrative to this book. We are thankful for their trust and patience. Finally, we 
would like to dedicate this book to all those who risk their lives in order to 
reach safe shores and yet remain unknown to most of us whilst making a 
huge difference in these uncertain times and spaces. 
Editors
Marianna Karakoulaki is Articles Editor and a Director of E-International 
Relations. She is an award winning journalist and foreign correspondent. She 
regularly reports as a freelance foreign correspondent for Deutsche Welle and 
has worked with IRIN, The Telegraph, Middle East Eye, CBC Radio, Voice of 
America, BBC Radio, Channel 4 News, Radio Television Suisse, Human 
Rights Watch and Refugees International among others. 
Laura Southgate is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Aston 
University. She is a regular contributor for Global Risk Insights and a Senior 
Commissioning Editor for E-International Relations. Her research focuses on 
regional intervention and state resistance to sovereignty violation in 
Southeast Asia. Her work has been published in International Politics, 
Intelligence and National Security, and Journal of Asian Security and 
International Affairs. 
Jakob Steiner is a PhD student at the Department of Physical Geography at 
Universiteit Utrecht, the Netherlands and a Senior Commissioning Editor for 
E-International Relations. He has conducted field research on drivers of local 
migration and rural development in rural Pakistan and on the paths of 
Pakistani men leaving along the common refugee routes for Europe.
vi
Contributors
Sally Clark attained her doctorate from Swinburne University in 2016. Her 
PhD, titled ‘Navigating Asylum: Journeys from Indonesia to Australia’ charts 
the precarious nature of life in transit for Hazara asylum seekers undergoing 
refugee status determination and explores the connection between conditions 
in transit and irregular migration. She is currently lecturing in international 
politics and conducting research on displacement and exceptionality in 
marginalised groups.  
Kamel Doraï is a researcher at the French National Centre for Scientific 
Research currently based at IFPO, Jordan and research associate at 
MIGRINTER, University of Poitiers. His work focuses mainly on asylum 
seekers and refugees in the Middle East. He is currently conducting research 
on Syrian and Palestinian refugees from Syria in Jordan and Lebanon as well 
as on the urbanization process of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. 
Susana Ferreira holds a PhD in International Relations and International 
Security from the NOVA University of Lisbon and the Instituto Universitario 
General Gutiérrez Mellado. She is a researcher with the Instituto Português 
de Relações Internacionais (IPRI), NOVA University and the Centro de 
Investigação de Segurança e Defesa do IUM (CISDI). She has been a visiting 
scholar at the Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado and at the 
Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University. 
Andriani Fili is part of the interdisciplinary research group of Border 
Criminologies as managing editor of the blog and social media, and a 
Research Associate at the University of Oxford Centre for Criminology. She is 
a PhD candidate at the University of Lancaster. Her research focuses on 
resistance in women’s immigration detention centres in Greece. She has 
published on immigration detention in Greece and is currently co-editing a 
book on criminal justice research in an era of mass mobility. 
Benjamin Hulme is a PhD candidate in EU Law at the University of Warwick. 
His primary research interest is EU migration and asylum law, in particular, 
returns and readmission. His wider interests include EU constitutional, human 
rights and external relations law and policy. He holds an LL.B. Law degree 
and an LL.M. in International Human Rights Law from the University of York.
Amadu Wurie Khan is an independent researcher and consultant on forced 
migration, international development, the news media and social policy. He 
has contributed to teaching and research at the University of Edinburgh and 
Njala University. Amadu Khan is a human rights journalist and storyteller-
vii 
performer artist. He is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Nomoli 
Media Group.   
Dora Kostakopoulou is Professor of European Union Law, European 
Integration and Public Policy at Warwick Law School. She was Co-director of 
the Institute of Law, Economy and Global Governance at the University of 
Manchester (2005–2011) and Director of the Centre for European Law at the 
University of Southampton (2011–2012). She was British Academy, Thank 
Offering to Britain Fellow (2003–2004) and recipient of an Innovation Award 
by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (2004–2005). 
Anitta Kynsilehto holds an Academy of Finland Postdoctoral Fellowship 
(2015–2018) for a project titled ‘Everyday politics of solidarity: Undocumented 
Mobilities in Europe and the Mediterranean’. She works at the Tampere 
Peace Research Institute and is the author of Choreographies of Resistance: 
Mobile Bodies and Relational Politics (with Tarja Väyrynen, Eeva Puumala, 
Samu Pehkonen and Tiina Vaittinen; Rowman & Littlefield, 2017) and Gender 
and Mobility: A Critical Introduction (with Elina Penttinen; Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2017). She serves as board member to the EuroMed Rights 
network.
Nicola Langdon researches and lectures in International Relations and 
sustainability issues at the University of Plymouth. Her research interests lie 
predominantly in the realms of security studies and foreign policy, with a 
specific focus upon the interplay between the media and interventionism. Her 
PhD, from the University of Plymouth, focused upon morality framing during 
conflict. More recently she has applied this methodology to look at issues of 
sustainability, including green energy production.
Emma Larking is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Australian National 
University’s School of Regulation and Global Governance RegNet, where her 
research focuses on political mobilisations for social justice, especially anti-
poverty campaigns and the global food sovereignty movement. She has 
published widely on the concept and status of human rights, and on refugees 
and forced migration. She is the author of Refugees and the Myth of Human 
Rights: Life Outside the Pale of the Law (Ashgate, 2014) and co-editor with 
Hilary Charlesworth of Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: 
Rituals and Ritualism (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
Valsamis Mitsilegas is Professor of European Criminal Law, Dean for 
Research (Humanities and Social Sciences) and Head of the Department of 
Law at Queen Mary University of London (QMUL). He is currently serving as 
Academic Lead for Internationalisation for the University. He is the Inaugural 
viii
Director of the Queen Mary Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences 
(IHSS) and has been the Director of the Queen Mary Criminal Justice Centre 
since 2011. His latest books are The Criminalisation of Migration in Europe 
(Springer, 2015) and EU Criminal Law after Lisbon (Hart, 2016). 
Thomas Nail is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of 
Denver. He is the author of Returning to Revolution: Deleuze, Guattari and 
Zapatismo (Edinburgh University Press, 2012), The Figure of the Migr-
ant (Stanford University Press, 2015), Theory of the Border (Oxford University 
Press, 2016) and co-editor of Between Deleuze and Foucault (Edinburgh 
University Press, 2016). His work has appeared in publications such as 
Angelaki, Theory & Event, Philosophy Today, Parrhesia, SubStance, Deleuze 
Studies, Foucault Studies. 
Özlem Özdemir works for The Gendarmerie General Command in Turkey. 
She received her PhD from Akdeniz University, Institute of Social Sciences, 
Faculty of Communication in 2014. She was an academic visitor at Swansea 
University College of Arts and Humanities in 2013–2014, and a post-doctoral 
academic visitor at Swansea University College of Science, Department of 
Geography between 2014–2016.
Jenny Poon is a PhD Candidate at the Faculty of Law of the University of 
Western Ontario, a qualified Barrister & Solicitor in Ontario, as well as a 
Visiting Study Fellow at the University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre, 
Trinity Term 2017. Jenny’s research focuses on examining the principle of 
non-refoulement as a norm in international and European law and  compara-
tive analysis of the United Kingdom and Germany. 
ix 




Marianna Karakoulaki, Laura Southgate & Jakob Steiner 1
PART ONE - PERSPECTIVES
1.  THE POLITICAL CENTRALITY OF THE MIGRANT
Thomas Nail 15
2.  THE CULTURAL ‘THERAPEUTICS’ OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE  
CONTEXT OF FORCED MIGRATION
Amadu Wurie Khan 28
3.  MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS – EXPOSING THE UNIVERSALITY  
OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS A FALSE PREMISE
Emma Larking 45
4.  FROM NARRATIVES TO PERCEPTIONS IN THE SECURITISATION OF 
THE MIGRATORY CRISIS IN EUROPE
Susana Ferreira 57
5.  EUROPE’S BARBWIRE FENCES: REFLECTIONS ON REPORTING  
THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN GREECE
Marianna Karakoulaki 74
6.  EMPATHY AND OTHERING: FRAMING SYRIA’S REFUGEE CRISIS IN 
THE BRITISH PRESS
Nicola Langdon 91
PART TWO - DRIVERS AND RESPONSES
7.  CONFLICT AND MIGRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: SYRIAN  
REFUGEES IN JORDAN AND LEBANON
Kamel Doraï 113




9.  AUSTRALIA’S EXTRATERRITORIAL ASYLUM POLICIES AND THE  
MAKING OF TRANSIT SITES
Sally Clark 143
10. CONTAINMENT PRACTICES OF IMMOBILITY IN GREECE
Andriani Fili 162
11. SOLIDARITIES IN MIGRATION
Anitta Kynsilehto 181
12. SOLIDARITY BEYOND THE STATE IN EUROPE’S COMMON  
EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM
Valsamis Mitsilegas 196
13. EUROPEAN UNION MIGRATION LAW AND POLICY
Benjamin Hulme & Dora Kostakopoulou 211




Marianna Karakoulaki, Laura Southgate & Jakob Steiner 239
NOTE ON INDEXING 243
1 Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century
Introduction
Critical Perspectives on Migration in the 
Twenty-First Century
MARIANNA KARAKOULAKI,  LAURA SOUTHGATE  
& JAKOB STEINER
In the summer of 2015 the island of Lesbos in Greece, located just a few 
miles from the shores of Turkey, became a symbol of the so-called migration 
crisis in Europe. In an island of less than 87,000 residents, thousands of 
people were arriving on a daily basis. In some ways, Lesbos represented the 
European dream: the first step to safety and prosperity for thousands of 
people, far from the conflicts of the Middle East. That summer the ‘migration 
crisis’, so dubbed by the media, had just reached its climax. Two years later, 
Lesbos still struggles to cope with overcrowded camps, and has become the 
symbol of Europe’s mismanagement of migration (Broderick 2017; Holland 
2017; Sallet 2017; Stone 2017). How did we get here? How can we place this 
in a wider debate on migration? And what is missing to lead that debate?
The Century of the Migrant: A Fractious Debate
Central to this edited collection is the individual plight of millions of displaced 
peoples in what has been referred to as the ‘century of the migrant’ (Nail 
2015, 1). Since the start of the twenty-first century, the number of inter-
national migrants has grown rapidly, from 173 million in 2000, to 244 million in 
2015, and to 258 million in 2017 (UN 2015, 1; 2017). Of those, 65.6 million 
were forced to flee their countries due to conflict and persecution in 2016, 
leading the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to 
conclude that forced displacement was at its highest peak in decades 
(UNHCR 2017). The routes taken are often dangerous, putting refugees at 
continuous risk even after they have left a war zone. On 9 November 2017, 
an article listed the names of 33,293 migrants who died on their way to reach 
Europe. That list was an attempt to ‘identify thousands of dead as human 
beings, with an origin, a past, a life’ (Casdorff and Maroldt 2017).
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Domestic debate as to the relative costs and benefits of migration is 
extensive and fractious. As of 2008, more than 30 million foreign citizens 
were living in the 27 Member States of the European Union (Spencer 2011, 
1). In the United Kingdom, a 2012 poll showed that 68% of the British public 
believed that migration had a negative effect on Britain (YouGov 2012). 
Germany, which accepted 890,000 migrants in 2015, held pro- and anti-
migration marches following the European migration crisis (Amnesty 
International 2016). In France, which declared it would accept 24,000 
refugees in the wake of the migrant crisis, public opinion was split, with at 
least half opposing the arrival of more refugees (Chrisafis 2016). What these 
figures show is both the degree to which migration dominates domestic policy, 
particularly during election periods and in the wake of specific crises, and the 
mixed feelings citizens hold towards the issue. Indeed, recent studies suggest 
that the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) 
following the controversial ‘Brexit’ campaign held in 2016, was due in part to 
anti-migrant prejudice and fears of uncontrolled migration (Meleady et al., 
2017). 
Current academic debate on the subject of migration is equally varied and 
contested. Whilst some scholars focus on the economic and cultural impact of 
migration (Eckstein and Najam 2013), others focus on political borders and 
boundaries (De Genova 2017; Bacas and Kavanagh 2013), state and 
institution migration policies (Boswell and Geddes 2011), human rights 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen and Vedsted-Hansen 2017) and gender (Yucesahin and 
Yazgan 2017) to name but a few. Acknowledging the importance of these 
contributions to the study of migration, this edited collection seeks to build on 
their work by providing an inter-disciplinary analysis of migration in the 
twenty-first century. Straddling the political, legal and humanitarian discip-
lines, this collection shines a light on underlying perspectives and drivers of 
migration, and critically appraises current international and regional res-
ponses. It addresses the long-running academic, policy and domestic debate, 
drawing on case studies of migration in Europe, the Middle East and the Asia 
Pacific. 
Before moving forward with the structure of the book, this chapter will briefly 
examine migrant terminology, followed by an overview of classical theories of 
migration more commonly used in the previous century. 
Debating Terminology: Migrant, Refugee or Asylum Seeker?
The media’s sudden focus on migration and the rising number of people 
arriving on Europe’s shores has sparked a debate on terminology. If one 
looks at a variety of reports from 2015 and before, the terms migrant, refugee 
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and asylum seeker were used interchangeably, as the debate over 
terminology became heated. In August 2015, Al Jazeera decided to stop 
using the word ‘migrant’ in an attempt to avoid any negative connotations with 
that term, and substituted it with the word ‘refugee’ (Malone, 2015). Other 
media outlets published articles explaining these terms in more detail, with 
reasons why people needed to take care when using them due to the 
potential legal implications of using the wrong term (Sengupta 2015; Spencer 
2015; Travis 2015; UNHCR 2016b). 
The way a migrant is defined, however, is a complex issue. For the 
International Organisation of Migration (IOM), a migrant is someone who is 
moving across borders or within a state, despite their legal status, the 
reasons and causes of the movement, or the length of the stay in the host 
country (IOM n.d.). The UNHCR, on the other hand, defines a migrant as 
someone who chooses to move mainly to improve his or her life (2016b). One 
of the reasons why the definition of ‘migrant’ is so complex is that it includes a 
wide range of people who are all in a different situation, who cross borders 
because of different reasons, yet all have their movement as a common factor 
(Koser 2007). 
A ‘refugee’, on the other hand, is strictly defined by legal texts and 
international conventions. According to the Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (1951) defines a refugee as someone who: 
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Finally, an ‘asylum seeker’ is someone who has fled their country of origin 
and has made a claim for asylum under the 1951 Refugee Convention, and 
their status has not yet been determined (O’ Neil 2010, 6; UNHCR 2011).
In his book ‘The Figure of the Migrant’ (2015), Thomas Nail adopts the use of 
the word ‘migrant’. He explains, however, that whilst everyone who crosses 
borders is a migrant, their movement differs as ‘[f]or some movement offers 
opportunity, recreation, and profit with only a temporary expulsion. For others, 
movement is dangerous and constrained, and their social expulsions are 
much more severe and permanent’ (2015, 2). While this book’s contributors 
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use the terms interchangeably, Thomas Nail provides a history of the theory 
of the migrant in the first chapter of the book, providing an important guideline 
to this underlying challenge of terminology.
Theorising Migration in the Twentieth Century
During the twentieth century, those who studied migration mainly focused on 
its economic aspects. Thus, the theories that developed during that period 
were mostly of an economic nature. The type of migration that characterises 
the most recent migratory flow – and the one that most contributors of this 
book focus on – is different, with a majority appearing to flee from conflict-
affected areas. 
An attempt to explain the reasons why people migrate was made by Ernest 
Ravenstein in 1885, when he published the ‘Laws of Migration’. Ravenstein 
came to the conclusion that migration is the result of a push and pull process 
that makes people cross borders, either by being pushed by their 
unfavourable countries’ conditions, or pulled by the host countries’ favourable 
conditions. The following suppositions are central to Ravenstein’s Laws: that 
migrants are less likely to move long distances; there is a process of 
absorption in which people who surround a rapidly growing town are drawn to 
it, thus leaving rural areas to migrants from distant areas; there is an inverse 
process of absorption with similar characteristics; each migration flow 
produces a counter-flow; migrants who move long distances usually prefer 
large centres with economic growth; those who live in a town are less likely to 
migrate than those in rural areas; and that women migrate more than men 
(Ravenstein 1885). 
Migration theories of the twentieth century draw upon Ravenstein’s Laws of 
Migration, whilst focusing on the economics of migration (either internal 
migration or international migration). Everett Lee (1966) attempted to provide 
a Theory of Migration by emphasising push and pull factors, the difficulties 
migrants face, and migrant profiling (age, gender, class, education). The 
Neoclassical Economic Theory, which is mainly used to describe migration 
between two countries, suggests that there is a correlation between the 
global supply and demand for labour and the reason people migrate, effec-
tively driven by a wage gap among geographical areas (Sjaastad 1962; 
Todaro 1969; Jennissen 2007). The Dual Labour Market Theory suggests that 
it is pull factors that lead people to migrate, because there is always demand 
for migrant workers in developed countries – something that is inherent in 
their economic structure (Piore 1979; Massey et al. 1993, 440–1; Jennissen 
2007). Additionally, the World Systems Theory focuses on a more sociological 
examination of migration, suggesting that due to the interaction among global 
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societies, migration is influenced by the capitalist development of the global 
market (Massey et al. 1993).
These dominant theories have been subjected to criticism (Arango 2000; 
Massey et al. 1998), notably that they are overtly focused on why some 
people move whilst ignoring why others do not, as well as a lack of attention 
to state policies as influencers of migration. As Arango (2000) notes, 
migration is ‘both very complex and straightforward’. General explanations 
are therefore bound to be ‘reductionistic’. However, the basic unequal 
distribution of resources (including a ‘safe living environment’) lies convin-
cingly at the basis of many migration patterns. In any case, in order to 
adequately describe migration in the twenty-first century these commonly 
applied theories need to be expanded to include a number of other 
dimensions beyond the economic ‘push and pull’. These should include 
societal factors and broader social processes and changes. Recent attempts 
to expand the theoretical debate have led to more interdisciplinary 
approaches to theorising migration (Massey et al. 1993; Favell 2008; Bretell 
and Hollifield 2000; Castles 2008). This book seeks to contribute to this 
growing interdisciplinary debate. 
One critical dimension is evident from recent developments: the inclusion of 
refugees in the larger debate. And while the development of an actual theory 
to describe current developments may be too farfetched – and considering 
the complexity of the problem also not necessarily desirable – a collection of 
critical approaches to discuss the topic should provide a guide to what is 
relevant in this increasingly complex field.
Structure of the Book
The chapters that follow are presented in two parts: ‘Perspectives of 
Migration’ and ‘Drivers and Responses to Migration’. Our attempt here is to 
move beyond one single perspective; be it forced migration, the economics of 
migration, or refugee studies – among others – to draw on under-theorised 
perspectives on migration. The chapters in this collection are therefore 
underpinned by a critical theoretical analysis. By considering in greater detail 
the philosophical history of the migrant, the language and framing of 
migration, and narratives of security, sovereignty and identity, the collected 
authors critique current approaches and offer new and innovative ways to 
address migration in the twenty-first century. 
Perspectives
As an entry point into the book, Thomas Nail uses a theoretical lens to 
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discuss the modern philosophical history of the political centrality of the 
migrant. Through his examination of the works of Marx, Nietzsche, Arendt, 
Deleuze and Guattari, Badiou, Agamben, Balibar, and Hardt and Negri, Nail 
reveals the existence of a common figure defined by movement. With this 
theoretical history, Nail claims we are now in a position to move forward with 
the consequences and political history of this figure for the twenty-first 
century. For Nail, this is a century at a crossroads, where migration has 
reached a critical threshold, and new theories are required that favour the 
figure of the migrant. Nail’s chapter provides an answer to the most divisive 
debate of the past couple of years by discussing the history and theory of the 
migrant. 
Following the theoretical debate on the migrant, Amadu Wurie Khan looks into 
the identity of migrants and argues that they can have multiple identities and 
are not restricted to a ‘singular’ national identity. He considers the United 
Kingdom (UK) government’s formulation of restrictive and assimilationist 
citizenship policies, and the impact of such policies on aspiring UK citizens. 
Khan explores this internalisation of cultures and identities through 
examination of the experiences and views of 23 asylum seekers and refugees 
residing in Edinburgh and Glasgow in Scotland, with interview questions 
covering a range of topics from naturalisation and statelessness, participation 
in ‘British’ citizenship classes, and transnational cultural practices. 
Emma Larking’s chapter opens the discussion on migration and human rights. 
Larking examines the universality of human rights, which she seeks to expose 
as a false premise. According to this argument, the universal enjoyment of 
human rights is in fact heavily circumscribed, with access to rights linked to 
citizenship of just a few states. For Larking, structural impediments to 
universalising human rights, most notably the principle of sovereignty, have 
been downplayed by many international law scholars and human rights 
practitioners. As Larking seeks to show, re-casting human rights along 
recommended lines is possible, and can do more for self-determination than 
continuing to uphold an outdated conception of sovereignty.
The next chapter by Susana S. Ferreira looks into the European Union (EU) 
and the current migratory crisis, and examines the securitisation narratives of 
European leaders. Through an analysis of EU security practices and 
narratives, Ferreira argues that the EU has entered a crisis mode, with 
increasingly negative and xenophobic statements leading to the securitisation 
of the migration crisis. Going one step further, Ferreira explores perceptions 
of European citizens, and the growing support for nationalist and populist 
parties in Europe, to claim that there has been an acceptance of this 
securitisation by the public. For Ferreira, if the EU does not move beyond a 
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securitisation approach, security, stability and the free movement of people 
are at risk.
Chapter five sees Marianna Karakoulaki’s attempt to shed light on the refugee 
crisis in Greece. By using ethnography as a methodology, Karakoulaki tells 
five different stories that took place in five different periods between 2015 and 
2017. These stories are an attempt to examine the way in which borders 
create violence, the kinds of violence they create and how this violence can 
be fought. Karakoulaki concludes that the violence of the borders can be 
eliminated with a no borders politics. 
The final chapter of the ‘Perspectives’ section, by Nicola Langdon, examines 
the Syrian refugee crisis through the lens of the British press. Through a 
discursive construction of the crisis, Langdon focuses her attention on British 
media ‘threat’ framing, ‘othering’ and cosmopolitan framing, which she 
argues, have impacted upon public understandings and perceptions of 
refugees. For Langdon, by framing the refugee movement as a threat and 
manipulating the proximity of the event, the British media has shaped our 
compassion for those suffering from violence and insecurity, and our support 
for policy formation in the wake of the Syrian crisis.
The second part of the book – ‘Drivers and Responses’ – starts by examining 
what drives people to migrate, focusing specifically on the current migratory 
flows from the Middle East, how these drivers are framed and what happens 
when refugees stop moving. In the first chapter of this section, Kamel Doraï 
examines the movement of Syrian refugees towards neighbouring countries 
and consequently assesses the socio-political consequences of the mass 
arrival of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan since 2011. More 
specifically, Doraï focuses on the gradual changes of migration policies in 
both countries and its consequences on migration patterns, with special 
attention placed on Palestinian refugees from Syria, and the forms of 
settlement of the Syrian refugees. For Doraï, the large influx of refugees from 
Syria has had a significant local impact on host societies, and has led to the 
development of restrictive migration policies in neighbouring countries.
Remaining on the topic of Syrian refugees, Özlem Özdemir’s chapter 
examines an often-ignored issue; women refugees during the flight. Özdemir 
claims neither the migratory route is safe nor transit camps are safe for 
women refugees. Through a gender and human security analysis Özdemir 
looks into the specifics of women’s displacement by placing her focus on 
Syrian women refugees during the recent refugee crisis. Özdemir showcases 
the gendered nature of migration and concludes human security during 
migration needs to be examined through a gendered lens.
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A book on migration would not have been complete if it did not assess the 
way migration is dealt with on a larger political, legal and social level. Sally 
Clark examines Australia’s asylum policies and its transit camps as she 
explores the effects of developed nation-states’ aggressive border security 
policies on forced migrants and the transit countries that host them. For Clark, 
these practices are designed to exclude forced migrants from territories 
where the rights of asylum are enshrined. In her examination of the Australia-
Indonesia relationship, Clark ascertains that Australia, in a bid to protect itself 
from unwanted migration, has implemented border security policies that have 
had an instrumental role in reconfiguring the search for asylum in Southeast 
Asia. In so doing, migrants have been left desperately searching for ways to 
seek protection.
On the same topic, Andriani Fili provides an in-depth examination of 
containment practices in Greece. Fili argues that Greece’s policies towards 
irregular migration have increasingly relied upon detention and deportation, to 
the detriment of human lives. Driven by an interest in the Greek notion of 
hospitality, Fili considers the primary characteristics of the Greek detention 
system. In doing so, Fili claims that Greek detention practices have been 
legitimised through a narrative of deterrence, the rationalisation of deportation 
and the denial of both policies’ racialised nature. As a result, Greece’s 
humanitarian and leftist ideals have been abandoned, and its migrants are left 
at risk and unaccounted for.
The following chapter by Anitta Kynsilehto examines different types of migrant 
solidarity action, both those with a humanitarian orientation, and those geared 
towards advocacy. For Kynsilehto, the distinctions in solidarity action are 
becoming increasingly difficult to uphold. This is due to inequalities that actors 
at all levels regularly witness, and the radical undermining of human rights 
frameworks. Drawing on insights from her own ongoing multi-sited 
ethnographic research at different borders around the Mediterranean Sea, 
Kynsilehto addresses the spatialities and temporalities of solidarity activism, 
and the critical practices and politics of movements, before addressing the 
tendency of criminalising solidarity action and the long-term impact on actions 
of solidarity.
Remaining on the topic of solidarity but from a different perspective, Valsamis 
Mitsilegas assesses its legal meaning in the Common European Asylum 
System. Mitsilegas seeks to demonstrate the limits of a state-centred 
approach to solidarity. In this view, claims of solidarity have been advanced 
with states as beneficiaries and reference points. Instead, Mitsilegas 
advocates for a concept of solidarity centred on the individual, achievable by 
the application of the principle of mutual recognition in the field of positive 
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asylum decisions. Looking forward, Mitsilegas argues for a uniform refugee 
status across the European Union, which can act as a catalyst for a 
strengthened refugee-centred solidarity.
The next chapter by Benjamin Hulme and Dora Kostakopoulou analyses the 
European Union’s migration policy. Hulme and Kostakopoulou examine a 
number of historical developments in the European Union’s migration policy, 
before moving on to focus on more recent developments in EU policy. These 
recent developments include the creation of a new European Coast Guard, 
and new forms of ‘third country’ agreements and the harmonisation of ‘third 
country’ information. The authors highlight a number of concerns with regards 
to these developments, including the need to respect human rights and 
provide effective protection to those in need. However, for Hulme and 
Kostakopoulou, these developments are a significant step in the development 
of a truly Common European Asylum System.
The final chapter of the book by Jenny Poon is an in-depth examination of the 
legal responses to the refugee crisis. Poon argues that the international and 
regional legal responses to the refugee crisis have been inadequate and 
much too late. At the international level, Poon claims that guidelines imposed 
by the UNHCR permit group recognition of refugee status, rather than the 
processing of applications on a case-by-case basis. At the regional level, it is 
argued that the European Union’s process of swapping one asylum claimant 
for another promotes violation of the principle of non-refoulement. For Poon, 
change should be implemented at both levels in order to properly safeguard 
the rights of asylum claimants and refugees.
The topic of migration is one that has no end. Whilst it is difficult to grasp all 
aspects of migration fully, this book tries to bridge the gap between different 
fields and frameworks and provide an insight into the current migration crisis. 
The ultimate goal of the editors is to encourage discussion on the utility of the 
critical perspective as a theoretical tool of analysis, and the interdisciplinary 
nature of migration and refugee studies.
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1
The Political Centrality of the 
Migrant
THOMAS NAIL
Political theory from Plato to Rawls has largely treated the migrant as a 
secondary or derived political figure of relatively little importance. Political 
theory has tended to privilege citizens and states over migrants and their 
circulations. 
This chapter, however, shows for the first time that within this dominant 
history is also a subterranean or minor history of political theory that grants 
the figure of the migrant a certain degree of centrality or importance. If we 
want to rethink migration in the twenty-first century, we must be able to 
rethink the basic assumptions that we have inherited from a certain dominant 
history of political theory. One of the best ways to do this is to begin with the 
subterranean history that has been buried below it from Marx to Badiou. Any 
future theory of the migrant must begin from the previous attempts to think 
about the nature of its centrality and importance in political theory. Since this 
history has nowhere else been elaborated, this chapter presents it here for 
others to build on.
The Age of Mass Migration
The modern philosophical history of the thesis of the centrality of the migrant 
begins alongside what is commonly referred to as the ‘age of mass migration’ 
that took place between 1840 and 1914 (Hatton and Williamson 1998).
Karl Marx
The first historical expression of the centrality of the migrant occurs in Capital 
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Vol. I published in 1867 by a migrant in exile, Karl Marx. This is perhaps the 
first work of philosophy to explicitly valorise the revolutionary potential and 
political-economic centrality of the figure of the migrant, or what Marx calls 
the ‘relative surplus population’ (Marx 1976, 781). Marx (1976, 784) goes as 
far as to say that the relative surplus population is: 
the lever of capitalist accumulation, indeed it becomes a 
condition for the existence of the capitalist mode of production. 
It forms a disposable industrial reserve army, which belongs to 
capital just as absolutely as if the latter had bread it at its own 
cost. 
As capitalist markets expand, contract, and multiply ‘by fits and starts’, Marx 
says, capital requires the possibility of suddenly adding and subtracting ‘great 
masses of men into decisive areas without doing any damage to the scale of 
production. The surplus population supplies these masses’ (Marx 1976, 785). 
If there were 100% employment in all markets then where would a new and 
expanding market get its labour? If there was total employment, then workers 
would not be easily replaced and their strikes would have substantial force 
over production. 
Capitalist production thus requires a mass of workers which is superfluous to 
its requirements for two reasons: 1) so that when expansion or multiplication 
of markets occurs there will be a surplus of workers ready at hand and 2) so 
that this surplus of unemployed workers will make the current workers highly 
replaceable and thus over-workable, thus requiring less active workers (thus 
increasing surplus population further), and making active workers available at 
a cheaper wage. ‘Modern industry’s whole form of motion,’ Marx claims, 
‘therefore depends on the constant transformation of a part of the working 
population into unemployed or semi-employed “hands”’ (Marx 1976, 786).
The proletariat is always already a migrant proletariat. At any moment an 
employed worker could be unemployed and forced to relocate according to 
the demands of capitalist valorisation. In fact, its mobility is the condition of 
modern industry’s whole form of motion. Without the migration of surplus 
population to new markets, from the rural to the city, from city to city, from 
country to country (what Marx calls the ‘floating population’) capitalist 
accumulation would not be possible at all. As the most mobile and 
deterritorialised part of the proletariat, however, the surplus population also 
has the greatest potential for revolutionary transformation. Unemployed 
workers have the least to lose and the most to gain from revolution. They also 
have more time to educate, organise, and motivate others. Also, as the most 
mobile, the surplus population is always on the brink of deterritorialising 
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capitalism itself insofar as it is capitalism that relies on their existence. In this 
way the strikes of the unemployed might be more powerful than the strikes of 
the actively employed. Or, said in another way, the surplus population is also 
the lever which allows for the success of an active workers’ strike. Without the 
solidarity of their potential replacements, the striking workers cannot win: they 
will be replaced by the mobile surplus population. Thus, as the most mobile 
figure of Marx’s thought, the surplus population is both the conditions of 
mobility for modern industry and the conditions of the proletariat’s eman-
cipation from the bonds of territorial immobility. 
Friedrich Nietzsche
The second major work of philosophy during this time to valorise the 
transformative power and centrality of the migrant is The Gay Science 
published in 1882 by the stateless migrant, Friedrich Nietzsche. Eighteen 
years after Capital Vol. 1 was published, 1882 was the highest year of annual 
migration in Europe in the entire age of mass migration (Hatton and 
Williamson 1998). In aphorism 377, titled ‘We who are homeless’, Nietzsche 
writes as a migrant to migrants as the ‘children of the future’ (Nietzsche 1974, 
338). Here, there is a dual sense of subject and temporality in his address. 
Nietzsche addresses the present and empirical migrants of his time, who are 
moving around Europe and the world by the millions, but does so by 
addressing them in the future and collective unifying sense of an ‘untimely 
we’. ‘We’ are both now-here and nowhere. ‘We’ are a people which is here but 
whose time is also yet to come. The use of the word ‘we’ and the amount of 
political content gives this relatively long aphorism a strong political tone even 
as Nietzsche clearly rejects traditional political categories.  
For Nietzsche, these migratory children of the future occupy a special place in 
The Gay Science. Not because they appear often, but because it is to them 
‘especially’ that Nietzsche ‘commends [his] secret wisdom and’, the book’s 
title, the ‘gaya sciensza’ (Nietzsche 1974, 338).The number of such 
unequivocally valorised figures in Nietzsche’s works are few (i.e. the 
Übermensch, barbarians, etc.). To these figures we should add another: the 
homeless migrants of Europe. According to Nietzsche, it is migrants who have 
pushed the farthest by rejecting all the ‘ideals that might lead one to feel at 
home even in this fragile, broken time of transition’ (Nietzsche 1974, 338). It 
is they who ‘constitute a force that breaks open ice and other all too thin 
“realities”’. ‘We homeless’, Nietzsche says, reject both conservatism, liberal-
ism, ‘progress,’ as well as a ‘return to any past periods’ (Nietzsche 1974, 
338). ‘We homeless’ migrants, Nietzsche says, are fleeing capitalism just as 
much as the humanist notions of ‘equal rights,’ and ‘a free society’ which 
mask their weakness with virtue. ‘We homeless,’ Nietzsche continues, are too 
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‘well travelled’ and too ‘racially mixed’ to fall prey to ‘the European system of 
a lot of petty states’ (Nietzsche 1974, 340). 
In these rapid sentences Nietzsche identifies and clearly valorises a figure of 
the migrant who abandons or was perhaps abandoned by the political parties 
of left and right, historical progress, humanism, nostalgia, nationalism, racism, 
capitalism, socialism, and religion. The migrants’ being out-of-place and out-
of-time, is not only the conditions for their marginalisation but the conditions 
under which their movement can create a new place and a new time.
For Nietzsche, this new migrant figure expresses a radical exodus from all the 
diseases of its age. But in the final lines of this aphorism the figure of the 
homeless migrant also offers the possibility of a new world. ‘The hidden Yes 
in you is stronger than all Nos and Maybes that afflict you and your age like a 
disease; and when you have to embark on the sea, you emigrants, you, too, 
are compelled to this by – a faith!’ (Nietzsche 1974, 340) Despite Nietzsche’s 
emphasis on all the migrants are leaving behind, there is also an even more 
powerful capacity to create something new that they can say yes to. But the 
hope in such a new world is already a kind of faith. It is a strange faith: the 
faith of the faithless. 
The Age of Displacement
Migration, displacement, and statelessness during the period of 1914 to 1970 
easily rivals ‘the age of mass migration’ at more than 60 million displaced 
people.
 Hannah Arendt
In 1951, another exiled migrant philosopher, Hannah Arendt, wrote one of the 
most well-known articulations of the philosophical dilemma posed by these 
events. ‘The Decline of the Nation-State and the Ends of the Rights of Man’, 
in The Origins of Totalitarianism describes this group of European migrants, 
refugees and stateless people as ‘the most symptomatic group in 
contemporary politics’ (Arendt 1951, 277). This is the case because they 
expose the internal paradox of the modern nation-state and the idea of 
natural rights. ‘Only with a completely organized humanity’, she writes, ‘could 
the loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion from 
humanity altogether’ (Arendt 1951, 297). Only when the entire world has been 
divided into nation-states that define the rights of man as the rights of the 
citizen, do we see the truly exclusionary nature of nation-states. Political 
rights exist only when protected by a political community. It is thus with the 
emergence of stateless migrants, a people who are truly in-between places, 
19 Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century
without a legal origin or destination, that the universal pretensions of the 
supposedly ‘inalienable’ human rights show themselves to be false. 
According to Arendt, the stateless migrant was not suffering the ‘loss of any 
specific rights, but the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any 
rights whatsoever’: the loss of the ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt 1951, 297). 
Arendt writes, 
No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more 
poignant irony than the discrepancy between the efforts of 
well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on regarding as 
‘inalienable’ those human rights, which are enjoyed only by 
citizens of the most prosperous and civilized countries, and the 
situation of the rightless themselves (Arendt 1951, 297).
Thus, the centrality of the figure of the displaced migrant lies in two things for 
Arendt: 1) the displaced migrant demonstrates a division internal to the 
dominant political philosophy of the time, between the citizen and the human; 
and 2) if societies are going to change, they must begin by including this 
increasingly large number of displaced migrants who have been pushed 
outside public life (the sphere of equality) into private life (the sphere of 
difference), which is undermining public, political life. For Arendt, displaced 
migrants are ‘the most symptomatic group in contemporary politics’, not 
because they are the most numerous or powerful, but because their 
displacement most reveals to us the condition of modern politics and its 
future: not right, but the right to have rights.
The Age of Globalisation
Today, with currently over 214 million international migrants world-wide, the 
contemporary age of migration (‘the second wave’) is the largest yet, with no 
signs of decreasing.1
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari
Directly following Virilio’s insight five years later (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 
65)2, French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari place the figure 
of the nomad (defined by speed) at the heart of their political philosophy of 
1  As of 2010, there were 215 million international migrants and 740 million internal 
migrants according to the United Nations Human Development Report (2009, 21).
2  ‘Virilio’s texts are of great importance and originality in every respect’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987 fn 65).
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revolution in A Thousand Plateaus (1982/1987). ‘If the nomad’, Deleuze and 
Guattari say, ‘can be called the Deterritorialised par excellence, it is precisely 
because there is no reterritorialisation afterward as with the migrant, or upon 
something else as with the sedentary (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 381). 
Thus, it is not the nomad who is a type of proletariat, as defined by Marx, 
Virilio, and others, but rather the ‘proletariat [who is] the heir to the nomad’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 558 fn 61). 
However, Deleuze and Guattari also introduce three novel distinctions into the 
history of the philosophy of the migrant with their concept of the nomad. First, 
they distinguish between three types of speed which Virilio conflates: ‘1) 
speeds of nomadic, or revolutionary, tendency (riot, guerrilla warfare); 2) 
speeds that are regulated, converted, appropriated by the State apparatus 
(management of the public ways); and 3) speeds that are reinstated by a 
worldwide organisation of total way, or planetary over-armament’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, fn 65). Second, they distinguish between speed, which is 
intensive, and movement, which is extensive. ‘Movement designates the 
relative character of a body considered as “one” and which goes from point to 
point; speed, on the contrary...can spring up at any point’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 381). Third, they distinguish between the migrant, which they 
define by the extensive movement from one point to another and the nomad, 
defined by the ‘path that is between two points’, whose stopping points are 
only relays or consequences of the nomad’s principle trajectory (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 380).
The first distinction Deleuze and Guattari make between different types of 
speed is crucial. Part II of the present chapter develops this in more depth. 
The second distinction is significant, but only insofar as one understands 
movement and speed (extensive and intensive) as absolutely coexistent in 
every situation. They are absolutely distinct and yet every movement has a 
degree of speed, and every speed has a degree of movement: like a 
cartography with ‘a latitude and a longitude’, as Deleuze and Guattari say 
elsewhere.3 Thus, the migrant and the nomad coexist in the same figure. In 
fact, Deleuze and Guattari define both migrant and nomad in exactly the 
same way: ‘as the movement between points’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 
380). The two even ‘mix and form a common aggregate’, they say (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, 380). The difference is that the migrant is defined by the 
3  Deleuze and Guattari make this clear when they say, ‘On the plane of consistency, 
a body is defined only by a longitude and a latitude: in other words the sum total of the 
material elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed 
and slowness (longitude); the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a 
given power or degree of potential (latitude). Nothing but affects and local movements, 
differential speeds. The credit goes to Spinoza for calling attention to these two 
dimensions of the Body (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 260).
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fact that it will settle permanently and the nomad will move on. 
However, there are thus three ways in which a migrant is also a nomad. The 
first is practical: the majority of empirical migrants move multiple times in their 
life, even if it is within the same country. ‘Settlement’ is thus not an adequate 
way to describe their ‘arrival’, since this arrival is almost always a partial one 
(partial status, precarity, possible deportation, etc.). The second way is 
conceptual: there are already two words that define the migrant by its 
departure from a settlement or its arrival and resettlement: the emigrant and 
the immigrant. The word ‘migrant’ is literally the one in-between, intermezzo, 
in-transit: not defined by settlement. If one defines the migrant by settlement, 
then one is merely duplicating the definition of emigrant or immigrant. The 
third way is etymological: the French and English word migration comes from 
the Latin word migrātiō, which means ‘a change of abode, move’ (Oxford 
Latin Dictionary 1982). This word, and the similar Greek one, μέτοικος 
(métoikos), from metá, indicating change, and oîkos ‘dwelling’, both come 
from the proto-Indo-European root Mei, meaning ‘change’. There is nothing in 
the etymology of the word migrant that indicates permanent settlement. 
Thus the real distinction that should be upheld is between the migrant-nomad 
on one side and the emigrant-immigrant on the other. The first is defined by 
change and movement (in-between), the second is defined by settlement 
(departure from, or arrival to). 
Alain Badiou
Two years after the book A Thousand Plateaus was published (1980), French 
philosopher Alain Badiou published Theory of the Subject, where he too 
granted the migrant a central role in his political philosophy. With respect to 
politics, Badiou argues that ‘the immigrated workers are at the centre of the 
current process of political subjectivity’ (Badiou 2009, 263). Since, for Badiou, 
‘our society – imperialist society – is defined as a whole by the declaration 
that immigrant workers are not of this society, that it is impossible that they 
ever be’, then ‘the immigrant proletarians are the inexistent proper to the 
national totality’ (Badiou 2009, 263). The ‘immigrated proletarians’ are those 
whose marginalisation and (inclusive) exclusion is required for France to 
identify itself as a unity, which excludes some and includes others. Thus,
a protest struggle in which the immigrants, represented as a particular 
social force, demand the same political rights as the French, forces 
the inexistent whose national multiplicity determines its closure as 
imperialist, that is, it forces the immanent popular internationalism 
(Badiou 2009, 263–264).
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For Badiou, proletarian migrants are central to the current process of political 
subjectivity for two reasons: 1) through their marginalisation and exclusion 
they provide the condition for the unity of national identity. Without the internal 
exclusion of the migrant, the national totality would lose its identity, and; 2) 
the demand for the political unity of nationals and immigrants is thus the key 
point for the transformation of the whole of politics and a new form of 
international revolutionary subjectivity.
Badiou was so committed to the centrality of this figure that he founded a 
political action group with Natacha Michel and Sylvain Lazarus called 
L’Organisation Politique, which was particularly committed to helping organise 
and support undocumented migrants (les sans-papiers). The group (active 
1985–2007) often worked with migrants staying in French hostels and aided 
their demonstrations for equal rights. 
Despite the group’s dissolution, Badiou remains committed to the thesis of the 
centrality of the migrant. This is evidenced in his more recent book, The 
Meaning of Sarkozy (2008). In this book Badiou claims that ‘the intimate link 
between politics and the question of foreigners is...absolutely central today’ 
(Badiou 2008, 69). And further, that ‘the concrete articulation of [the demands 
of thousands of foreigners in our countries] defines what is most important in 
politics today’ (Badiou 2008, 68–69). 
Giorgio Agamben 
Closer to the turn of the century, Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben argues 
a radical version of this thesis in his essay ‘Beyond Human Rights’, published 
in a short collection of essays titled Means Without End: Notes on Politics 
(1996/2000). It is important to note that while he frames his argument in terms 
of the refugee, which is a type of migrant, much of what he says is equally 
applicable to non-refugee migrants as well. Before expanding on this point it 
is worth quoting him at length:   
The refugee is perhaps the only thinkable figure for the people 
of our time and the only category in which one may see today 
– at least until the process of dissolution of the Nation-State 
and its sovereignty has achieved full completion – the forms 
and limits of a coming political community. It is even possible 
that, if we want to be equal to the absolutely new tasks ahead, 
we will have to abandon decidedly, without reserve, the funda-
mental concepts through which we have so far represented the 
subjects of the political (Man, the Citizen and its rights, but 
also the sovereign people, the worker, and so forth) and build 
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our political philosophy anew starting from the one and only 
figure of the refugee (Agamben 2000, 16).
Taking Arendt as the historical point of reference for this thesis, Agamben 
argues that what is new in our time is that unprecedented numbers of people 
are no longer representable inside the nation-state (Agamben 2000, 21–22). 
Industrialised countries today face ‘a permanently resident mass of 
noncitizens who do not want to be and cannot be either naturalized or 
repatriated. These noncitizens often have nationalities of origin, but, in as 
much as they prefer not to benefit from their own states’ protection, they find 
themselves, as refugees, in a condition of de facto statelessness’ (Agamben 
2000, 23). Insofar as the refugee, according to Agamben, is the figure who 
unhinges the universality promised by the nation-state-territory, ‘it deserves 
instead to be regarded as the central figure of our political history’ (Agamben 
2000, 21–22). 
This is an important philosophical continuation of the thesis of the centrality of 
the migrant in the following sense: If the novel issue of our time, according to 
Agamben, is truly the ‘permanently resident mass of noncitizens’ living inside 
industrial countries and threatening the unity and universality of the nation-
state-territory trinity, then it does not follow that the refugee alone is the 
central figure of our political history. Refugees alone are only about 7% of 
these global non-citizen masses. Among non-citizen masses 15.4 million are 
refugees and 214 million are international migrants (25–32 million of whom 
are undocumented). Agamben’s thesis is important, and thus should be 
expanded accordingly. Thus, this chapter follows Agamben in arguing that we 
must build our political philosophy anew, not only from the limited figure of the 
refugee, but the larger figure of the migrant. 
Étienne Balibar
At the turn of the century, French philosopher Étienne Balibar wrote two short 
articles succinctly articulating the centrality of the migrant (the non-status 
migrant, in particular) for political philosophy: ‘Le droit de cité ou l’apartheid?’ 
[The Right to the City or Apartheid], published in Sans-Papiers: l’archaïsme 
fatal [Undocumented: the Fatal Archaism] (1999) and a modified version of 
the last section of this text titled ‘What We Owe to the Sans-Papiers’, 
published in 2000. In these texts, Balibar names three central contributions of 
the sans-papiers: 1) They have rejected their ‘illegality’ by daring to make 
themselves seen and heard as real people ‘with their particularities and the 
universality of their condition as modern proletarians’. ‘As a result, we 
understand better what democracy is: an institution of collective debate, the 
conditions of which are never handed down from above’, but must be fought 
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for and demanded from below; 2) ‘They have also brought to light one of the 
principle mechanisms of the extension of institutional racism, which tends 
toward a sort of European apartheid by associating the legislation of 
“exceptions” with the diffusion of discriminatory ideologies’; and 3) ‘Finally, we 
owe them for having (among others – like those of the strike of December 
1995, recreated citizenship among us, in as much as it is not an institution or 
a statute but a collective practice’. Through their activism ‘they have given 
political activity the transnational dimension which we so greatly require in 
order to open up perspectives of social transformation and of civility in the era 
of globalization’ (Balibar 2000, 42–43).
The sans-papiers, ‘the excluded among the excluded’, reveal to us the 
universal condition of the modern proletariat, the racism inherent in national 
exclusion, and a new form of transnational political subjectivity unrestricted by 
national citizenship. But it is not their battle to fight alone. Balibar thus 
concludes these contributions with a final call to action, to ‘commit ourselves 
ever more numerously at their side, until right and justice are repaid them’ 
(Balibar 2000, 43). Aiming to make good on this claim, both Balibar and 
Badiou became members of the Collectif Malgré Tout [Despite it all 
Collective], an anti-capitalist political organisation dedicated to, among other 
causes, the struggle for the rights of migrants in France.
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
The final text I would like to flag in the history of this thesis is also from 2000 
and also places the figure of the migrant at the heart of political philosophy: 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s book Empire (2000). In an ‘Intermezzo’ 
entitled ‘Counter-Empire’, they introduce the figure of the migrant as the 
source of a coming communist revolution against capitalist empire. ‘A specter 
haunts the world’, they say, ‘and it is the specter of migration’ (Hardt and 
Negri 2000, 213). Unlike Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri quite clearly 
(and rightly) identify the concept of nomadism with migration. It is worth 
quoting them at length:
Whereas in the disciplinary era sabotage was the fundamental 
notion of resistance, in the era of imperial control it may be 
desertion. Whereas being-against in modernity often meant a 
direct and/or dialectical opposition of forces, in postmodernity 
being-against might well be most effective in an oblique or 
diagonal stance. Battles against the Empire might be won 
through subtraction and defection. This desertion does not 
have a place; it is the evacuation of the places of power (Hardt 
and Negri 2000, 212).
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Rather than arguing that the mobility of the worker follows the accumulation 
of capital, Hardt and Negri argue that it is capital that follows the workers 
desire for resistance and exodus. ‘Mobility and mass worker nomadism’, they 
say, ‘always express a refusal and a search for liberation: the resistance 
against the horrible conditions of exploitation and the search for freedom and 
new conditions of life’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 212). Thus, desertion and 
exodus are the new forces of anti-capitalist resistance in post-modernity 
(Hardt and Negri 2000, 213). Their desertion is out-of-place and thus is the 
condition for the creation of something new.
Hardt and Negri draw on the two ancestors of this thesis: Marx and 
Nietzsche. Following Nietzsche, Hardt and Negri equate this vast and mobile 
group of revolutionary migrants to ‘New Barbarians’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 
214). Quoting Nietzsche, they ask ‘where are the barbarians of the twentieth 
century? Obviously they will come into view and consolidate themselves only 
after tremendous socialist crises’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 213). But this 
‘barbarian’ force is not merely a force of destruction or exodus, it is also the 
capacity to create an alternative, as we read in The Gay Science. ‘The 
counter-Empire’, Hardt and Negri say, ‘must also be a new global vision, a 
new way of living in the world’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 214). A further 
expansion of this thesis, they say, would be ‘to write a general history of the 
modes of production from the standpoint of the workers’ desire for mobility’ 
(Hardt and Negri 2000, 212). That is, a philosophical history of the power of 
mobility from the standpoint of the proletarian migrant. This is precisely what 
this chapter offers: the next step in the political philosophy of migration and 
the defence of the political centrality of the migrant. 
Conclusion 
The history of the political theory of migration reveals the existence of a 
common figure defined by movement – what we can call the figure of the 
migrant. Now that we have a theoretical history of this common figure defined 
by political movement, we are prepared to move forward with the conse-
quences and political history of this figure for the twenty-first century. The 
above theories of the migrant are only the beginning. Today we need a whole 
new theory and history that inverts the political primacy of the citizen in favour 
of the figure of the migrant.
This means developing new theories of citizenship, sovereignty, borders, 
rights and nations – all from the perspective of the migrant. This means 
returning to political history and identifying all the old figures of the migrant 
and regimes of expulsion like the nomad, the barbarian, the vagabond and 
the proletariat that remain continuous with and inform the present. The 
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present is still defined by the history of these techniques. 
This is the century of the migrant because the return of all the old techniques 
of expulsion now make it clear for the first time that the migrant has always 
been a constitutive social figure. In other words, migrants are not marginal or 
exceptional figures, as they have so often been treated, but rather the 
essential lever by which all hitherto existing societies have sustained and 
expanded their social form. Territorial societies, states, juridical systems and 
economies all required the social expulsion of migrants in order to expand. 
The recent explosion in migrant mobility is only a provocation to finally see 
what has always been happening – and do something about it. 
Political theory in the twenty-first century is at an interesting crossroads 
where migration has reached such a critical threshold that what seemed to be 
an exception has now become the rule. The question now is how to 
understand the rules of this game in a much more adequate way.4
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The Cultural ‘Therapeutics’ of 
Sovereignty in the Context of 
Forced Migration
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Anti-asylum policies continue to be characteristic of contemporary European 
Union (EU) countries, as politicians attempt to placate public anxiety and 
hostility against perceptions of an asylum ‘influx’ (Chandler 2006, 71). This 
hostile treatment of asylum seekers and refugees has fallen short of the EU’s 
commitment to ‘universalising the political subject’ and duty of care to victims 
of political repression who are not their citizens (Chandler 2006). As the 
recent United Kingdom (UK) election and EU referendum have shown, anti-
asylum and immigration rhetoric tends to heighten as political elites seek to 
present a ‘fortress Britain’ immigration stance to win political campaigns. 
There is a presumption that electorates tend to be anti-immigration and anti-
asylum, and to win a mandate to govern, political elites make attempts to 
resonate with the anti-asylum sentiments of their citizens (Nolan 1998, 241). 
Consequently, successive UK governments have formulated restrictive and 
assimilationist policies like ‘citizenship classes and tests’, deportation and 
reduced welfare provision for certain immigrants, such as asylum seekers and 
refugees. The intention is to convey a message that the government has the 
capacity to control the asylum-migration ‘crisis’ (Rudolph 2005), and the 
‘influx’ does not pose a threat to an ‘imagined’ Britishness and state 
sovereignty (Dwyer 2010). In this sense, policy-making has evolved into a 
therapeutic process of state legitimisation by which political elites demon-
strate that they are in sync with the electorates’ beliefs about immigration 
(Nolan 1998, 20). 
Notwithstanding the hostile asylum policies and cultural assimilation, asylum 
seekers and refugees, as immigrants and aspiring UK citizens, continue to 
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retain and express multiple identities, and are not restricted to a singular 
‘imagined’ British national identity. This paper explores this internation-
alisation of cultures and identities through the experiences and views of 
asylum seekers and refugees in Edinburgh and Glasgow in Scotland, UK 
across a range of topics including naturalisation and statelessness, particip-
ation in ‘British’ citizenship classes, and transnational cultural practices. The 
chapter considers the futility of UK governments’ formulations of restrictive 
and assimilationist policies (on immigration and citizenship) to assert British 
cultural homogeneity and state sovereignty (Dwyer 2010). In addition, the 
paper draws from Nolan’s ‘therapeutic state’ to explore the tensions between 
the UK state’s mandatory citizenship classes and tests, and asylum-seeking 
migrants’ identity formations (Nolan 1998). 
The Cohort, Citizenship Classes and the ‘Therapeutic’ State
The research for this chapter is drawn from fieldwork among asylum seekers 
and refugees residing in Edinburgh and Glasgow in Scotland on the topic of 
media communication, asylum-seeking migration and citizenship. The 
evidence for the chapter is based on in-depth, semi-structured, individual 
face-to-face interviews with twenty-three asylum-seeking and refugee 
migrants. The sample is composed of twelve males and eleven females, aged 
between 26 and 65 years. Eight of the participants, four men and four women, 
self-describe themselves as Muslims. Each individual describes their 
experiences as asylum seekers/refugees in terms of fleeing persecution from 
countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle-East and South America. Each person 
had been dispersed as an asylum seeker to Edinburgh or Glasgow, where 
they became aware of the UK’s citizenship policy involving citizenship 
classes, tests and oath. The citizenship classes and tests were introduced 
into UK law in 2002, and have since been repeatedly amended. The 
citizenship classes and tests incorporate knowledge of life in the UK and 
language classes and tests. The designated main language is English, 
although immigrants can choose Scottish Gaelic or Welsh, which are national 
languages of UK territories of Scotland and Wales respectively. The content 
of citizenship consists of British history and accomplishments, politics, 
geography and civic life, although such content may reflect the realities of the 
UK homeland territories (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) where it is 
administered. The oath element occurs at a citizenship ceremony, usually 
taken upon successful completion of the language and citizenship tests. 
Oath-taking involves swearing or affirming a citizenship oath of allegiance to 
Her Majesty the Queen at a citizenship ceremony. The oath swearing is to 
God, while affirming the oath does not have any religious context. 
The sample of participants was generated by ‘snowballing’, ‘convenience’ and 
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non-random techniques. This means participants were selected for ease of 
access and ability to speak English. Additionally, participants were either 
known by the researcher or were asked to recommend others to participate in 
the study. This sampling method also entailed opportunistic recruitment of 
participants through accidental or off-chance encounters. Employing snow-
balling, non-random and convenience techniques enabled the recruitment of 
participants to be on-going throughout the research. However, I used different 
networks for accessing participants including attending public and private 
meetings, social functions and other activities organised for asylum seekers 
and refugees by gatekeeper agencies, including Refugee Community Organ-
isations (RCOs). Four participants were known by the researcher prior to 
interviewing through common participation in IKAZE, a theatre group run by 
asylum seekers and refugees in Edinburgh. One participant was known in 
advance of the interview through common membership of the then Exiled 
Journalists’ Network (EJN), a UK wide organisation for exiled journalists. 
All 23 participants were informed of the researcher’s refugee status prior to 
being interviewed. In order to control potential researcher bias in collecting 
and analysing the interview data, measures employed included ‘respondent 
validation’ and note-taking of contextual information to cross-check the 
accuracy of views and to inform the analysis (Creswell 1998; Beresford and 
Evans 1999; Arthur and Nazroo 2003; Small and Uttal 2005; Kezar 2005). 
Note-taking involves recording background information, emotional accounts 
and practices that are relevant in understanding the issue being investigated. 
For example, I sometimes gleaned information from ‘back-stage’ chats, 
including whilst travelling with participants on the bus to and from an interview 
session. Through ‘respondent validation’, I got feedback on the accuracy of 
participants’ views, and asked them to provide their own definitions of 
concepts or words to mitigate misunderstanding. Note-taking of contextual 
information was, therefore, useful to inform the analysis, and mitigated 
against bias. 
Participants were guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity to facilitate part-
icipation (Powles 2004). Verbal consent was sought to use recordings and 
take notes, and to let me know of any issue they would not like to be recorded 
(Powles 2004). Seeking consent was not only done before interviews, but 
was also reiterative (Mackenzie et al. 2007, 308).
‘Cultural Therapy’ as Locus for Sovereignty
Nolan’s (1998) book The Therapeutic State is a US case study that provides 
interesting insights on government (and allied institutions) attempts to 
connect with society at the individual level. He argues that policy-making has 
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a therapeutic basis in which political elites seek legitimacy from their 
electorates and citizens. In order to respond to citizens’ concerns, political 
elites resort to formulating policies that acquire symbolic significance but yield 
less or no material impact on the issue of concern (La Fond 1992). The 
ensuing ‘therapeutic culture’ becomes an institutionalised practice of 
formulating laws aimed at averting or stopping a perceived problem whilst 
communicating to the public that political elites are responsive to the 
concerns of citizens. By so doing, ‘therapeutic culture’ is a symbol of political 
power with ambiguous outcomes; whilst individuals embrace the therapeutic 
culture, it could also be incapable of solving the perceived problem (Jones 
2009; Nolan 1998). 
However, Nolan’s analysis of cultural therapy as a political tool for social 
control of citizens by political elites is silent on its relevance for non-citizens 
like asylum-seeking migrants residing in liberal democracies. Yet, the concept 
of ‘therapeutic culture’ has explanatory value for understanding governments’ 
assimilationist citizenship policies in countries like the UK. This is because 
policies like citizenship classes are a manifestation of the visible assertion of 
state authority on non-citizens in two respects: the imposition of a 
‘pathological identity’ and controlling access to citizenship, and moral panics 
on asylum. Cohen (1987) observed that a ‘moral panic’ can occur when ‘a 
condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined 
as a threat to societal values or interests’ (Cohen 1987, 9). The moral panic 
generates a state of impending crisis emanating from uncontrollable asylum-
seeking migration, resulting in portraying asylum seekers as ‘folk devils’ or as 
‘bad citizens’, and an embodiment of ‘evil’ (Rothe and Muzzati 2004; Ejarvec 
2003; Hall 1997; Cohen 2002). The ‘folk devils’, in this case asylum seekers 
and refugees, are perceived as bereft of responsible social actions, and 
blamed for the breakdown of social cohesion, and a threat to an ‘imagined’ 
Britishness and the national citizenship order (Gifford 2004,148; Bruter 2004; 
ICAR 2004; Ejarvec 2003; Speers 2001; Bloch 2000; Anderson 1991). The 
‘pathological identity’ ascribed to asylum seekers and refugees is further 
reinforced by the citizenship classes policy in prescribing ‘cultural compet-
ence’ in and ‘normative commitment’ to an ‘imagined’ Britishness, as a 
prerequisite for admission into national citizenship (see Nolan 1998). By so 
doing, the policy pathologises non-citizen immigrants as afflicted with a 
‘disease’: that of not being British enough (Veit-Brause 1995). 
In the context of Nolan’s ‘cultural therapeutics’, the citizenship classes 
become the ‘technocratic’ treatment of this disease. This is because they are 
used to ground into the psyche of immigrants, the language, histories, values, 
traditions and achievements of the British nation-state (Camilleri 1995, 220; 
Crick 2000). As the current Prime Minister, Teresa May argued when she was 
the coalition government’s Home Secretary, content of citizenship that 
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prioritises the learning of British history and traditions would instil ‘British 
patriotism’ among immigrants (Jones 2011). Through this, the state aims to 
control the behaviour, and social and cultural values of minority populations in 
line with those prescribed by policymakers. Citizenship classes, therefore, 
constitute what Tyler referred to as a ‘biopolitics’, meaning a set of legal, 
moral and social strategies to control and shape the behaviour of individuals 
(2010, 62). More importantly, the prescribed behaviour and values are 
predominantly those of the mainstream or the majority white population 
(Byrne 2007; Gillespie 2007; Fortier 2010; Lentin and Titley 2011; Khan 
2012). 
At the same time, in legislating the citizenship classes and tests, political 
elites signify that they are responsive to citizens’ concerns and the moral 
panic over the perceived perils of uncontrollable asylum-seeking migration. In 
this regard, citizenship classes, as a cultural therapeutic intervention, are 
intended to manage public unease about a perceived asylum seeker ‘influx’ 
posing a threat to an ‘imagined’ Britishness. Yet, as the UK referendum on 
leaving the EU reminded us, we know that migration into the UK continues 
unabated because under its international humanitarian obligation, the UK 
cannot gratuitously refuse to grant asylum. To do so would evoke a political 
backlash, as occurred with US President Donald Trump’s ban on refugees 
and Muslims. In this sense, policymaking has involved a therapeutic process 
of state legitimisation by which political elites socially control non-citizens and 
show that they are accordant with citizens’ beliefs about immigration (Nolan 
1998, 20). 
From the interviews, it is clear the participants’ opinions of this policy are 
nuanced. On the one hand, participants perceived this policy as a practical 
opportunity to learn more about citizenship rights and responsibilities in a 
British context. Thus, the classes were viewed as protocols of life necessary 
for the migrants to manage everyday life in a new environment, for example 
by improving their communication skills and social interactions among both 
the linguistically diverse asylum-seeking migrant population and indigenous 
British citizens. The participants also perceived the classes in therapeutic 
terms similar to official policy: as a tool that would facilitate immigrants’ social 
engagement, inclusion and integration (Home Office 2001). 
On the other hand, participants felt coerced into accepting that, as non-British 
citizens, they lacked the language, values and histories of ‘Britishness’: 
It [learning about citizenship and English] doesn’t have to be a forced matter. 
They are putting pressure on people, if I may say so (110, Zimbabwean, 
Glasgow).
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Since I have been in Zimbabwe, born and bred there, and colonised by the 
British, I speak fluent English. I didn’t have to go to school to study their 
English’ (110, Zimbabwean, Glasgow). 
The participants raised serious questions relating to using citizenship classes 
to exert sovereignty. Although the policy excludes immigrants from selected 
English-speaking territories, participants, like 110, from former British colonial 
territories where English is the official language of schooling, perceived the 
policy as discriminatory against the ‘ex-colonial other’. Many participants 
attributed the perceived discrimination of the policy to a deliberate attempt by 
the state at differentiating newcomer non-UK citizens from UK citizens:
I have got friends, who are Scottish, Isabel that was here. She says: ‘Some 
questions in that book [citizenship study material] you know them better than 
me’. They [policymakers] say to be a British citizen you have to know the 
geographical area of the UK, but the Scottish, they know nothing. We know 
more than they [Scottish friends] do. So [knowing about] the geographical 
area of the UK should apply to every citizen living in UK soil not just asylum 
seekers and refugees (121, Angolan, Glasgow).
This person’s recounting of the views of a UK citizen, particularly a Scot, 
highlights the policy’s discriminatory potential in mandating ethnic minority 
immigrants learning about British culture, history and geography whilst native-
born UK residents are exempt. Others, like 102, felt the policy typifies 
asymmetrical power relations in the West in dealing with non-Western states 
and their citizens: 
Europe also had their troubles [wars]…millions were displaced and went all 
over the place: in Latin America, in Africa. And the governments there gave 
them land, gave them opportunities...to succeed…and the good thing about 
that was nobody was asked even for a passport, and they were just very 
welcomed in these places (102, Chilean, Edinburgh).
The post-colonial critique of the policy was based on the belief that UK 
citizens were not subjected to similar policies of cultural assimilation and 
sovereignty when they migrated to former colonial countries. Participants, 
therefore, perceived the compulsory element of the policy as an expression of 
coercive state authority:
You don’t need to force people to become citizens, you know. It has to be 
natural; it has to be a natural process. I think, to some degree, it is coercive 
and it shouldn’t be like that. Citizenship is a natural process…(112, 
Cameroonian, Glasgow).
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Citizenship classes and tests were also viewed as part of a government 
hidden-agenda to control access to national citizenship:
I think behind it, there is a concern in the way it [classes and tests] is being 
applied. It could be used as a way to refuse people full integration. What 
about people who can’t read and write? How are you going to integrate them 
into the citizenship programme? So, I think there are some anomalies with 
regards to the issue (112, Cameroonian, Glasgow).
Thus, one participant described the policy as a ‘symbolic gesture’ to 
communicate to UK citizens that something was being done to contain the 
threat posed by asylum-seeking migration to British values (111, 
Cameroonian, Edinburgh). In this case, as others have argued, immigration 
and citizenship policies are predicated on the assumption that native-born 
citizens will only tolerate and support immigration if they believe in their 
government’s determination to control migration (Kofman 2005, 459; Rudolph 
2005). 
Participants’ assessments could also be unpacked in Nolan’s therapeutic 
terms. Firstly, the policy functioned in part as an antidote for public hostility 
and moral panics on asylum, and as a therapeutic form of state legitimation to 
socially control non-citizens (Nolan 1998, 293). In this case, immigrants felt 
that they were expected to prove that they have the knowledge, and values of 
an ‘imagined’ Britishness beyond that required of British citizens (McGhee 
2009). Given that some Scots, as UK citizens, see themselves as ethnically 
and nationally different from other nationalities within the UK, such as 
English, Welsh or even British (Lord Goldsmith 2008), 121’s experience 
suggests that citizenship classes construct ethnic minorities as the source of 
social problems afflicting communities. Secondly, immigrants often ascribe to 
a utilitarian pragmatic logic with respect to citizenship classes and tests that 
is different from the state’s therapeutic logic. Although participants compre-
hended the classes and tests as a cultural therapeutic intervention by the 
state, they nonetheless pragmatically subscribed to them to the extent that 
the classes were useful to their British citizenship formation, particularly in 
enabling their social inclusion and ending their ‘refugee-hood’ and 
statelessness. This area, and its relevance to challenging sovereignty, is 
discussed below. 
Statelessness, Naturalisation and Sovereignty
All 23 participants described themselves as victims of social and political 
injustices in their homelands. Many were from so-called ‘failed states’ where 
their government was either unwilling or unable to protect them, or was itself 
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responsible for oppressing them (Tickner 1995; Chandler 2006). Seeking 
asylum shows that challenges to state sovereignty include citizens’ ‘exit’ to 
escape state repression (Moses 2005). At the same time, ‘exit’ constitutes 
making claims to human rights and international solidarity, and loyalties to 
political membership are not restricted to territorial borders (Joppke 1997). 
Asylum seekers’ actions constitute an ‘exit’ from the oppressive sovereignty of 
their homelands (Hirschman 1970) and a challenge to the UK to exercise its 
sovereignty to uphold its responsibilities to protect international humanitarian 
norms (Joppke 1997). Although asylum is not a legal obligation under The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and is therefore not 
prioritised over state sovereignty, participants perceived the UK as morally 
obligated to grant them asylum (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Chandler 2006, 
55):
In fact, these countries, so-called developed countries, promote the problem. 
Like the British are responsible for the arms trading and promoting wars, like 
the Americans do. So they see this human disaster and they don’t want to 
take responsibility for it (102, Chilean, Edinburgh). 
All of the participants also partly blamed a protracted and often unsuccessful 
asylum process for their statelessness. Their general perception was that 
having rights to naturalisation would end their statelessness and attendant 
threat of deportation. More broadly, participants attributed their statelessness 
to their exclusion from rights of residency and naturalisation in the UK and 
threats of deportation: 
At the moment, I just see myself as okay. Legally on paper, I am a 
Zimbabwean citizen. But personally I just see myself as a person in a 
dilemma. I don’t know where to go. I can’t go to the right. I can’t go to the left 
(107, Zimbabwean, Glasgow). 
If [the UK government] talked about bad things, deportation, I am not feeling 
good. Last year I remember in my work they take, early morning, they take 
about four or five ... a Kurdish family... they deport them.... (119, Eritrean, 
Glasgow) 
You have to think about your home first, where you are coming from is not 
good for me, you understand me? So I just have to bear it (108, Nigerian, 
Glasgow). 
These comments suggest the emotional consequences of exclusion from the 
rights of residency or statelessness. Consequently, asylum seekers choose to 
continue holding on to their homeland national citizenship. This embodies the 
problematic choice confronting many asylum seekers: to either continue being 
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stateless, while anxiously awaiting the outcome of their asylum claim, or be 
deported to their homelands to face further persecution. All of the participants 
chose the former, as the lesser of two evils. Consequently, some chose to 
evade deportation either by legal challenge or by ‘going underground’, ‘under 
the radar’ or being ‘illegal’, which are metaphors for resisting the sovereign 
state’s authority to exclude them from membership in the polity. 
Some spoke of their homelands’ policies that proscribed them from attaining 
dual citizenship. Four participants said they would forfeit their homeland’s 
citizenship if they were to acquire any other citizenship including that of the 
UK. Three of these individuals were from Somalia and one from Sierra Leone 
(with the latter repealing its law prohibiting dual citizenship in 2007). In this 
case, the acceptance of dual citizenship policies by nation-states like the UK 
is an act of recognition of transnational citizenship rights, with attendant dual 
citizenship responsibilities for émigré nationals (Sales 2007, 234). As such, 
immigrants in these host and origin countries are allowed multiple national 
identities, while also submitting to multiple state sovereignties. 
This has both internationalist and multicultural components. Morally, it is 
consistent with international human rights norms of free movement and an 
individual’s freedom of choice with respect to country of residence. Culturally, 
it is an acknowledgement by host states like the UK that immigrants, as 
citizens of their homelands, continue to maintain emotional attachments and 
cultural ties to their countries of origin. In this sense, acceptance of an 
immigrant’s dual citizenship is a practical government response to the ethnic 
and cultural diversity within contemporary Western states. Yet, this is at odds 
with the state’s promulgation of assimilationist citizenship classes to assert 
sovereignty over an ‘imagined’ British cultural identity.  
The next section further considers how the participants’ opposition to the 
assimilationist citizenship policy was expressed through cultural and 
technological practices. It is another reminder that forced migrants do not 
succumb to the way they have been pathologised by the cultural therapeutics 
of officials. 
Cultural Production and Sovereignty
The participants’ opposition to the UK state’s attempt to assert cultural 
homogeneity and ‘Brito-centric’ national identity through citizenship classes 
was more directly channelled through organising social, cultural and artistic 
events. Seven of the eight women participants were also involved in 
organising and delivering art and cultural activities facilitated by refugee 
advocacy networks such as Oxfam-Scotland and the British Red Cross. The 
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activities were often targeted to grass-roots local residents and schools: 
While we respect the [British] culture, the law of the land, we equally keep our 
own culture, and that in itself will make our children understand where we 
came from (112, Cameroonian, Glasgow). 
These events served two identity functions that are relevant to appraising 
cultural sovereignty. First, the events represented the participants’ accept-
ance of British cultural diversity; and second, the events were used to 
educate UK citizens about their plight and cultures (Khan 2008, 13). The 
events therefore embodied immigrants’ expression of cultural attachment and 
identity with their homelands. In this regard, transnational identity expressions 
(Morrel 2008) constitute a challenge to the authority of the state to prescribe 
or impose its cultural and national identity preferences. 
Further, the participants used the internet for a similar purpose, specifically as 
a technological instrument for political mobilisation, and engagement with 
other asylum seekers and their interlocutors including UK citizens. For 
instance, one participant stated that: 
The computer has given me the opportunity to write and express myself and 
communicate with others in South America and the world over (102, Chilean, 
Edinburgh). 
In this case, fifteen of the participants were either members of, or involved in 
running, internet-based networks, while three owned websites that were 
devoted to political, social and cultural participation in the UK and beyond. 
One participant belonged to the Exiled Journalists’ Network (EJN). The 
organisation was founded by asylum-seeking migrant journalists residing in 
the UK to respond to their exclusion from the mainstream UK media, and 
provide a ‘voice’ to counter the negative coverage of asylum seekers in the 
UK media. EJN also contests the repression of free speech and other human 
rights abuses perpetrated by states against their citizens around the world. 
Another participant participated in FABULA (Forum of Arts for Better 
Understanding of Latin American Culture), which contests misrepresentations 
of Latin-American cultures in UK media and cultural spaces. 
Additionally, both EJN and FABULA aim to mobilise support among UK 
citizens to influence the UK government to act in support of their claims-
making for cultural, political and social rights within and beyond the UK. This 
shows that the asylum-seeking migrants prefer to view the UK state in 
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humanitarian terms, as a community of solidarity for persecuted individuals 
and a facilitator of rights and responsibilities at the international level (Joppke 
1997; Murphy and Harty 2003, 187). It shows, too, that a number of the 
participants recognised that public support for non-citizen asylum seekers 
was crucial in influencing policy-makers to be more asylum-friendly. As such, 
these websites function as self-organising technological instruments and 
virtual spaces for political and cultural mobilisation, contestation and 
participation at cross-border levels. In this sense, they are spaces by which 
the participants make claims for recognition of asylum-seeking migrants’ 
human and cultural rights and identities within and beyond the territorial 
borders of the UK. 
Conclusion
This UK case study shows that asylum-seeking immigrants and their cross-
border activities challenge the ability of the state to restrict territorial access 
and impose an ‘imagined’ identity (Veit-Brause 1995, 69). UK citizenship 
classes and tests assume a social contract in which non-citizen immigrants 
accept certain obligations of ‘British’ core values of the state. Yet, mandates 
on cultural assimilation are at odds with immigrants’ expressions of an 
internationalisation of cultures which pushes their political and cultural 
identities beyond the nation-state (Kofman 2005, 464). The unintended 
effects of multiple identities and transnational political and cultural activities 
contradict the goal of the policy, which is aimed at asserting its authority to 
control immigrants’ orientation to an ‘imagined’ Britishness. 
It has also been discussed that immigrants seeking asylum challenge the UK 
state to honour its international humanitarian obligations to grant asylum, and 
question the potential excesses of its policies regulating inward asylum 
migration and deportation. Recent anti-immigrant legislation in the UK and 
other Western states highlights the exclusionary power of sovereignty. At the 
same time, by accepting the right of immigrants to have dual citizenship, the 
state compromises its sovereign authority to assert a Brito-centric national 
and cultural identity. The assumption by the sovereign states in the West that 
members of the polity should share a common national and cultural identity, 
and an ‘ethnic’ conception of formal membership, is therefore precarious. It is 
also precarious for the state to assume that all members of the state should 
have allegiance to a dominant cultural identity. As evidenced in this paper, the 
multiple identities and citizenship formations by and among immigrants are at 
odds with assimilationist policies. Immigrants could make claims to and 
contest official identities that are prescribed to accompany membership of the 
political community. These actions confront the territorial construction of 
citizenship and raise serious questions about the efficacy of using restrictive 
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and assimilationist policies to include or exclude asylum seekers. 
Yet, the way this cultural therapeutics is experienced by asylum seekers and 
refugees is nuanced. In one sense it is futile because asylum seekers and 
refugees, as aspiring UK citizens, would acquire knowledge of the language, 
and British cultural values and histories for pragmatic reasons of their own 
volition. On the other hand, as others reminded us, participants claimed that 
they are supportive of some aspects of this form of ‘cultural therapeutics’ 
insofar as it gives them knowledge of the cultural, social and linguistic 
resources to enable their social inclusion in the polity (La Fond 1992, Nolan 
1998). Additionally, immigrants are opposed to the state’s therapeutic concep-
tualisation of Britishness that is skewed towards the majority white population, 
and where exclusion on ethnic and religious basis is the locus for British 
citizenship and the rights enjoyed by British citizens. Immigrants construct 
Britishness as culturally and ethnically diverse, to which they aspire to 
orientate. State therapeutic apparatuses such as assimilationist citizenship 
classes are, therefore, based on a false premise that immigrants are 
incapable of acquiring the behaviours, language and cultural values of the 
host country (see Jones 2009).
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3
Migration and Human Rights 
– Exposing the Universality of 
Human Rights as a False 
Premise
EMMA LARKING
In the twenty-first century, the ability to migrate to some country other than 
one’s own, and to enjoy in that country legal status akin to that of a citizen, is 
a global marker of privilege. Such freedom is accorded only to a small class 
of people. For Bauman (1998, 9), international mobility is now the world’s 
‘most powerful and most coveted stratifying factor’ (as cited in Castles 2005, 
217). 
In Castles’s account (2005), there exist hierarchies of citizenship based on 
how much international freedom of movement a country’s passport provides 
and the degree to which the rights of its citizens are recognised at home and 
abroad. On this basis he identifies five tiers of citizenship, with citizens of the 
US occupying the first tier; citizens of other highly developed countries the 
second; citizens of transitional and newly industrialising countries the third; 
and citizens of less developed countries the fourth tier. In the fifth tier, Castles 
includes members of failed states, stateless people and a group he refers to 
as ‘non-citizens’, whose residence status where they live is irregular or 
unlawful. While we might quibble with the details – for example, placing 
citizens of the US in the top tier ignores the inability of the country’s poorer 
citizens to access rights in their own country and material constraints on their 
ability to migrate – this taxonomy makes it clear that the universal enjoyment 
of human rights is heavily circumscribed. It suggests rights realisation 
correlates strongly with privileged categories of citizenship. 
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Remarking that rights realisation is linked to citizenship of just a few states 
draws into question what the instruments of international human rights law 
describe as ‘beyond question’ – the universality of human rights (Vienna 
Declaration, para. 1). While accepting the reality of widespread rights 
violations, supporters of the international human rights system argue it is 
designed to ensure that one day all human beings will enjoy all human rights. 
In the words of a former UN Special Rapporteur on Non-Citizens, ‘[t]he 
architecture of international human rights law is built on the premise that all 
persons, by virtue of their essential humanity, should enjoy all human rights’ 
(Weissbrodt [2003] in Larking 2016, 201). In fact, however, the architecture of 
international human rights law is built on the premise of sovereignty, which 
accords states freedom from external interference and equal standing and 
authority within a global society of states (Larking 2014, 144).1 As such, the 
international human rights regime assumes that individuals enjoy human 
rights – if they do so at all – primarily by virtue of their membership of some 
rights-recognising state. This suggests there are structural impediments to 
universalising human rights that are downplayed by many international law 
scholars and human rights practitioners.
By comparison, international relations scholars tend to emphasise the 
centrality of sovereignty as a structuring principle of international law.2 Some 
also take the claimed universality of human rights seriously and suggest its 
theoretical import is to fundamentally qualify sovereignty. In the late 1970s, 
Hedley Bull (1977, 146) suggested that ‘[c]arried to its logical extreme, the 
doctrine of human rights and duties under international law is subversive of 
the whole principle that mankind should be organised as a society of states’ 
(as cited in Noll 2000, 82–3). In a similar vein, in the 1990s many cosmop-
olitan political theorists described the world as moving towards an era in 
which the universal realisation of rights might become possible in the form of 
‘post-national’ or ‘de-territorialised’ rights (see Stasiulis 1997, 198 citing 
Jacobsen 1996; Sassen 1996; Soysal 1994). Although not presaging the 
demise of the sovereign state, they took the European Union as an exemplar 
and suggested that citizenship was no longer a privileged category or 
precondition for rights recognition. They pointed to ‘new forms of post-
1  I have previously developed versions of this argument in Larking 2004; 2014, ch. 8; 
and 2016. See also Larking 2012, 72–3.
2  While noting Falk’s assessment that the concept of sovereignty is – as Mayall 
couches it – ‘in such deep trouble that its use should be left to politicians but discarded 
in serious academic analysis’, Mayall points out that ‘[t]he formal order of international 
society continues to be provided, in the main, by the collectivity of sovereign states’ 
(1999, 474). Characterisations of sovereignty as the foundational structuring principle of 
international law is consistent with widespread scepticism about the degree to which it 
reliably constrains state behaviour – see Jack Goldsmith’s account of this prevailing 
scepticism (2000, 959–61).
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national membership and rights, protected by international human rights 
provisions…and increasingly accepted and indeed organised by nation states’ 
(Stasiulis 1997).
Yet in a world in which strident nationalism is resurgent, political parties that 
vilify migrants are gaining ground,3 and states that once viewed themselves 
as ‘settler societies’ no longer see the incorporation of migrants as 
fundamental to nation building (see Dauvergne 2016), it is becoming clearer 
that individuals without access to a privileged category of citizenship are 
individuals without human rights. 
After detailing how international law ties human rights to membership in 
rights-recognising states, I discuss the normative heft of sovereignty, locating 
it in the principle of political self-determination. I argue that recognising a 
qualified right to international freedom of movement and placing corres-
ponding limits on how states police their borders would do more for political 
self-determination than continued deference to the principle of sovereignty in 
the instruments of human rights and in international frameworks governing 
migration. Re-casting human rights along these lines may be achieved by the 
advocacy of citizens within rights-recognising states, combined with 
international pressure from coalitions of states whose residents are most 
disadvantaged by the current global institutional order. In order to promote 
mobilisations in this direction, clarity is necessary about the role currently 
played by human rights instruments in upholding an outdated conception of 
sovereignty.
How International Human Rights Recognise and Uphold the Principle of 
Sovereignty
The international human rights regime is based on multilateral declarations 
and treaties between states that have bound themselves to recognise the 
rights contained therein. There is nothing unusual about states as sovereign 
entities entering into multilateral arrangements that constrain their future 
behaviour. In the case of human rights instruments, however, sovereignty is 
preserved as a structuring principle, with only minimal constraints imposed 
and the freedom of states in relation to border controls protected. The 
regime’s foundational instruments specify that rights should be exercised in a 
3  The election of Donald Trump in the United States and Britain’s decision to leave 
the EU are two of the more notable examples reflecting a resurgence in xenophobic 
nationalism. Regarding the growing popularity of anti-immigrant parties in Europe, see 
Chakelian 2017 and Adler 2016. While Adler accepts there has been a rise of 
nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe, she denies this is evidence of a 
recent lurch to the far-right.
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manner consistent with the UN’s ‘purposes and principles’ (Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 29(3)) which include the sovereign equality 
of all Member States (Charter of the UN, Art. 2(1)). With the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) constitute an international bill of rights, 
specifying all the key human rights. Although primarily dedicated to individual 
rights, article 1 of both Covenants affirms that ‘all peoples have the right to 
self-determination’, allowing them to ‘freely determine their political status’, 
‘freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’, and ‘freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources’. I discuss the relationship 
between peoples, self-determination, and sovereignty in the next section.
As well as upholding sovereignty and self-determination, the international bill 
of rights imposes obligations on states to protect without discrimination the 
rights of all individuals subject to their jurisdiction or on their territory (ICCPR, 
Art. 2(1)). Discrimination on the basis of national or social origin is illegitimate 
(ICCPR, Art. 2(1) and ICESCR, Art. 2(2)).4 This would seem to imply that 
people living in a state that fails to protect their rights are free to migrate to 
another rights-recognising state, but in fact no human rights instrument 
accords a right to international freedom of movement. States are entitled to 
control their borders (Noll 2000, 13) and the sovereign right of states to refuse 
territorial access or deny naturalisation to non-citizen residents is not 
questioned by international human rights bodies (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, 
168). States determine the conditions for lawful residence and treat 
individuals who do not comply with these conditions as unlawfully present. 
Despite explicitly opposing discrimination, if a person is unlawfully present, 
international human rights instruments allow that their rights can be qualified. 
Most significantly, they can be detained and deported. This means they are 
unlikely to make themselves known to authorities in order to claim other rights 
to which they may theoretically be entitled, or to protest rights violations 
(Larking 2014, 132). 
The sovereign control that states exercise over matters related to 
membership has been treated by the European Court of Human Rights as 
qualifying the rights even of native born or long-standing non-citizen 
residents. This is telling because the Court is widely celebrated as uncoupling 
human rights recognition from national status and curtailing the sovereign 
4  With these qualifications: developing countries may determine to what extent they 
guarantee economic rights to non-nationals (ICESCR, Art. 2(3)), and non-citizens do 
not have rights of political participation (ICCPR, Art. 25). Note as well that the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination does 
‘not apply to distinctions, exclusion, restrictions or preferences…between citizens and 
non-citizens’ (Art.1(2)).
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autonomy of EU Member States. Yet in a number of cases, the Court has 
found that the deportation of non-citizen residents who have committed 
crimes does not breach their human rights. In hundreds of other cases it has 
refused even to consider the question, ruling challenges to deportation orders 
inadmissible (see Dembour 2003).5
The right to seek asylum in article 14(1) of the UDHR has not prevented 
states from constructing elaborate border control regimes to prevent asylum 
seekers accessing their territory. These regimes have been treated as ‘within 
the letter, if not the spirit’ of international law (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 
2007, 360) and the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(‘Refugees Convention’) itself recognises that an asylum seeker’s presence in 
a Convention state may be unlawful (Art. 31(2)). While parties to the 
Refugees Convention should consider protection claims of asylum seekers 
who arrive on their territory, and afford protection to those who have a well-
founded fear of persecution in their home state,6 in practice this protection is 
afforded to a tiny percentage of refugees globally.7 It offers little comfort, 
moreover, to those people impelled to migrate because of poverty or 
starvation, war or civil conflict, or environmental disaster. In the remainder of 
this chapter, I use the expression ‘forced migrants’ to refer to both Convention 
refugees and people who migrate for any of the reasons just listed.8
The Normative Defence of Sovereignty
Given it is states that are parties to international human rights treaties, it is 
not surprising that these treaties should preserve state sovereignty. But that 
they do so is not regarded merely as marking the limits of the possible in 
international relations. Rather, it is defended on the basis that sovereignty is a 
5  See Guiraudon and Lahav (2000, 169) for an account of the few cases in which the 
Court ruled against the legality of deportation on the basis deportation would breach the 
right to family life or to protection against inhuman or degrading treatment.
6  To qualify for protection under the Refugees Convention as amended by its 1967 
Protocol, the reasons for persecution must relate to a person’s race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (Art. 1). 
7  Border controls prevent most refugees from leaving the region in which their home 
state is located and thus from accessing protection under the Convention. Official 
resettlement programs for refugees are also very limited. In 2015, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees estimated there were 21.3 million refugees and another 44 
million forcibly displaced people worldwide. In the same year, 107,100 refugees were 
resettled (UNHCR 2015). 
8  As indicated above (fn 6), the Refugees Convention defines the term ‘refugee’ 
restrictively, requiring a person to be outside his or her country of nationality and unable 
to return to it ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion [etc.]’ (Art. 1(2)).
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good in itself, and desirable from the perspective of human rights on the basis 
that it supports political self-determination. As we saw earlier, this concept is 
equated in the international bill of rights with the freedom of peoples to 
‘determine their political status’, ‘pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development’ (ICCPR and ICESCR, Art. 1(1)), and ‘dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources’ (ICCPR and ICESCR, Art. 1(2)). The claim that 
sovereignty supports political self-determination is true only in a very limited 
sense. The boundaries of all current states are based on histories of violence 
and dispossession, and most are host to a number of different national, 
cultural and ethnic groups – some of which view themselves as politically 
autonomous or as deserving of political autonomy. 
In international law, however, the self-determination principle has been 
treated primarily as applying to existing states and to the overseas colonies of 
the European imperial powers (Mayall 1999, 481). Appeals to self-
determination have not proved effective as a more general route to sovereign 
autonomy – international recognition of sovereignty tends to follow in the 
aftermath of successful secessionist struggles rather than to support them. 
And while the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples includes a 
right to self-determination, this is heavily qualified. Rather than being 
correlated with the exercise of sovereign powers, the Declaration specifies 
that the rights it contains cannot be used to undermine the ‘territorial integrity 
or political unity’ of the state in which indigenous peoples reside (Art. 46; see 
also Larking 2014, 145). 
Despite the fact that the principle of sovereignty provides only heavily qualif-
ied support for political self-determination, it retains powerful normative 
appeal as a mechanism to ensure some degree of respect for political 
autonomy, self-government, and the collective right of members of states to 
freedom from overbearing control by imperial or alien powers. Consistently 
with this, sovereignty should act as a barrier to global tyranny, preventing the 
concentration of power in any one state or group of states.  
Recognising a Qualified Human Right to International Freedom of 
Movement
We have seen that an aspect of sovereignty is a state’s right to control the 
composition of its population and those who cross its borders. I want to 
suggest here that how this right is currently exercised does not advance the 
principle of political self-determination that provides normative justification for 
sovereignty. It is, moreover, fundamentally at odds with the aspirational 
claims of human rights, including the suggestion that ‘recognition of the 
inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
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human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’ 
(UDHR, preamble).
As things currently stand, the burden of hosting and caring for forced 
migrants is very unevenly shared. The vast majority are contained in their 
own countries or regions. The capacity of these countries and regions to 
‘freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ and ‘freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources’ (ICCPR and ICESCR, Art. 1) – 
and thus to be politically self-determining – is limited by the fact that they 
shoulder most of the costs of accommodating the world’s forced migrants.9 
This inequity is both produced and compounded by other forms of inequality 
within global institutions and regimes. Wealthy and powerful states strongly 
influence how international trade, finance and other governance regimes 
function, with the result that they benefit disproportionately from these 
regimes.10 Ensuring that these states support a larger share of the financial 
and social burden of resettling or otherwise assisting forced migrants would 
provide an incentive to make the international rules of engagement fairer. 
This would reduce the number of people forced to migrate in the first place. It 
would also promote the causes of political self-determination and genuinely 
universal human rights.
One major barrier to achieving more equitable burden-sharing in relation to 
forced migration – and thus to incentivising the creation of fairer global trade 
and finance regimes – is the perception within wealthy, rights-recognising 
states that according even a qualified right to international freedom of 
movement will undermine social conditions for current citizens. Very large, 
unregulated influxes of people entering a country in a short space of time do 
place pressure on social infrastructure, but research suggests that the long-
term economic benefits of immigration either outweigh the costs or are cost 
neutral, and moreover, that immigration may be necessary to fuel the 
economies of post-industrial states with ageing populations.11 Globally and 
within many countries, wealth and income inequalities have reached 
historically unprecedented levels (see Alston 2015, paras 8–9, 10, 35 and 
37). These inequalities impede economic growth and pose greater dangers 
for social cohesion than the challenges posed by even large-scale migration. 
Members of wealthy, rights-recognising states must confront what are 
genuine threats to their lifestyle, rights and culture. These threats do not stem 
directly from forced migration, but from global inequalities combined with the 
9  See Hansen 2017, 12–3. The discussion primarily concerns refugees but also 
refers more generally to displaced populations.
10  See Joseph 2007; George 2004, 53ff. and 57ff.; and Pahuja 2014. 
11  See OECD 2014 and Koser 2007, ch.7, ‘The economic impact of immigration’.
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corrosive effects on the rule of law within states from designating forced 
migrants as unlawfully present and denying them equal recognition and 
protection under the law. The proposition endorsed by the US Supreme Court 
that ‘Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if 
applied to citizens’12 is at odds with the idea that even democratically elected 
parliaments are bound by rule of law principles. It contradicts the 
‘revolutionary principle of equality’ that Hannah Arendt argues must support 
and legitimate government in all rights-recognising states.13 Governance in 
accordance with the rule of law requires that laws are capable of impartial 
application and do not single out particular groups, including non-citizens, for 
punitive measures. Building border fences, denying entry, and creating zones 
of exclusion does not dissolve this problem because border regimes must be 
administered within the framework of the law, regardless of whether the law is 
state-based or regional. If democratic states disavow their commitment to a 
foundational law of equality, they accept the idea that some people have an 
innate or inherent right to govern. Historically, this idea justified the rule of the 
monarchy, but it can also be used to justify the rule of larger collectives, as in 
Hitler’s claim that ‘right is what is good for the German people’ (see Larking 
2004, 16; 2014, 45). Who counts as a member of ‘the people’ is endlessly 
contestable and revisable. Recognising the threat posed to their own rights by 
the refusal to accord rights to unwelcome outsiders, privileged individuals 
who are members of rights-recognising states and who inhabit Castles’s top 
tiers of the citizenship hierarchy must mobilise in support of fairer global rules 
of institutional engagement, combined with a right to international freedom of 
movement for all forced migrants.14 
These mobilisations could be supported by the advocacy of states in the 
global south whose members are currently disadvantaged by global trade and 
finance regimes, and by the failure in international human rights instruments 
and migration frameworks to accord even a qualified right to international 
freedom of movement. Coalition building among these states and their 
members, and between them and concerned citizens of wealthy rights-
recognising states, would recognise their shared interests. It would promote 
the ideals of political self-determination and of human rights shared and 
enjoyed by ‘all members of the human family’.
12  Demore v Kim 538 U.S. 510 (2003) 11, in Wilsher 2012; and see Larking 2016, 197. 
13  This principle must be protected by ‘the complete impartiality of the law’ (see Arendt 
1968, 11 and 91, and my discussion in Larking 2014, 29–35 and 165–7).
14  Previously I have argued in support of a right to international freedom of movement 
only for victims of genocide, but supplemented by obligations on wealthy rights-
recognising states to share the burden of resettling or otherwise supporting all forced 
migrants (Larking 2012; 2014). In Refugees and the Myth of Human Rights I suggested 
obligations in relation to forced migrants who are not victims of genocide could be 
spelled out in a multilateral resettlement treaty (2014, 164–5).
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4
From Narratives to Perceptions 
in the Securitisation of the 
Migratory Crisis in Europe
SUSANA FERREIRA
The management of migration in the Mediterranean is one of the main 
challenges that the European Union (EU) currently faces. The intense 
migratory flows registered since the end of 2013 that peaked in 2015, with 
over 1.8 million border crossing detections around the EU (Frontex 2017, 19), 
have put to test the mechanisms of the Union’s immigration, border and 
asylum policies and its capacity to deal with a humanitarian crisis. 
The current migratory crisis has revealed the EU’s weaknesses regarding the 
management of migratory flows and the deficiencies of its legal framework on 
migration, borders and asylum. Furthermore, the EU’s actions have been 
criticised by many (namely civil society organisations and academics) for its 
focus on security measures, specifically in terms of border management, 
claiming that the securitisation of migrations is not the answer to the crisis.
The adoption of a set of emergency actions, extraordinary measures that go 
beyond ordinary politics, and the emphasis on a dialectic between migration 
and security on political narratives, aims to legitimise the securitisation 
practices adopted during the current migratory crisis. Hence, in this chapter I 
focus on the practices and narratives of the EU’s political leaders to address 
the securitisation of migrations during the migratory crisis. I argue that a 
securitisation of migrations in the EU is taking place during this period (from 
2013 to date), through the implementation of emergency actions by the EU 
and the adoption of securitarian narratives by European political leaders to 
support these actions.
58From Narratives to Perceptions in the Securitisation of the Migratory Crisis in Europe
For a better assessment of the securitisation process, this chapter is 
organized as follows: firstly, I introduce the academic debate on the 
securitisation of migrations in the EU, followed by an analysis of the EU’s 
main strategic documents to assess how migrations are presented as a 
security threat to the EU; afterwards, I address the emergency actions 
adopted during the current migratory crisis, as well as the discourses of 
political leaders on migration, and the impact they had on public perceptions 
and opinions; and, lastly, I present some overall conclusions.
The Securitisation of Migrations
Any matter dealt with at a higher level, often the state, is considered as 
politicisation. When that subject is regarded as urgent it can lead to 
securitisation. Securitisation, more than an extreme version of politicisation, 
goes beyond it, since a special treatment is given to the subject. Thus, there 
is securitisation only when there is a legitimate existential threat that legiti-
mises the breaking of rules to perform emergency actions (Buzan, Wæver 
and De Wilde 1998, 24–25). 
For the Copenhagen School, the speech that presents an object as an 
existential threat does not create securitisation on its own; it is rather a 
securitising move. Acceptance by the audience is necessary so that the issue 
in question is dealt with as a securitised object (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde 
1998). Thus, the securitising process is only complete when there is an 
acceptance by the audience. Nevertheless, Balzacq (2011, 22) goes beyond 
the focus on the speech acts of the Copenhagen School, instead empha-
sising the role of practices; the security acts. In this sense, an approach that 
combines both practices (acts) and narratives (speech acts) is a more 
comprehensive one to analyse the process of securitisation of migrations in 
the EU.
Over the last two decades, the academic debate on the securitisation of 
immigration has been a very rich one. This link between international migra-
tions and security has a constructivist matrix at its basis, arising from the 
creation of a nexus of threats, where different actors share their fears in the 
creation of a ‘dangerous society’ (Bigo 2002).
When analysing the migration-security link, we are not only focusing on state 
security, but on the security of society as a whole and even the security of the 
various groups that compose it. Immigration can be perceived as a threat to a 
state’s sovereignty, but also as a threat to the freedom of society. In the first 
case, we are dealing with the immigration problem as political security, 
whereas in the second, we are under societal security.
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Within the framework of societal security, immigration threatens societal 
identity. Thus, the securitisation of immigration takes place through the 
securitisation of identity, i.e., ‘the European supranational identity is defended 
against a cultural (or demographic) invasion of other identities’ (Brancante 
and Reis 2009, 82).
Jef Huysmans argues that the securitisation of immigration in Europe is 
intertwined with the regional integration process (Brancante and Reis 2009, 
83). On the one side, this securitisation of immigration is triggered by welfare 
chauvinism, which, according to the author, is ‘a strategy of introducing 
cultural identity criteria in an area in which belonging is determined on the 
basis of social policy criteria, such as health, age, disability and employment’ 
(Huysmans 2000, 768). It translates into an economic fear that immigrants 
might overload the welfare system and jeopardise the internal market. On the 
other side, immigration may also be perceived as a menace to cultural 
homogeneity. Within the logic of societal security of the Copenhagen School, 
Huysmans (2000) suggests that an identity is created in opposition to the 
identities that surround it, which may lead to the creation of a supranational 
European identity.
Critics of the societal security concept, Bigo (2002) and Adamson (2006) 
claim that there is a securitisation of migration to fight transnational crime, 
such as terrorism and organised crime, within the realm of national security. 
Bigo (2002, 63) claims that this security prism to analyse migrations ‘is the 
result of the creation of a continuum of threats and general unease in which 
many different actors exchange their fears and beliefs in the process of 
making a risk and dangerous society’. In this sense, Bigo’s sociological 
approach focuses on the role of security agencies, which he calls prof-
essional ‘managers of unease’, in the securitisation of migration, by their own 
practices. These professionals not only have to face the threat, but they have 
the power to determine what is or what is not a threat (Bigo 2002, 74).
Nevertheless, the rise of terrorism in the security agenda led to the increasing 
relation between terrorism and migration and the adoption of a human rights-
centred perspective, focusing on the human security of individuals. In this 
sense, authors such as Bhabha (2005) claim that anti-immigrant policies do 
not work in practice and they should rather be framed within existing human 
rights law. Thus, states should rethink their policies and protect their borders 
while safeguarding immigrants’ human rights.
Irregular migrations are often conceived as an element of insecurity, as the 
illicit entrance of migrants might present a direct or immediate challenge to 
state security (Requena 2015, 61). Nevertheless, the requirements for legal 
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entrance are defined by national immigration policies. Therefore, the political 
power is the one entitled to declare the entrance of others as regular or 
irregular. Thus, in a situation of irregularity the immigrant becomes the enemy 
of the politician (Bigo 2002, 6), and is therefore considered a threat. 
Moreover, irregular migrations bring along a series of threats to immigrants’ 
human security.
Migrations as a Security Threat to the EU
The definition of security priorities is essential for policy design. Accordingly, 
an analysis of the EU’s main strategic documents allows us to understand the 
connection between security and migrations in the EU’s lexicon, which later 
translates into its policy making.
In this sense, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the EU has 
adopted different security strategies in order to adapt to the new realities, 
taking into account the threats arising at that moment in time. The 2003 
European Security Strategy identifies five key threats to European security: 
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, 
state failure and organised crime (European Council 2003). Under the threat 
of organised crime, it briefly addresses irregular migrations, along with drugs 
and arms trafficking, as part of the external dimension of organised crime. 
Furthermore, it focuses on the Mediterranean region as a neighbouring 
unstable area, which requires the Union’s continued engagement. In this 
sense, the document reflects post-9/11 thinking, focusing on the threat of 
terrorism and transnational organised crime. Yet, it already reflects the 
Union’s concern over irregular migrations and stability in the Mediterranean 
area.
Given the changes the EU suffered in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, such as the 2004 enlargement and the beginning of the economic 
crisis in 2007, as well as the international system, and within the framework of 
the Stockholm programme, the European Council adopted in 2010 an Internal 
Security Strategy for the EU, which aimed to address the new challenges. 
The strategy defines a ‘new’ set of common threats to internal security, which 
are: terrorism, organised crime, cyber-crime, cross-border crime, violence 
itself, and natural and man-made disasters. Some of these threats had 
already been outlined by the 2003 European Security Strategy – terrorism 
and organised crime – yet, new ones emerge as part of the new international 
order (Council of the European Union 2010).
Finally, in 2015, the Union adopted the European Agenda on Security, at a 
time that the EU faced a migratory crisis. This new agenda aims to be a 
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‘shared agenda’ between the Union and its Member States in the creation of 
an area of internal security. The EU outlines three common threats to its 
internal security: terrorism, organised crime, and cybercrime. Furthermore, 
the document stresses the need to effectively implement border management 
to prevent cross-border crime and terrorism (European Commission 2015c, 
6), highlighting the link between border management, migrations and security.
These three documents – the European Security Strategy, the Internal 
Security Strategy and the European Agenda on Security – define the EU’s 
key priorities in terms of internal security, always taking into account the 
specific moment in which they are inserted. Still, the connection between 
security and migrations is clear, depicting irregular migrations as a threat to 
security and emphasising the role of border management in the management 
of migrations.
In this sense, the EU mainly focuses on irregular migrations as a threat to its 
internal security, despite the fact that it only represents a small part of the 
total migrations to the European territory. Furthermore, the repeated use of 
the word ‘illegal’ in the EU’s jargon to refer to these flows emphasises this 
representation of a threat. 
Furthermore, the current migratory crisis reiterated the connection with 
terrorism, previously established with 9/11. Fears that jihadist terrorists could 
enter the EU’s territory using migratory routes were confirmed after the Paris 
attacks on November 2015, since ‘[t]wo of the terrorists involved had 
previously irregularly entered via Leros and had been registered by the Greek 
authorities, presenting fraudulent Syrian documents in order to speed up their 
registration process’ (Frontex 2016, 12).
To sum up, within the EU, migrations are mainly conceived as a threat to 
societal and internal security, particularly irregular migrations. Thus, this 
approach translates into the policy design in the field of migrations.
On the Adoption of Emergency Actions to Face the Migratory Crisis
The endorsement of a set of emergency actions is a fundamental axis in the 
securitisation process (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde 1998, 24–25), as prev-
iously highlighted. Therefore, it is of great importance to analyse the urgent 
measures adopted to deal with the migratory crisis, in order to assess the 
securitisation of migrations.
The sinking of a vessel carrying over 500 refugees in Lampedusa (Italy) in 
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October 2013 led to the implementation of a Task Force for the Mediter-
ranean, which proposed guidelines and measures to better address migratory 
flows in this area and prevent deaths at sea (Council of the European Union 
2013). The Task Force identified five main areas of action that should be 
assessed in the following months: strengthening cooperation with third 
countries; regional protection, resettlement and reinforced legal avenues to 
Europe; fight against trafficking, smuggling and organised crime; reinforcing 
border surveillance in order to provide an up-to-date maritime situational 
picture and the protection and saving of lives of migrants in the 
Mediterranean; assistance and solidarity with Member States dealing with 
high migratory pressure. However, despite the Commission’s commitment to 
implement the actions proposed, the ones taken were not enough to prevent 
the worsening of the crisis and the increasing loss of lives at sea.
The increasing migratory pressure in the Mediterranean since the end of 2013 
became again an increasingly pressing issue on the European agenda in April 
2015, when a boat sank near the shores of Lampedusa killing near 300 
people (Kington, 2013). This humanitarian tragedy left the EU in a crisis mode 
(Ferreira 2016, 5). The following day, on 20 April, the European Commission 
presented a ten-point action plan on migration, which defined immediate 
actions to be taken in response to the humanitarian crisis in the 
Mediterranean (European Commission 2015e). Among the measures 
established, the most controversial one was the proposal of a military action 
to tackle smuggling in the Mediterranean. Finally, in May 2015 the European 
Commission presented its European Agenda on Migration (European 
Commission 2015f), setting concrete and immediate actions to tackle the 
crisis and looking forward in terms of a strategy to better manage migrations.
The European Agenda on Migration aims to give a comprehensive framework 
to the management of migrations in the EU, combining both internal 
(immigration, asylum and borders) and external policies (Common Security 
and Defence Policy), and taking into account the shared responsibility 
between EU Member States and also countries of transit and origin.
The plan put forward a set of specific measures at two different levels: the 
first level focuses on the urgent actions needed to respond to the human 
tragedy lived in the Mediterranean; and the second level identifies the four 
main pillars to better manage migrations (European Commission 2015f, 3–6). 
Among the urgent actions, a very controversial issue has been the adoption 
of a relocation and resettlement scheme (European Commission 2015f, 4), 
since home affairs and interior ministers could not reach an agreement on the 
quota of refugees to be relocated and resettled across the EU, given the 
divergences and controversies between frontline Member States and central 
63 Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century
and northern Member States. Member States finally reached a consensus in 
September 2015 to relocate a total of 160,000 people (see Council Decisions 
of 14 September and 22 September 2015). However, the relocation process 
has been very slow and thus has fallen very far behind the numbers agreed. 
According to the European Commission’s ninth progress report on the EU’s 
emergency relocation and resettlement schemes, on 8 February 2017 a total 
of 11,966 refugees had been relocated (8,766 from Greece and 3,200 from 
Italy) and 13,968 people in need of international protection had been resettled 
in the EU’s Member States. According to the same report, ‘Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, Finland and Netherlands as well as associated countries 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Iceland have already fulfilled their pledges’ 
(European Commission 2017a).
Furthermore, the plan proposes, among other urgent measures: a funding 
package for Frontex’s missions Triton and Poseidon; the implementation of a 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission on smuggling 
migrants; a pilot multi-purpose centre established in Niger by the end of 2015; 
and a ‘hotspot’ approach to work on the ground with frontline Member States 
to identify and register incoming migrants (European Commission 2015f, 
3–6). However, so far the EU has not been able to deliver the necessary 
results. In this sense, according to a report of the European Council of 
Refugees and Exiles, the ‘hotspots have certainly not helped in relieving the 
pressure from Italy and Greece as was their stated objective: instead, they 
have led to an increase in the number of asylum applicants waiting in Italy 
and Greece, consolidating the challenges and shortcomings already inherent 
in the Dublin system’ (European Council for Refugees and Exile 2016, 7). 
Regarding the adoption of the CSDP operation – EUNAVFOR MED Operation 
Sophia, although this operation has helped to reduce the migratory flow by 
nine percent (compared to the previous years) in the Central Mediterranean 
route, it has led to a change in routes and a high increase in the Eastern 
Mediterranean route (Council of the European Union 2016).
Nevertheless, given the migratory pressure that Greece was being subjected 
to by the beginning of 2016 due to the closing of borders along the Balkan 
route, the EU-Turkey Agreement was signed in March 2016. This agreement 
takes a step further in the externalisation of the EU’s borders, making Turkey 
partly responsible for the management of the EU’s eastern border, while 
creating a new buffer State. The agreement aims to address the overflowing 
arrival of migrants from Turkey to Greece through the return of any new 
irregular migrant that arrives in Greece to Turkey. Nevertheless, it raises 
several questions regarding its legality, as it violates EU law on issues such 
as detention and the right to appeal (Collett 2016), and even its 
operationalisation. On the one hand, this agreement denies potential 
refugees the possibility to request international protection in the EU. On the 
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other hand the mass returns of refugees and migrants to Turkey, despite the 
establishment of a resettlement scheme, violates international and European 
law protecting refugees and asylum seekers, namely the principle of non-
refoulement. Moreover, it is still questionable if Turkey may be considered a 
‘safe third country’ for refugees or whether Turkey can ensure access to 
effective asylum procedures for those in need of international protection 
(Brooks 2016; de Marcilly 2016). Furthermore, this agreement also shows the 
EU’s connivance with totalitarian regimes in order to achieve its goals.
Discourses on Migration
Discourses on immigration create different perceptions within the general 
public, often supported by the media coverage of these issues. Sometimes 
the person who presents the discourse is more important than the speech 
itself. As Balzacq (2005, 172) put it, the discursive techniques used by agents 
allow ‘(…) the securitising actor to induce or increase the [public] mind’s 
adherence to the thesis presented to its assent’. Various studies have 
focused on the different construction of discourses on immigration issues in 
Europe (see Buonfino 2004; Triandafyllidou 2000). Therefore, I do not aim to 
do a thorough analysis of European leaders’ political discourses on 
immigration and security, rather to deconstruct the main ideas portrayed by 
these speeches in this specific moment in time.
Research has shown that there are two main opposite axes on discourses on 
migrations (Gropas 2015; Triandafyllidou 2012, 389). On the one hand, there 
is a humanitarian and solidarity approach. In these discourses, the emphasis 
is placed on equal treatment for immigrants and their contribution to host 
societies. On the other hand, there are the discriminatory discourses, which 
emphasise a nationalistic rationale, often linking migrations with criminality, 
terrorism or prostitution (Triandafyllidou 2012, 389).
Negative political discourses on immigration often resort to different linguistic 
expressions to describe this phenomenon, particularly with regard to irregular 
migrations. In this sense, political leaders frequently use metaphors related to 
natural catastrophes to describe the arrival of large number of migrants. Take 
for example Italy’s former Prime Minister Berlusconi’s speech resorting to the 
wording ‘human tsunami’ to refer to the growing number of migrants arriving 
in Italy in 2011 (Corriere Della Sera 2011). Thus, expressions connected to 
natural disasters serve as a securitarian element in the politicians’ speech, as 
they imply that those migrants pose a threat to internal security. The media 
also uses those metaphors for greater impact among its audience. That is the 
case with some of the headlines of the Washington Times – ‘Stop the 
immigration flood’ (Thomas 2015) ; BBC News – ‘Migrants flood trains in 
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desperate bid to leave Italy’ (Bell 2015) ; or Mail Online – ‘Forget the Greek 
crisis or Britain’s referendum, this tidal wave of migrants could be the biggest 
threat to Europe since the war, writes Michael Burleigh’ (Burleigh 2015).
From British Prime Minister David Cameron’s use of the expression ‘swarm’ 
to address the ‘Calais crisis’ (Elgot 2015), to former French President Nicolás 
Sarkozy’s metaphor of a ‘leak in the kitchen’ to ridicule the Commission’s 
proposal to relocate refugees – later used by the Spanish Interior Minister 
Férnandez Díaz (Sánchez 2015) – a number of similar terms were used to 
depict the refugees reaching European shores during the current migratory 
crisis. These negative statements by political leaders potentiate racist and 
xenophobic feelings among local populations, which have been criticised by 
civil society organisations, such as Amnesty International, and even by the 
United Nations (United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High 
Commissioner (UNHCR) 2015).
Furthermore, since 9/11 there has been a growing association between 
migration and terrorism. The speeches portraying immigrants as terrorists 
have gained momentum during the current migratory crisis, given the 
presence of the Islamic State in Syria. In this sense, political leaders have 
expressed their ‘fear’ that jihadi terrorists might be among those seeking 
international protection in Europe. An example of this is the concern 
expressed by the Spanish Interior Minister that a group of jihadi terrorists 
might enter Spain along with the refugees relocated to the country (EFE 
2014). In the end, these negative discourses and statements portray mig-
rations as a threat to European Member States, generating fear and rejection 
among host societies.
Nevertheless, a humanitarian and solidarity approach is also present in many 
other speeches, particularly the ones from the leaders of the EU’s institutions. 
European leaders, such as the President of the European Commission, Jean-
Claude Juncker, or the High Representative of the European Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, have called for 
collective action, solidarity and courage to face the migratory crisis. Jean-
Claude Juncker issued a statement which openly showed his concern about 
the ‘(…) resentment, the rejection, the fear directed against these people by 
some parts of the population’ (Juncker 2015). 
In this line, the Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi took a stronger stance 
threatening to ‘hurt’ Europe if it remained paralysed in the face of the 
migratory crisis (Agence France-Presse 2015). French Interior Minister 
Bernard Cazeneuve criticised the French far-right Front National party’s 
proposal to reinstate border checks, calling it a ‘stupid’ idea (Boudet 2015). 
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Other political leaders have called for action and solidarity from the EU and its 
Member States, while sometimes being reluctant to adopt some of the 
measures on the table. That was the case of the Spanish Prime Minister 
Mariano Rajoy, who, after the 19 April 2015 tragedy in the Mediterranean 
claimed that, ‘Words are now worthless, we need to act’ (Eldiario.es 2015), 
and later rejecting the scheme proposed for the relocation of refugees.
Another relevant leader worth mentioning is Pope Francis, whose messages 
reach beyond the Catholic world. When visiting Lampedusa in 2013, remem-
bering the many hundreds of migrants who had died in their attempt to reach 
European shores, the Pope talked about the ‘globalisation of indifference’ 
regarding our current world, calling for international solidarity towards these 
tragedies (Staff Reporter 2015).
The securitising actor, in this case European leaders, is the one who speaks 
security. If it is true that the wording used in the speeches may speak for itself 
and have a great impact in public opinion, the figure of the leader himself or 
herself is a crucial element in the acceptance of the audience. In this sense, if 
it is a well-respected leader speaking security it will have a greater accept-
ance among a wider public.
Public Perceptions and Opinions
Narratives and practices on immigration and security shape citizens’ pers-
pectives about immigration. In the EU, public opinion about immigration and 
racist attitudes has suffered slight changes over the last decades, as well as 
the perception of threats to internal security. 
An analysis of the Eurobarometer surveys on racism and xenophobia and on 
internal security from the eighties until now allows us to conclude that despite 
the different critical moments regarding migrations, there has been no 
significant impact in terms of the public opinion’s perceptions. However, in 
2015 there was a high increase from the 2011 survey, from 13% to 19%, on 
the Europeans’ perception of migrations as a security challenge (European 
Commission 2015d, 6–9). In general, European citizens consider the EU as a 
critical element in the development of policies and strategies to face the 
different threats to European security. Moreover, Europeans believe that 
internal security is linked to external events, thus supporting a common 
answer to these threats. European citizens in general advocate common 
immigration and asylum policies, while requesting stricter controls of the 
external borders (European Commission 2015d).
Furthermore, we should also mention the increasing importance that far-right/
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right-wing populist parties have in European policies, based on an 
ethnocentric ideology and often opposing pro-immigration policies. These 
parties focus on the national identity axis, where the ‘other’ is not part of the 
society, thus leading to racist and extremist discourses. The break of the 
migratory crisis and the terrorist attacks that have spread around Europe over 
in recent years (Paris, Brussels, or more recently, London) have paved the 
way for a growing Euroscepticism and an increasing support for these 
populist parties. They have established and reinforced their presence in 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Sweden, where they have acquired significant political 
visibility and power (Gutteridge 2015). It is interesting to observe that the far-
right has had a pronounced impact in Central European Member States, 
which are most of the refugees’ host countries.
These results are in line with the slight growth registered in the perception of 
irregular migrations as a security threat to the EU and its Member States, and 
demonstrate the acceptance of the anti-immigrant, racist and nationalist 
discourses of these parties’ leaders. In this sense, it would be interesting to 
analyse discourses of a group of far-right parties around the EU and its 
impact on the different societies.
Final Remarks
The current migratory crisis has highlighted the handicaps of the EU’s 
common immigration, border and asylum policies, as well as the growing 
securitisation of these policies. The call for Member States’ solidarity to face 
this crisis has collided with Member States’ own political interests, creating 
internal frictions and dissidences. Most of the measures adopted to face this 
humanitarian crisis were based on low common denominators, and the EU 
seems to be falling short in accomplishing them. In March 2017, the 
European Commission called for renewed efforts from Member States to 
implement the relocation and resettlement schemes, where progress was 
slow in its first moment and now seems to be promising, with a total of 13,546 
relocations and 14,422 resettlements (European Commission 2017b).
Taking into account the practices and narratives analysed, I conclude that 
there has been a securitisation of migrations in the EU with the current 
migratory crisis, through the adoption of exceptional measures that go beyond 
the sphere of normal politics and the adoption of what might be considered 
some legally questionable measures (such as the EU-Turkey Agreement). 
Furthermore, the growing support to far-right parties all around the EU, as 
well as EU citizens’ growing perceptions of migration as a threat to security, 
legitimises this securitisation of migrations. This should be contrasted with 
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figures regarding migratory flows. In 2015, migrants in the EU represented 
6.7% of the total population (around 3.4 million migrants) and in that same 
year illegal entrances peaked at 5.2%, a representative figure if we consider 
that there was an increase of 100% in detections of illegal border crossings, 
compared to the previous year (Eurostat 2016; Frontex 2016 and 2017). In 
this sense, this feeling of insecurity is the result of a perception of a threat 
posed by the growing number of irregular migrants entering the EU during this 
period.
Nevertheless, the adoption of these measures so far has not helped to solve 
the crisis, rather to circumvent it or even to displace it to other regions, given 
the EU’s incapability to find a common ground to deal with this humanitarian 
crisis. Therefore, to sustain the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ), 
the EU needs to move beyond a securitarian approach and adopt a coherent 
and comprehensive strategy regarding migration management, which 
ensures the security and stability of external borders while preserving the 
freedom of movement. 
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Since the summer of 2015, the Greek islands of the Aegean Sea, that are 
only a few miles from the coasts of Turkey, and the small village of Idomeni, 
which is next to Greece’s northern border with Macedonia, have become 
directly associated to the so-called refugee crisis. Thousands of refugees 
mainly from war-torn areas in the wider Middle East were arriving daily in the 
country’s islands in their attempt to reach safety, and once they left the 
islands they moved towards Greece’s northern borders. The images that were 
broadcasted from these areas immediately became associated with human 
loss, sorrow and trauma but also hope, perseverance and global acts of 
solidarity. At the same time, since 2015 we also observed the rise of barbwire 
fences as Member States of the European Union (EU) and their neighbours 
relentlessly tried to keep those arriving away from their territory. 
In 2015, I was working as a freelance journalist, reporting on the refugee 
crisis from Greece’s northern border in Idomeni. This chapter is my attempt to 
reflect on my understanding of borders. For this reason, I examine the way 
the refugee crisis unfolded in Greece from 2015 until the end of 2017 through 
my ethnographic observations as a journalist on the ground. However, this 
chapter is not about the crisis in Greece; it is a series of observations of the 
violent nature of borders and their impact on those on the move. In order to 
do that, I recount the story of the refugee crisis in five acts: five stories of 
individuals I met throughout these years that showcase the violent nature of 
the border. I do not intend to examine all aspects of the crisis – something like 
this would be impossible. But I do intend to look at the way borders create 
violence and the consequences of this for the people on the move. Due to the 
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fact that I focus on people’s movements in Greece since 2015, I refer to those 
on the move as refugees defying the legal limitations of the term because the 
majority of them but not all came from war-torn areas.1 At the end of the 
chapter, I explore the notion of a no borders politics as a method of fighting 
the violence created by borders. 
Violent Borders and Traumatic Experiences: A Story in Five Acts 
Act I: Violent Lands  
In the morning of 8 May 2015 a local volunteer and activist who was helping 
refugees at the Greek-Macedonian border2 was asking for supplies and help 
in a Facebook post. According to that post, hundreds of Syrian refugees were 
found locked inside a freight train wagon and they were taken to the police 
station of Idomeni. At that period, I was working as a field producer on a 
different story about a gang that was kidnapping refugees in Macedonia3, so 
that story’s reporter, Ramita Navai, and I thought this incident may be 
connected to our research. It turned out that it was not related, but that 
incident exposed a different side of the migration route and the methods used 
to move people throughout borders. Those who were at the police station had 
paid thousands of Euros to smugglers in order to take them directly to 
Germany by train. However, when the train entered Macedonia it was 
checked by the police who in turn sent it back to Greece without alerting the 
Greek authorities of those locked inside. Hours later, the Greek authorities 
found the train abandoned near the border. One of those who were at the 
police station exclaimed during a short interview,
I was close to losing my family and my life. When the train 
stopped, a police officer opened the door. He saw us but he 
didn’t say anything. He then closed the door and told the driver 
1  The term ‘refugee’ is defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 
Protocol among other legal texts and mainly refers to those fleeing conflict or adverse 
political situations thus the term has legal limitations. For more on this issue see this 
book’s introduction as well as the first chapter, and for an interesting thesis on people 
on the move see Thomas Nail’s The Figure of the Migrant (2015).
2  By referring to the Greek-Macedonian border, I mean the so-called buffer zone next 
to the village of Idomeni, and between the railway that crossed Greece and Macedonia 
and the Axios (Vardar) River.
3  ‘Macedonia: Refugees Kidnap Gangs’ was broadcast by the British broadcaster 
Channel 4 News and exposed an organised gang network of Afghans who were 
operating in Greece and mainly Macedonia and were kidnapping refugees who were 
trying to cross the Western Balkan Route (Navai 2015). The film is available here:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A5fDgJP2G30. 
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to return to Greece. When the train arrived in Greece, we were 
abandoned inside the wagon (Field Notes, 8 May 2015).
That time must have been the fifth time I was at the Greek-Macedonian 
border since the first time I went to the area on January 2015. Incidents of 
violence were evident as the refugees who were stuck between the borders 
always recounted various stories with violent incidents; from beatings and 
muggings by the Macedonian authorities to being shot (Field Notes, January 
2015; April 2015; May 2015). Yet that was the first time that an incident that 
involved hundreds of people had happened; at least, as far as I was aware at 
that particular moment. 
Every time I visited the Greek-Macedonian border, I was trying to figure out 
the dynamics of what was happening and where it might all lead. I think the 
train incident can put the people’s movement dynamics at that time into 
perspective. First of all, the borders were closed; this means refugees had no 
option other than moving throughout borders in an irregular manner – without 
any form of legal papers that would have given them the right to cross 
borders. For this reason, the only way one could cross was by paying 
someone else to help them cross without getting caught by the authorities; 
thus people’s movements were controlled by smuggling networks who had 
the know-how of moving irregularly. For example, the incident with the train 
was one of the methods; someone – possibly a smuggler – had paid train 
officials in order to hide people inside wagons (for more on how that was 
done, see Navai 2015). Each one of those in the wagons had paid 
approximately 1200 Euros in order to go from Greece to Germany, 
considering there were almost 200 people, the smuggling network that was 
responsible for this made 240,000 Euros per trip; thus, closed borders was a 
profitable business for criminal  networks (Field Notes, January 2015; April 
2015; May 2015). It is important to note here that this concerns the crossing 
of the Greek-Macedonian border by hiding in a train as prices differed 
depending on the type of crossing. It is also important to add that crossing the 
sea border was a different side of the same journey that included different 
prices and other methods.  
Apart from the way smuggling networks were taking advantage of closed 
borders, the number of people who arrived was rising; local activists said that 
one day 100 people would arrive and the next up to 500. Moving inside 
Greece was restricted, as those without papers or a residency permit could 
not take public transportation, which led to people paying extra money to taxi 
drivers who took the risk, or even walking for hours to the borders.4 Physical 
4  The route towards the Greek mainland shifted several times from 2015 until 2016. 
During May 2015, the most common route someone took once they arrived in Athens 
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violence was evident as people were beaten by the authorities or by criminal 
gangs. Yet, hundreds of people were daily defying both restrictions and 
violence, and kept on arriving in Greece with the tolerance of the authorities, 
as their movement was no longer a secret for anyone in the areas near 
Greece’s borders. 
A large number of researchers support the idea that movement is a political 
act and those at the centre of it are political actors as they defy politically 
imposed restrictions in their struggle to move throughout borders (see for 
example Agier 2016; King 2016; Hess 2017; Jones 2016). Indeed, what was 
happening at the beginning in 2015 was an act of political resistance as 
thousands of people resisted state imposed laws and restrictions and 
marched towards their ultimate goal: a safe area where they could build their 
lives from the beginning. When one person was down, the rest would help 
them, when their attempt was unsuccessful, they would keep on trying until 
they succeeded. In fact, this form of perseverance was successful in the end. 
Act II: Violent Seas 
The autumn of 2015 was entirely different from the beginning of that year. In 
July 2015, the authorities of Macedonia passed a law that allowed refugees 
who entered the country to freely move in it for three days (Associated Press 
2015). That meant that those who were entering Macedonia through the 
Greek-Macedonian border were legally allowed to be in the country for three 
days. In my understanding that was the beginning of the open borders period5 
in the Balkan Route (Associated Press 2015). One of the immediate impacts 
of this policy was the gradual disappearance of smuggling networks through-
out the route. At that time, I had met several refugees who were on their way 
to Northern European countries; contrary to those who crossed borders 
before summer, they managed to reach their final destinations relatively faster 
from the Greek islands was as follows: from Athens people took the train to 
Thessaloniki (identification was not necessary); once in Thessaloniki, there were two 
main options: either take the bus to the small town of Polycastro which is near the 
border, and then either take a taxi or walk to the village of Idomenito, or walk from 
Thessaloniki to Idomeni directly, which is approximately 79 kilometres (Field Notes, 
April 2015; May 2015).
5  By referring to the open borders period, I refer to the term that was used mainly by 
the media in order to describe the movement of people from Greece towards Northern 
Europe with the tolerance of the authorities who, from the summer of 2015 until the 
closure of the so-called Balkan Route, managed movements in order to be done in an 
orderly manner. In reality, the borders were never officially open and this movement 
never took place in official border crossings. For example, the refugee crossing at the 
Greek-Macedonian border was on the area that the railroad crossed from Greece to 
Macedonia. 
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and most of them without paying excessive amounts to smuggling networks.
In September 2015, thousands of refugees, mainly from Syria, Afghanistan 
and Iraq were arriving on the Greek islands on a daily basis (United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees 2016). Although the free passage through 
the Balkan Route had eliminated gang violence throughout the border, the 
situation at sea was different. The rising number of people who crossed 
meant a rising demand for smugglers who operated on the Turkish side of the 
Aegean. The higher demand meant different prices and services. As a result, 
those who did not have enough money to guarantee their safe passage put 
their lives at risk by wearing cheap fake life vests and using unsafe rubber 
boats (Hubbard 2015; BBC News 2016). 
At that moment, I had not been to the Greek islands as I was focused on 
reporting from the northern part of the border. However, I had gained multiple 
contacts with refugees, reporters, government officials and activists in order 
to be as well-informed as possible for someone not on the ground. 
On 2 September, I received a message on Facebook from Zahra, a 19-year-
old refugee girl that I met at the bus station in Thessaloniki. ‘Hi, I need your 
help’, she said. Zahra had already arrived in Sweden so at the beginning I 
was confused about why she may need my help. Zahra had settled in 
Sweden, however, members of her extended family had fled from Syria a few 
weeks before she contacted me. When she sent me that message, her sister-
in-law was in a sinking rubber boat in the middle of the Aegean Sea. None of 
the passengers could get hold of the Greek authorities and time was running 
out. They could, however, contact their families and friends and as such that 
message reached me. Due to the urgency of the situation help had to be sent 
immediately. Zahra wrote:
Call the police. Please we need help. I am waiting. There are 
children and they are afraid. The boat is destroyed. Please 
hurry, they are drowning. They are wearing life vests but they 
are not so strong. They can’t hold them for long time.
I called one of my contacts in the Greek military who in turn informed the 
Greek Coast Guard. I had already sent him their location, as Zahra had sent 
me a Google Maps screenshot that had the coordinates on it. Their rescue 
was not an easy task, as they had to be located in the middle of the night. 
That night, the authorities rescued more than one boat. Since that day, I have 
had several discussions with my contact from the military regarding that 
incident. As he mentioned one time, he felt responsible for those people’s 
rescue despite not being directly involved. I felt the same. That sense of 
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responsibility for someone else’s life would have been even stronger for 
Zahra as it involved a person she knew well, but also, an experience she 
herself went through – the precariousness of crossing the sea in a rubber 
boat. 
Act III: Violent Camps 
The previous incident took place during the same period that the German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel announced the opening of the borders for refugees 
who were fleeing conflict (Hall and Lichfield 2015; De La Baume 2017; 
Dockery 2017). Largely because of Angela Merkel’s statement, the number of 
those who decided to cross the borders reached new levels. In 2015 more 
than one million people reached Europe through the Mediterranean Sea 
including the Aegean Sea; of those an estimated number of 800,000 people 
arrived through Greece (Clayton and Holland 2015). The open border policy 
that created the Balkan Route provided a safe and fast way for people to 
reach their final destinations as the route was no longer controlled by 
smugglers. 
A couple of months later, however, borders started shutting down 
unexpectedly as European countries were not able to cope with the rising 
numbers of arrivals (Karakoulaki 2015; Siegfried 2015). The final straw came 
in March 2016 with the introduction of the EU-Turkey statement that was 
drafted in such a way as to intentionally reduce refugee arrivals (AFP 2016). 
The EU-Turkey Statement, which is more commonly known as the EU-Turkey 
Deal, is an agreement between Turkey and the EU regarding Syrian refugees. 
In short, for each Syrian refugee who returns from Greece or Italy to Turkey, 
one Syrian refugee from Turkey is accepted to the EU.6
It is important to note that as people were arriving in thousands at the buffer 
zone of the Greek-Macedonian border, and their crossing was officiated by 
the Greek and Macedonian authorities, there was a need to set up several 
facilities including medical centres or waiting areas. That need created what 
became known as the camp of Idomeni – from now on Idomeni – which took 
its name from the nearby village. Because Greece did not at that moment 
officially recognise Idomeni as an official camp, it did not built any facilities for 
the people who were there. For that reason, humanitarian organisations, and 
mainly the Médicins Sans Frontières [Doctors without Borders] (MSF), started 
building emergency infrastructure. By the beginning of January 2016, the 
camp had expanded throughout the fields near the buffer zone (Field Notes, 
August 2015–May 2016).  
6  For a detailed discussion on the EU-Turkey Statement see Jenny Poon, Benjamin 
Hulme and Dora Kostakopoulou’s chapters in this book.
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Between the end of February and the beginning of May 2016, I was going to 
the Greek-Macedonian border at least three times a week, if not on a daily 
basis. Following the new developments, thousands of people were stranded 
in Idomeni and around March 2016 thousands of people were in limbo 
(Karakoulaki 2016b; 2016c; 2016d). Information by official authorities was 
limited, if not non-existent, and day after day it became clear that there was 
no plan by either the Greek government or the European Union. The situation 
at the time created a cloud of uncertainty and this, along with the harsh winter 
conditions, seemed to take its toll on people. Protests, either large or small, 
that resulted in violence were almost daily – fake rumours about the opening 
of the borders even had severe results (Tosidis 2016). Becoming a refugee 
already has psychological implications, thus the ongoing uncertainty of that 
time seemed to take its toll on those stranded (Papadopoulos 2007; Field 
Notes, 18 March 2016; Karakoulaki 2016c). I still vividly remember when I 
first met Ibrahim, a former interpreter for the US forces in Iraq, who broke 
down in tears as we were talking: 
I feel very stressed about everything. I am 26 and I haven’t 
lived anything. When I was in Iraq, I was studying and working 
at the same time. Then I went to Turkey, and I was working for 
nothing. When I finally left Turkey and crossed the sea, I 
thought I made it. I thought I would go to Germany and I would 
bring my wife. Then I came here… I came to nothing. I don’t 
know what I will do (Karakoulaki 2016c).
This was not the first time that someone broke down in tears in the middle of 
a discussion and it turned out it would not be the last. The common factor 
among all times was the fact that it occurred when there was some sort of 
disruption of refugees’ movement throughout borders.
According to Renos Papadopoulos (2007), the closest theory that a 
psychologist can use in order to describe what is happening to refugees 
during their flight is trauma theory. However, refugee trauma and psy-
chological trauma are different notions. Refugee trauma is a more general 
term that refers to various phenomena that are connected to a specific reality 
– the refugee reality and everything associated to it. On the other hand, 
psychological trauma does not necessarily have to do with external causes 
(Papadopoulos 2007, 303). Yet, not every person exposed to similar exp-
eriences has the same reaction (Papadopoulos 2007). 
For some, the loss of home can lead to the loss of belonging and an 
environment where everything is new can cause frustration (Alcock 2003). 
Refugee trauma can have great effects on people’s lives. Some of those who 
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have fled from conflict suffer or have suffered physical trauma but for 
Kalsched (1996), physical trauma ‘doesn’t split the psyche. An inner 
psychological agency …does the splitting’. While refugees were on their 
journey they did not allow themselves to be influenced by what they had 
experienced in their countries; their only goal was to reach their final 
destination (Field Notes, March–April 2016). Those who experience trauma 
block their memories in order to cope with their daily lives, yet, when this 
mechanism is disrupted their trauma resurfaces (Alcock 2003). For those in 
Idomeni, when their destination and consequently their goal was disrupted, 
the memories of their experiences resurfaced (Field Notes, March–April 
2016). 
Act IV: Violent States
As days were passing by and people had no information on their status or 
situation, tension was imminent. On 10 April 2016, refugees had organised a 
protest. By 9 am, hundreds that became thousands gathered in the middle of 
Idomeni. The protests were calm and all of us who were reporting on it 
thought it was going to die out as it happened almost every day. After a 
couple of hours of peaceful protests, a refugee delegation asked to speak 
with the Macedonian authorities who were gathered on the other side of the 
border. The Greek police negotiated with the Macedonians who in turn agreed 
to speak to refugees. Several police officers, journalists and the five 
delegates went to the side of the Macedonian border. After the negotiations 
had no actual result, the delegation left and went to inform the thousands who 
were protesting behind. In the beginning, I thought that the protest was over 
but those who were protesting had had enough. Approximately ten minutes 
later, thousands started marching towards the Macedonian-built fence and the 
first teargas from the Macedonian side fell on the ground. The Macedonian 
authorities had thrown teargas inside Greek territory before due to protests by 
refugees, but what was to follow was unexpected. 
Teargas, rubber bullets, stun-grenades and water cannons with water that 
seemed to have chemicals were employed non-stop and with unprecedented 
force. At one point, my colleague and I left in order to file our report, and 
when we returned the clashes continued. For approximately eight hours, the 
Macedonian police and military were responding to the clashes with an 
extraordinary display of force towards men, women and children while 
refugees were responding by throwing rocks. As one of the protesters said: 
‘This is like Palestine, Gaza.’ (Field Notes, 10 April 2016). It is interesting to 
note that while these events were happening, the Greek authorities did not 
respond despite the fact that the Macedonian authorities were clearly 
violating Greece’s sovereignty by firing teargas and other riot control agents 
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inside Greek territory that included the village of Idomeni. 
The lengths that states go to in order to protect their borders in peaceful times 
became even more evident to me that day. By using a variety of riot control 
measures, the Macedonian authorities made it clear that their border was not 
going to open and anyone who tried to trespass was going to face the 
consequences.
Act V: Violent Isolation
A month and a half after the events of 10 April 2016, the makeshift camp at 
the Greek – Macedonian border was evicted by the Greek authorities and a 
new phase of the refugee crisis in Greece started. Before the closure, the 
Greek government hurriedly prepared refugee camps isolated from urban 
settings and in many cases in areas that were not suitable due to hazardous 
conditions.7 On 11 November 2016, my colleague and I were working on a 
story about the conditions of refugee camps during winter; at that time a 
popular narrative was the winterisation of refugee camps and the 
unpreparedness of the Greek government. Little did we know that a 
conversation that we would have that day would leave us in a state of shock; 
not because of the contents of the discussion – these were not dramatic, 
shocking or traumatic – but because of the way these stories were told and 
the feelings they conveyed. 
We arrived at the camp of Nea Kavala in Northern Greece early in the 
morning, and after passing the police check we started working. That camp 
was one of the good ones in Greece as instead of tents it had ISO boxes that 
had been converted into houses. A few hours after doing a series of 
interviews and photographs, we decided to leave as we had all the material 
we needed. As we were walking out, I noticed a handmade shoe cabinet 
outside a house. I stood for a second and mentioned it to my colleague who 
went close to see it. This is when Idris came. Idris is a Kurdish Syrian who 
had been in Greece for a little less than a year at that time. He was with his 
whole family. He invited us for coffee and we sat next to a fire outside. 
Nawras, a young Syrian English Literature student whom we met earlier, 
came to help us with the translation as Idris and his family did not speak any 
English. After asking the same questions I did with others, I thought of asking 
something different, something that has now become a standard question: 
‘How would you describe your situation in one word?’ 
7   This observation is based on various visits to several refugee camps in Northern 
Greece, Athens and several Greek islands between 2016 and 2017. 
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There was silence for a while. And then Idris said: ‘I left war from Syria and I 
expected to see a better life. After I came here, I saw another war; a 
psychological war.’ (Field Notes, 11 November 2016)
I then turned to Nawras and asked him the same question; his reply was 
equally emotionally charged: ‘I feel lost. This is the first time I have been 
confused to such a degree. I cannot even think of what I am supposed to do 
in the future. Nothing. I am literally confused.’ (Field Notes, 11 November 
2016)
Although the discussion with Idris and Nawras took place at the end of 2016, 
the conditions in Greece have not improved. The situation is even more 
critical in the islands of the Aegean where there is a geographical restriction; 
that means that refugees who arrived in Greece after the EU-Turkey 
Statement are not allowed to go to the Greek mainland before a decision 
regarding their asylum application is made. A recent report published by 
Médecins Sans Frontières [Doctors without Borders] (MSF) characterised the 
refugees’ situation in Greece as a mental health emergency to such a degree 
that their mental health services were overwhelmed (MSF 2017). 
Cathy Zimmerman, Ligia Kiss and Mazeda Hossain (2011) recognise five 
phases of the migratory process that are related to health considerations: pre-
departure phase, travel phase, destination phase, interception phase and 
return phase. Although all phases are relevant to refugees in Greece, it is 
particularly important to note the impacts of the interception phase, which 
relates to refugees in detention or in refugee camps. 
Immigration detention centres or refugee camps often have deleterious 
effects on mental or physical health and are commonly sites of human rights 
abuses. There are clear associations between the length of detention and the 
severity of mental disorders, especially for individuals with prior exposure to 
traumatic events, which is common among forced migrants (Zimmerman et 
al., 2011). 
As mentioned, Greece initially set up refugee camps, both on the islands and 
on the mainland, in isolated areas with limited capacities and few, if any, 
provisions. More than a year later, problems in the camps remain. However, 
none of Greece’s or the EU’s actions regarding the refugee crisis are 
surprising. The deteriorating conditions of the camps can work as deterrence 
to refugees who plan to cross international borders in order to reach 
European countries. For this reason, both Greece and the EU are blatantly 
ignoring delays in setting up suitable refugee camps in the mainland and 
camps in deteriorating, inhuman and degrading conditions on the islands, as 
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well as human rights abuses by the authorities (Council of Europe 2017; 
Banning-Lover 2017; Howden and Fotiadis 2017). 
Final Reflections: Toward a No Borders Approach 
While commenting on the militarisation of borders and the construction of the 
wall between the United States and Mexico, Noam Chomsky emphasised the 
violent nature of borders: ‘The US-Mexican border, like most borders, was 
established by violence – and its architecture is the architecture of violence’ 
(Chomsky 2013). 
In this chapter, I looked at five examples of what I perceive as border 
violence. While reporting these events, I eventually came to a twofold 
conclusion: first, that borders are inherently violent – something that Reece 
Jones examines in depth in his book Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right 
to Move (2016); and second, that the forms of violence created by borders 
can be fought through a no borders politics approach – the theory of which is 
analytically examined by Natasha King in her book No Borders: The Politics 
of Immigration Control and Resistance (2016). Indeed, after observing the 
constant changing nature of the refugee crisis, I came closer to believing that 
Europe’s reaction to the refugee crisis creates violence. In order to fight this 
violence a different approach to borders is needed. This different approach to 
borders can start with an open borders policy that will eventually lead to a no 
borders politics. 
An open border policy does not necessarily mean the end of casualties. For 
instance in 2015, 300 people lost their lives at sea in September and October 
of that year when there was a sort of an open borders policy (MSF 2015). 
Thus, open borders cannot be successful without the provision of safe 
passage. In the event described in Act II for example, the borders were open, 
however, the sinking of the boat was not preventable as those on it did not 
have a safe option of crossing the sea border between Greece and Turkey; 
although there were no victims that day, the experience left its mark on 
everyone involved. Taking into consideration that people will continue to cross 
borders, for various reasons, the concept of safe passage includes the 
provision of safe and legal ways for people to seek asylum. One of these 
ways was the implementation of the EU’s emergency relocation scheme 
which promised to safely relocate 65,000 refugees from Greece and Italy to 
other European countries (European Commission n.d; International Organ-
ization on Migration n.d.). The EU’s relocation scheme offers safe access to 
asylum to thousands of refugees in Greece and Italy but it is far from perfect 
as, at the time of this writing, it is scheduled to discontinue without meeting its 
promised limit (Amnesty International 2017). Relocation was eventually a 
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failed policy. The way it was implemented did not take into consideration 
people’s needs and family ties as they were selected by European states and 
they did not have the chance to choose their destination. This, in turn, meant 
that some ended up in countries where they had no connections. 
At the same time, the EU did not take into consideration the continuation of 
refugee arrivals in Greece and the shifting of the routes. Once the EU-Turkey 
Statement was implemented, numbers were limited remarkably but arrivals 
did not stop. Considering that the Statement does not allow the transfer of 
people from the Greek islands where refugees arrive at the mainland to await 
processing of their asylum application, the Greek islands overflowed, as there 
is very limited capacity. For example, as of November 2017, the Greek 
islands hosted 14,586 refugees while their capacity is currently under 8,000 
(UNHCR 2017; Roberts 2017). The camps in turn are in dire conditions and 
those living there suffer from various abuses including refugee trauma 
(Human Rights Watch 2017a and 2017b). Thus, one can say that the way the 
EU has responded to the crisis has resulted in the continuation of violence as 
described in this chapter. 
The failure of states and the European Union to protect refugees amounts to 
their failure to discontinue the violence created by borders. This is where a no 
borders politics comes as an answer. A no borders politics can eventually 
eliminate the violence created by border regimes. However, in order to 
achieve this goal we need to take into consideration that a no borders politics 
involves the refusal of both the border and the state (King 2016, 126–132). 
The theory of no borders politics recognises that there are several tensions 
involved, as those at the centre of this politics – those on the move – seek 
political recognition. How can one refuse the existence of the state but at the 
same time seek political participation and recognition? As King concludes, we 
can overcome these tensions through collaboration of various actors involved 
in the dismissal of the border. 
Negotiating borders even as we aim towards their negation is 
always an ongoing process of overcoming – of being attentive 
to the presence of borders while also trying to render them 
redundant. A no borders politics is not just a naïve demand to 
bring down all borders. It’s a constant, deeply realistic practice 
that undermines their logic and makes other worlds in their 
gaps (King 2016, 152–153).
Constantly working on issues around the refugee crisis in Europe has left me 
with a feeling of unease. The stories I have heard, especially the ones I never 
told in public, have taken their toll on me multiple times. At the same time, this 
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period made me reflect and, to a degree, change my perceptions of the 
border and the state. One chapter is not enough to fully explain or even 
understand the concepts of violent borders and the theory of a no borders 
politics. However, I hope it can be a starting point of the discussion on how 
these two notions interconnect and how we can take them one step further in 
order to find new ways of approaching the notion of borders.
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Empathy and Othering: Framing 
Syria’s Refugee Crisis in the 
British Press
NICOLA LANGDON
‘Choices about words do matter’ 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016)
Since 2011, an increasingly protracted civil war has ravaged Syria, resulting 
in a large-scale refugee crisis. Under threat from the Assad regime, Islamic 
State militants and coalition airstrikes, thousands of refugees and migrants 
prefer to risk the tumultuous seas of the Mediterranean in order to seek 
refuge on Europe’s borders, generating the largest mass movement of people 
in recent history (European Commission 2015, 1). In 2015, the number of ‘sea 
arrivals’ to Europe totalled 1,004,356, almost five times the figure for 2014 
(International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 2016). For many of those 
travelling by boat to seek sanctuary in the European Union (EU), the journey 
is a perilous one. The boats used are often small, overcrowded or unsea-
worthy, and many have perished in the Mediterranean Sea. The IOM 
estimates the number of fatalities in the Mediterranean at 3,771 in 2015 (IOM 
2016). 
Desperate images of overcrowded boats and a mountain of discarded 
lifejackets on the Greek island of Lesbos have appeared in the media over 
the preceding months (see BBC 2015c; CNN 2016). However, none pricks 
the consciousness like the image of a small boy face-down in the lap of the 
waves. On 2 September 2015, Turkish photojournalist Nilüfer Demir 
immortalised the tragedy of the refugee crisis by tweeting a photo of Aylan 
Kurdi, a Syrian toddler who drowned crossing the Mediterranean to Turkey 
alongside the hashtag #KiyiyaVuranInsanlik (English translation ‘humanity 
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washed ashore’ (Demir 2015). British print media remediated this harrowing 
image and presented it to us as the epitome of human vulnerability and 
Western shame (see Burrows 2015; Dubuis 2015; Hartley-Brewer 2015; 
Rayner and Dominiczak 2015; Smith and Goddard 2015). A cosmopolitan 
outlook was created as we imagined Aylan Kurdi, in his shorts and t-shirt, as 
our son and brother. The converse framing saw the Western media talking of 
the dangers of the refugee crisis. Calais was a ‘war zone’ or ‘gauntlet’, and 
‘swarms’ of people were trying to ‘storm’ the UK (Bland 2015; Fricker 2015; 
Ingham 2015; Saunders 2015; Whitehead 2015), or risk their children’s lives 
in precarious border crossings, or to unknown traffickers.
This chapter considers the ways in which we imagine such large-scale 
movements of people by considering the British press reporting of the crisis. 
In doing so, the chapter highlights ways in which the Syrian refugee crisis is 
constructed and presented, contributing to our understanding of this 
humanitarian emergency. The first is a ‘threat’ framing of the crisis which 
considers those in flight as threatening to the UK through criminality, 
immorality, fraud and divergent identities. The vulnerability of those in flight is 
perpetuated through dehumanisation, indifference and ‘othering’ as we 
elevate the perception of threats to the UK above the individual suffering of 
those who are displaced. The second framing draws the crisis near to us in 
proximity, perception and empathy, instilling a cosmopolitan conception of this 
as the moral responsibility of humanity. This chapter discusses the discursive 
construction of the crisis within the British media, considering how such 
understandings may shape our perceptions, affecting our compassion for 
those suffering from forms of violence and insecurity, and our support for 
policy-making that seeks to manage such crises. Scott Blinder has examined 
such latent perceptions of immigrants in British public opinion, and while not 
establishing causality, highlights the capacity of media coverage to indirectly 
influence attitudes on immigration (Blinder 2015, 96). Similarly, a study by 
Duffy and Frere-Smith for the Social Research Institute Ipsos MORI highlights 
that ‘cause and effect’ runs in all directions between the public, politicians and 
the media on the issue of immigration. The study finds that there is sufficient 
evidence ‘to suggest that the media have an independent effect on views of 
immigration and therefore that the accuracy and balance of their coverage 
needs careful scrutiny’ (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014).  
Media Framing: Power and Perception
The media are the primary channel through which domestic and foreign 
politics are disseminated to the public (McCombs and Shaw 1972). The press 
therefore plays an extremely significant role in shaping our understandings of 
issues such as migration (Allen 2016; Blinder and Allen 2015) and may do 
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this through the notion of media framing. A frame is a ‘central organizing idea’ 
(Gamson and Modigliani 1987, 143), or way of viewing the world that may 
lead to the promotion of particular understandings (Lawlor 2015, 329). This is 
achieved through the use of select information, language constructions and 
linguistic tools. Within the field of political communication, interest lies in how 
frames may shape political understandings and influence policy decision-
making. The media form a significant site within which ‘various social groups, 
institutions, and ideologies struggle over the definition and construction of 
social reality’ (Gurevitch and Levy 1985, 19), and as such frames are not 
value-neutral. Media texts utilise language and image to present information 
and events through particular frameworks. As such, they play a constitutive 
role (Lamont 2015, 92) and also perpetuate latent power;
We walk around with media-generated images of the world, 
using them to construct meaning about political and social 
issues. The lens through which we receive these images is not 
neutral but evinces the power and point of view of the political 
and economic elites who operate and focus it. And the special 
genius of this system is to make the whole process seem so 
normal and natural that the very art of social construction is 
invisible (Gamson et al. 1992, 374).
Frames often operate through the use of cultural resonance or magnitude 
(Entman 2004, 6). Cultural resonance involves discursive constructs that 
appear culturally familiar to the audience, or which ‘strike a responsive chord’ 
(Snow and Benford 1988, 207). This may be through the use of language that 
is ‘noticeable, understandable, memorable, and emotionally charged’ (Entman 
2004, 6). Magnitude, refers to the weight or strength of the frame, and may 
involve the repetition of words or themes to stimulate effect or metaphor, 
exemplars, catchphrases, depictions and visual images (Gamson and 
Modigliani 1989, 3–4). A frame is successful to the extent that it is 
unconsciously accepted by its recipient audience. The ramification of this is 
that we are insentiently influenced by what we see and hear through the 
media, and thus the promotion of certain understandings and policy reactions 
appear naturalised.
Forced Migration and Discursive Representation
The extant migration literature base has focussed upon empirical exp-
eriences, the normative and legal basis for migration and the role of 
institutions like the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
(Loescher 2001), or political and security implications (Loescher et al. 2008). 
However, a developing field addresses the discursive construction of forced 
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displacement. Much of this literature has considered migrants and refugees 
entering Australia, which has pursued a notoriously strict border policy 
towards non-nationals entering the country in recent years through the 
‘Pacific Solution’ (2001–2007)1. Such stringent policies have stimulated 
research into the attitudinal factors surrounding migration. There have been a 
variety of studies focussing upon the perceptions of those entering Australia 
(Lueck et al. 2015; McKay et al. 2011). Others discuss how these perceptions 
are generally negative and involve marginalisation through specific identity 
constructions such as ‘illegal immigrant’ or ‘boat people’ (O’Doherty and 
Lecouteur 2007), or dehumanisation through the establishment of a culture of 
fear around refugee-hood and displacement (Bleiker et al. 2013; Esses et al. 
2013). 
British media narratives on migration have addressed similar topics, such as 
the construction of asylum seekers as a ‘threat’ and legitimisation of 
subsequent restrictive policies towards immigration (Innes 2010) and the 
difference in attitudes between British public and experts working closely on 
asylum issues (Pearce and Stockdale 2009). Lawlor (2015) looks specifically 
at the media framing of immigration in Canadian and British newsprint. Balch 
and Balabanova (2016) have considered the communitarian and cosmop-
olitan framing of immigration within the British media with regard to the free 
movement of Romanians and Bulgarians from 2006–2013. Their study 
highlights the prevalence of communitarian framings of immigration within the 
British press, to the almost exclusion of cosmopolitan ideals.
Studies are emerging that examine the forced migration towards Europe that 
has been occurring since 2014; considering Mediterranean border policies 
(Lendaro 2016), discursive representations within Germany (Holmes and 
Castañeda 2016), or of Syrian refugees within social media (Rettberg and 
Gajjala 2016). Stuart Allan has looked specifically at the stereotypes surr-
ounding the Syrian refugee crisis, focussing upon the visual images of the 
Syrian child, Aylan Kurdi, who drowned in an attempt to cross from Turkey to 
Greece in September 2015 (Allan 2016). Furthermore, a key development 
has been a contemporary report prepared for the UNHCR, and also in 
conjunction with Cardiff University, which examines the press coverage of the 
EU refugee and migrant crisis through a content analysis of the newsprint in 
five European Countries, including the UK (Berry et al. 2015). This significant 
study arose from the evident mixed reportage of the migration, leading the 
1  The ‘Pacific Solution’ refers to the Howard Government’s 2001 policy to intercept 
asylum seekers on ‘unauthorised’ or ‘irregular maritime arrival’ (IMA) vessels in 
Australian waters and transfer them to processing centres on the Pacific islands of 
Nauru or Manus. The policy was contentious and received a great deal of criticism due 
to the conditions and length of stay within the offshore processing centres (Phillips 
2012).
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UNHCR to commission a report examining the drivers of such coverage. The 
findings of the study suggested there were significant differences between the 
five countries’ coverage of the crisis, from the sources used and language 
employed, to the problematising of the crisis, as well as the dominant themes 
presented. The report suggests that out of the five countries under analysis 
(Spain, Italy, Germany, UK, Sweden), UK coverage had the most negative 
and polarised coverage of the crisis, often presenting the issue as a social or 
cultural threat. This chapter develops upon these existing works, considering 
the discursive framing of the Syrian refugee crisis within the British press and 
the consequences of such ways of viewing the world.
‘Threat Framing’ and ‘Othering’ within British Newsprint
The presence of negative framings were clearly evident within the British 
press in 2015 during the height of refugee migration towards the EU. The 
dominant negative construction involved the attachment of some kind of 
‘threat’ to those displaced. This threat framing was constructed from a variety 
of negative portrayals, racial stereotypes (Allan 2016), fallacious attachments 
to acts of criminality or terrorism, and a questioning of refugees’ authenticity. 
These negativities were projected through the use of selective terminology 
and misleading information, the use of metaphorical statements and the 
evocation of past experiences of mass migration, such as during the 
Rwandan Genocide and World War II. The creation and projection of a threat 
frame played to domestic audiences already experiencing social anxiety due 
to financial austerity, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, terror incidents in the 
UK and Europe and increasing Islamophobia and racial tensions. Such 
anxieties led to an ingroup-outgroup mentality (Holmes and Castañeda 2016, 
13) as well as increased support for right-wing political parties in the UK and 
Europe, such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) who utilised the 
immigration debate to further their cause (Berry 2015, 1).
During the EU Referendum campaign, immigration formed the central 
foundation of the ‘Leave campaign’, supported by UKIP. A consequence was 
the stoking of social fears through the promulgation of an ‘immigration as 
threat’ framing, which was repeated through the press. This was particularly 
stark within traditionally right partisan press, but also evident throughout more 
liberal media in perhaps less pejorative ways (see Balch and Balabanova 
2017). At the height of the campaign, UKIP produced a billboard poster 
showing a throng of ‘migrants’ making the journey to the Croatia-Slovenia 
border. The people in the poster appear to be Arab and predominantly male, 
and it carries the tagline ‘Breaking Point’. The poster was internationally 
criticised within the media (Bilefsy 2016; Hopkins 2016; Safdar 2016; Stewart 
and Mason 2016), however despite condemnation the poster and the ensuing 
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discussion reinforced already evident social constructions. Firstly, that this 
was a ‘crisis’ – a situation at ‘breaking point’. Secondly, that those making the 
journey towards the refugee camp are young males – usually outside of the 
social constructs of victimhood (Bleiker et al. 2013, 408). Such imagery 
immediately leads to questions of authenticity. If this was a genuine 
humanitarian situation, where are the women, children and elderly – those 
assumed ‘most vulnerable’ in society? Instead, the poster shows primarily 
males under 65, providing the implication that they are seeking socio-
economic opportunities rather than fleeing persecution and violence, and 
establishing those in flight as ‘cowardly’ (Rettberg and Gajjala 2016, 180). 
Thirdly, the photo is hauntingly reminiscent of Nazi propaganda of Jewish 
refugees during World War II. These links were highlighted on Twitter and 
within some of the British press where UKIP leader Nigel Farage was widely 
berated for his insensitive ‘gutter politics’ (Stewart and Mason 2016).
The British press referred frequently to the refugee movement as a ‘crisis’. By 
describing the situation in this way, the event is instantly magnified as 
something critical and uncontrolled. Such speech acts take the issue out of 
the normal political process, placing it on the security agenda as something 
threatening; portraying ‘enemies at the gate’ (Esses et al. 2013, 519). 
Similarly, the situation was often referred to using metaphorical language or 
statements. These frequently were of an ecological nature, such as descri-
bing a ‘flood’, ‘deluge’, ‘tide’ or ‘swamp’ (Holmes and Castañeda 2016, 18; 
Parker 2015, 7), or using descriptors such as ‘swarm’. In the following 
statement, published in The Independent, Fergusson describes the situation 
as a ‘storm’, highlighting the scale of its ‘force’, and suggests a lack of 
situational control. ‘This is not a passing storm. We are in the grip of forces 
that have already accelerated beyond our control’ (Fergusson 2015).
The ecological nature of the language used suggests a natural power that is 
overwhelming or uncontrollable. Such terms reduce the event to an 
anonymous mass movement without consideration of the individual human 
element contained within. Terms such as ‘swarm’ suggest an individual 
element as part of a large collectivity, but degrades that individual element to 
the level of an insect or pest. We rarely use the word ‘swarm’ outside of 
descriptors about insects. Prime Minister David Cameron was criticised for 
his description of a ‘swarm of people’ entering the UK. While he defended this 
as an attempt to convey the scale of the situation, such terms reduce the 
displaced to numbers rather than people, which leads to a ‘denial of humanity’ 
(Esses et al. 2013, 519) and promotes the idea of people as dirty or diseased 
– associations we commonly make with pests. Nigel Farage and The 
Independent utilised theological metaphors to illustrate the scale of the 
refugee movement, suggesting this was something of magnitude and out of 
human control.
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[E]xodus of biblical proportions (Farage, in Mail Online 2015).
The figures already sound biblical (Fergusson 2015).
Both uses of metaphorical language dehumanise the vulnerable people 
affected. It is such dehumanisation that distances us from those experiencing 
such displacement, and leads us to consider them apart from ourselves. 
Instead of part of global humanity, they are the distant ‘other’, the ‘huddled 
masses’ (The Daily Telegraph 2015) or ‘irregular’ (Fergusson 2015). 
Furthermore, terms such as ‘swarm’ that conjure imagery of refugees as 
insects are disturbingly redolent of the hate language utilised to incite militias 
during the Rwandan genocide (1994) in their denunciation of the Tutsi as 
cockroaches (Melvern 2000, 227), or the Nazi regime descriptions of Jews as 
parasites (Kenez 2013, 91). The statements below are illustrative of this 
dehumanisation. The first is made by Katie Hopkins, a former columnist for 
The Sun who is recognised for rather vitriolic opinion pieces. In it, she makes 
explicit, distasteful references to cockroaches and the Ethiopian famine 
during the early 1980s. The second statement from an article published by 
The Express uses the water metaphor of a ‘torrent’. This statement also 
describes those in flight as ‘migrant stowaways’. This has the consequence of 
implying that these are economic migrants and that they are partaking in 
illegal activity – ‘stowing away to get into Europe’.
Make no mistake, these migrants are like cockroaches. They 
might look a bit “Bob Geldof’s Ethiopia circa 1984”, but they 
are built to survive a nuclear bomb (Hopkins 2015).
MIGRANTS SWARM TO BRITAIN: Torrent of stowaway 
migrants on a typical day in borderless UK [emphasis in 
original] (Chapman 2015).
The identity constructions of the refugees within the media also shape our 
perception of the forced migration. The UK media overwhelmingly referred to 
this as a ‘migrant’ crisis rather than utilising any other term for those 
displaced. The use of the term ‘migrant’ does not acknowledge the reasons 
for flight in the first instance. Rather, it suggests a level of agency in the 
decision-making process that for many is illusory. While there is always a 
choice to be made on an individual level to take particular action, the use of 
the term ‘migrant’ trivialises the complexities of this decision. It also 
associates those taking flight in the most precarious and dangerous of 
situations with economic migrants, emigrating for socioeconomic oppor-
tunities. The extracts below suggest an animal or gang-like group of 
‘migrants’ and asks us to question how many people can realistically be 
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resettled in the UK and Europe. The last extract suggests ‘migrants’ are 
‘invading’ the UK. Such rhetoric appeals to nationalistic sentiments and 
notions of strengthening sovereignty and border controls. 
MIGRANTS: HOW MANY MORE CAN WE TAKE? [emphasis 
in original] (Doughty et al. 2015).
[R]oaming packs of migrants (Gutteridge 2015).
New migrant ‘invasion’ of Britain bigger than the Vikings, 
Romans and Norman Conquest (Barnett 2016).
The normative categorisations of displacement are not made cogent within 
the press reports of the issue. The interchangeable use of the terms migrant/
asylum-seeker/refugee is damaging, leading to the undermining of public 
support for refugees and the denial of legal protection at the most vulnerable 
times (UNHCR 2016). While it is evident that some of those making the 
hazardous crossing to Europe are doing so for socioeconomic reasons, it is 
unwise to refer to this as a ‘migrant’ crisis when so many of those people are 
forcibly displaced by conflict and persecution. Moreover, the reasons for flight 
are at best trivialised, and at worst denied through a confusion between the 
push of conflict and insecurity and the draw of improved socioeconomic 
circumstances.
This delegitimisation is further compounded by overt claims to the sincerity 
and lawfulness of those in flight. The British press frequently made claims to 
the authenticity of those crossing to Europe, suggesting these were economic 
migrants, or suggesting they were fraudulent claims for asylum in order to ‘get 
into the country’, or that they should not be allowed into the UK as it was not 
the entry EU Member State under the Dublin Regulation2. 
[The BBC] carried an interview with a remarkably healthy 
looking Syrian refugee claiming not to have eaten for 16 days 
and who said he was going to be a European table tennis 
champion [emphasis added] (Clark 2015).
[W]e have been too quick to listen to the sob stories of 
terrorists disguised as asylum seekers and too quick to ask 
whether  there might be a good reason that their home 
countries were out to arrest them (Clark 2015).
2  Under the Dublin Regulation, asylum claims should be made within the first state 
entered (Lendaro 2016, 151).
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Frequently the press made references to ‘migrants’ receiving welfare in the 
UK being privileged above UK nationals (Berry et al. 2015, 253). Such 
reports, more prevalent within the British tabloid press demarcate those 
entering the UK as receiving preferential treatment, exacerbating social 
tensions and overall perceptions of refugees and migrants as untrustworthy 
(Parker 2015, 8), unlawful (Lueck et al. 2015, 619), ‘cheating the British 
system’ (Esses et al. 2013, 523) or causing injustices to British citizens and 
values.
As well as questions over the genuineness of those seeking asylum, the 
British press often made explicit links between those in flight and criminality, 
trafficking gangs or terrorists. Such accusations, often spurious, serve to 
cognitively link those vulnerable and in need of assistance with criminality 
(Lendaro 2016, 153; Lueck et al. 2015, 617; Parker 2015, 6), reinforcing the 
negative threat framing through which the forced migration is constructed.
What we can’t do is allow people to break into our country 
(Cameron, in Chapman 2015).
Armed gangs smuggling migrants to UK for £2,000 (Sheldrick 
2015).
Britain at risk of Mediterranean migrant crisis after second boat 
reaches UK in two weeks (Barnett and Sykes 2016).
In the statements above, The Express Online perpetuate the construction of 
refugees and migrants as criminals. They reproduce a comment from 
Cameron suggesting that people are ‘breaking in’ to the UK. The second 
extract illustrates the trafficking of refugees and migrants, suggesting gangs 
are violent and hold links to the UK. That the passport of a Syrian refugee 
was found near the body of one of the suicide bombers responsible for the 
Paris terror attacks in November 2015 solidified claims that terrorists were 
entering Europe under the pretence of refugee-hood (Lendaro 2016, 150). 
Links to people smugglers (often the only way for many to commence the 
arduous journey over land or sea)(UNHCR 2017, 1), constructs the desire for 
safety and asylum as a shady or ‘deviant’ activity (McKay et al. 2011, 117, 
124) pursued by those without a genuine need for assistance; human 
desperation is not sufficient cause.
These discursive devices combine to construct those journeying to the EU in 
search of sanctuary in a negative and threatening way, where those 
experiencing insecurity are constructed as perpetuating insecurity (Innes 
2010, 462). In framing refugees in this way, we protract the geographical and 
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cultural distance between the observer ‘us’ and the suffering ‘them’. The 
British press were complicit in promoting an ingroup-outgroup perception of 
the refugee emergency. This was a terrible situation, but these people were 
constructed as culturally dissimilar, economic migrants, criminals, fraudsters, 
terrorists or immoral.
‘Cosmopolitan Framing’ and the Death of Aylan Kurdi
In contrast to the negative ‘threat’ frame construction of those experiencing 
displacement, the British press also promoted a ‘cosmopolitan’ frame which 
emphasised a shared understanding of morality and the universality of 
humanity. Rather than perceiving those displaced as threatening, this frame 
identified with their vulnerabilities and may also provoke calls for some form 
of official assistance or aid in the drive to alleviate the suffering of others. In 
recognising the universality of human experience, it draws the event closer in 
our consciousness so that we are viewing from a position of morality, 
empathy and solidarity rather than distance and apathy. Those experiencing 
displacement are constructed as part of global humanity by reporting that 
highlights personal experience, tragedy or ‘human-interest’. This point is 
illustrated in the statement below by Zena Agha in The Independent, who 
describes the fate of her cousin who died crossing the Mediterranean.
Just because he was a migrant doesn’t mean his life was 
worthless – geography was the only difference between us 
and him (Agha 2015).
Agha also highlights the fickleness of the media, whereby certain human 
interest stories become the hooks upon which an article is hung, while many 
more people suffer without voice or media attention. Her point was valid and 
came two days before the death of three-year old Aylan Kurdi, who has been 
credited with a change in UK public interest and attitudes towards the 
emergency (BBC 2015b; Gunter 2015; Kingsley and Timur 2015). However, a 
cosmopolitan framing was evident prior to this tragedy and is illustrated by the 
first two extracts below which emphasise the UK’s moral position in the world 
and the universality of humanity. The third statement illustrates the converse, 
suggesting that the UK cannot help all of the people all of the time and thus 
we should expect individual tragedies like Agha’s cousin and Aylan.
Europe has to help – just as we did in generations past. We 
cannot carry like this. It’s immoral, it’s cowardly and it’s not the 
British way (Wintour 2015).
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Those of us lucky enough to live in stability must understand 
that the problems of those less fortunate are, in a sense both 
practical and moral, our problems, too (The Times 2015).
[C]ommon sense says that Britain cannot save the world (The 
Express Online 2015).
The cosmopolitan framing of this movement of people towards the EU apexes 
with the death of Aylan Kurdi, alongside his mother Rehana and brother Galip 
as they crossed from Turkey to Greece. The image of Aylan lying face down 
on the sandy shoreline was picked up globally by the media and the British 
press were no exception. With Aylan’s death was felt a shift in the media 
framing of the refugee movement (BBC 2015b; Gunter 2015; Kingsley and 
Timur 2015). Rather than a threat, the image of Aylan was one of innocence 
and tragedy. The little boy was portrayed as a victim of a tragic situation 
rather than a criminal. Aylan was not a terrorist. This image of death and 
innocence was a profound and shocking one, resonating with audiences, 
encouraging us to view Aylan as our child or little brother (Nicole Itano, in 
Gunter 2015; Bouckaert, in Laurent 2015). This was, in part, easy to do. Aylan 
looked like any toddler in shorts and t-shirt, his clothing no doubt aided this 
imagining for those in the West. While many images of death and violence 
shown in the media are grisly and bloody, this photo was shocking for its 
calmness – ‘he could have been sleeping except for the context’ (Itano, in 
Gunter 2015). What goes comparatively unnoticed is that Aylan’s mother and 
brother both perished alongside him. It is, however, the visual power of Aylan 
that is symbolic and resonates in our consciousness. The visual element of 
the frame provides evidence of his suffering and experience that is more 
emotionally affecting than any statistic (Bleiker et al. 2013, 399, 408). We are 
led to question with outrage how this little boy came to end up face down in 
the sand. What would drive this terrible situation? And what can be done 
about it? 
Despite this sorrowing event, some of the British tabloid press still questioned 
the authenticity of the family’s refugee status, with The Express Online 
suggesting the family had been safe in Turkey and were ‘not in deadly peril’ 
(Lee 2015). This illustrates how some elements of the British press continued 
to construct this event through a ‘threat frame’, seeking to disparage the 
validity of the Kurdi family’s vulnerability and experience, thereby suggesting 
less legitimate reasons for their displacement and encouraging us to doubt 
and distrust. This may of course reflect the partisanship of The Daily Express, 
a traditionally right-wing paper showing support to UKIP (Mason 2015) who 
utilised the immigration debate to underpin their campaign for the UK to 
rescind its EU membership in the 2016 referendum.
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The consequence of this potent symbolism was to bolster a cosmopolitan 
framing of the refugee movement, encouraging us to look beyond the 
negative imagery of ‘swarms’ of ‘migrants’ and recognise a responsibility to 
humanity. We are reminded that these people are human too. That in order 
for families to be making this perilous crossing of the Mediterranean, the 
situation at home must be more insecure, and that for Aylan and his family 
this was a journey of necessity not choice. This cosmopolitan framing 
encourages us to consider the refugee movement in a more proximate way, 
encouraging empathy and assistance rather than fear and ‘othering’. 
These two ways of perceiving the refugee crisis were conflictual and prod-
uced a competing narrative. This contestation was more evident after the 
death of the toddler Aylan Kurdi which seemed to alter, albeit temporarily, the 
discursive vista towards a more cosmopolitan moral frame. While these 
diverse ways of constructing reality may provide an equilibrium of sorts – 
what Entman has termed ‘frame parity’ (2010, 418), the reality is more like a 
swinging pendulum, where one frame tends to dominate with some cont-
estation from a counterframe. Furthermore, such frame contestation may in 
part reflect the partisan nature of British newsprint. It is regarded that the 
British press have traditionally held political leanings and we could therefore 
anticipate that those standpoints may in part be reflected in the media framing 
of a highly politicised issue such as immigration.
Conclusion
Why is it that some refugees are considered legitimate, innocent and worthy 
of assistance and others are criminals, illegitimate and not worthy of ass-
istance? How the media frames such events has the ability to shape our 
understandings and perceptions. By framing the refugee movement as a 
threat, we cognitively distance it and shift the social responsibility for 
assistance away from ourselves. The threat frame allows us to perceive this 
as the suffering of a distant ‘other’. The proximity of the event is distanced 
geographically and cognitively, and any cultural resonance is minimised. We 
are permitted to voyeur from afar or turn away from the suffering ‘other’. 
Subsequently, empathy is diminished alongside compassion and forms of 
moral responsibility, permitting us to legitimise certain policy responses. The 
projection of a threat resonates to cognitive schema already primed by 
financial, social and racial tensions, the visibility of atrocities committed by 
terrorists such as ISIS, and stoked in some cases by nationalist politics. 
Cultural stereotyping creates social and racial boundaries, whereby refugees 
belong to the same geographical region or religion as those we see as 
committing heinous terror attacks like in Paris (2015) or Brussels (2016). We 
form false collectivities and perpetuate the persecution of those suffering 
103 Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century
through simplistic stereotypes and indifference, which leads to 
‘revictimisation’ (Bleiker et al. 2013, 411). We fail to recognise that many of 
those seeking asylum in Europe are fleeing civil war, external intervention and 
the terror of ISIS as well. 
A cosmopolitan framing helps us to perceive this as an issue for global 
humanity that we are all responsible for, and compels us to assist in the 
mitigation of suffering. The image of Aylan Kurdi cognitively resonates as we 
think of him as our own child or brother. The symbolism of his image forces us 
to reconsider this morally as a humanitarian issue requiring social respon-
sibility and assistance. In encouraging us to view through a cosmopolitan 
frame, the media may go some way to alleviate the hostility around issues 
such as immigration, strengthening human bonds and moral responses, and 
mitigating against a dereliction of the suffering of ‘others’ or the perpetuation 
of difference and indifference that contributes to a ‘threat’ construction and 
fear response. However, the longevity of such a framing is in question, and 
we must wonder how many Aylan’s are required for such ways of perceiving 
the world to resound – ‘It shouldn’t take a viral image to make us care about 
other people’ (Agha 2015). At the time of writing the British media have a new 
symbol in Omran Daqneesh, a five-year-old rescued from the carnage of an 
airstrike in Syria. He sits shocked and bloodied in the back of an ambulance 
as the world press captured his photograph and the headlines resound once 
again with ‘global outrage’ (Coghlan and Philp 2016).
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7
Conflict and Migration in the 
Middle East: Syrian Refugees in 
Jordan and Lebanon
KAMEL DORAÏ
Since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011, nearly five million refugees 
settled in neighbouring countries. This massive refugee movement follows 
others, such as the forced exile of Palestinians after the creation of the State 
of Israel in 1948, Lebanese from 1975 to 1990 or Iraqis since the early 1980s 
(Chatty 2010). Refugee movements are one of the major consequences of 
the political crises in the Middle East in recent decades. As a result, the 
region is hosting one of the largest refugee populations in the world, while 
most of the host countries (except Turkey and Israel with time and 
geographical restrictions) are not signatories of the Geneva Convention of 
1951. In consequence there is no specific asylum legislation in these host 
countries (Kagan 2011). The region is also characterised by strong and 
ancient human mobility as a result of regional economic disparities and 
transnational social ties (Marfleet 2007). Today’s forced migration movements 
appear to be linked with previous cross border migration at a regional level. 
Current geographical distribution of Syrian refugees is partially shaped by 
pre-existing ties and regional labour migration. This chapter will focus first on 
the socio-political consequences of the mass arrival of Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon and Jordan. It will focus more specifically on the gradual changes of 
migration policies in both countries and their consequences on migration 
patterns. Special attention will be placed on Palestinian refugees from Syria, 
who face double displacement. It will then analyse the forms of settlement of 
Syrian refugees in both countries, with a focus on Jordan. The Syrian crisis 
has led to a shift in the Jordanian settlement policy. Until 2012, when Zaatari 
camp opened in Northern Jordan, the reluctance of the authorities of the host 
countries to open new camps was based on the fear of permanent settlement 
of refugees on their territory, as is the case for Palestinians.
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Conflict, Migration and the Syrian Crisis in the Middle East
The current Syrian forced migration movement has produced deep changes 
in the Middle East migration system. Before 2011, Syria was hosting large 
numbers of refugees, comprised mainly of Palestinians and Iraqis but also 
Sudanese and Somalis (Doraï 2011). Meanwhile hundreds of thousands of 
Syrian labour migrants were working in Lebanon and in the Gulf countries 
(Shah 2004). Since the outbreak of the conflict in 2011, Syria is one of the 
main countries of origin of refugees in the world, with more than five million 
Syrians fleeing their home, mostly to neighbouring countries. According to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Turkey, Lebanon, 
Jordan and Iraq are currently hosting the vast majority of the Syrian refugees.







Syrian refugees registered at the UNHCR, Oct. 2016 (UNHCR n.d.b)
The high concentration of Syrian refugees in the Middle East can be partly 
explained by the historical and previous migratory links existing between the 
countries in the region. Bilateral agreements existed to facilitate the 
circulation and employment – with restrictions – of people. Regional mobility 
pre-existed the independence of states in the region. When national borders 
were created at the beginning of the twentieth century, this circular migration 
transformed into transnational networks. The settlement of Syrian refugees is 
also the result of an open door policy during the first two years of the conflict. 
The Middle East is not an exception as most of the refugees in the world find 
asylum in neighbouring countries (UNHCR 2016, 15). The settlement of these 
refugees is also linked to the development of increasingly restrictive migration 
policies by most of the European countries, with the exception of Germany 
and Sweden. These two countries have received 64% of the total asylum 
applications in Europe (UNHCR n.d.a). 
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The recent agreement between Turkey and the European Union aims to 
stabilise Syrian refugees outside EU territory (Krumm 2015). European Union 
countries try to limit new entries, while the causes of departures are not 
addressed effectively both for those who continue to leave Syria or their 
country of first asylum (Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq). Some new agreements are 
being implemented in neighbouring countries. For example, since April 2016, 
Jordan has adopted a new regulation to give Syrian workers access to the 
labour market, but it still concerns a limited number of refugees (according to 
the Jordan Ministry of Labour, 37,000 Syrian workers had obtained a work 
permit by the end of 2016). The permanence of conflict is always a 
determining factor that leads to more departures. Meanwhile, the condition of 
exile in neighbouring countries leads to increasing impoverishment of the 
poorest refugees who have limited access to the legal labour market and 
resources. The Syrians are mostly confined to the informal sector and very 
exposed to competition with other migrant groups, such as Egyptian workers. 
Their precarious legal status is also a source of instability. The combination of 
all these factors explains the continuing migration to Europe.
From Cross-Border Circulation to Restrictive Migration Policies
The current Syrian refugee movement cannot be understood without taking 
into consideration the history of cross-border mobility in the region. Before 
2011, migratory circulation was sustained by the existence of well-established 
transnational networks. Circulation from Syria towards Lebanon or Jordan 
had different purposes: family visits, marriage or commercial activities. If the 
presence of Syrians is well documented in Lebanon (Chalcraft 2009; 
Longuenesse 2015), the current Syrian crisis has shed light on the growing 
presence of Syrians in Jordan (Al Khouri 2004). Historical links existed 
between Southern Syria and Northern Jordan – especially tribal and family 
links – even if it is difficult to evaluate their number before 2011. There was 
also a group of Syrians who found asylum in Jordan in 1982 after the Hama 
massacre. Some of them settled permanently in Jordan and opened 
businesses. They are well integrated in the Jordanian society and participate 
actively in the private sector.1
Migration policies of neighbouring states have dramatically changed since 
2011. Syrians were enjoying relative freedom of cross-border mobility towards 
Lebanon and Jordan. They also had access – with some restrictions in both 
countries – to the labour market. Both countries had signed agreements with 
the Syrian government to facilitate the circulation of migrant workers. Due to 
the mass arrival of Syrians after 2011 and the fear of their permanent 
1  Interviews by Kamel Doraï and Myriam Ababsa in Sahab (Jordan) in 2016 with 
municipality representatives and Syrian investors.
116Conflict and Migration in the Middle East: Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon
settlement in the country, Lebanon suspended a bilateral agreement in 2014 
– originally implemented in 1994 – on the access of Syrians to the labour 
market (Longuenesse 2015). At the same time, refugees were still arriving en 
masse in the country, trying to find jobs. If the conflict in Syria has led to the 
forced migration of hundreds of thousands of refugees, economic migration 
did not disappear. Nearly 400,000 Syrians were working in Lebanon before 
2011 (Chalcraft 2009). Most of them became de facto forced migrants, as 
they could not go back home. A large portion of them registered with the 
UNHCR (Knudsen 2017). Jordan has also gradually implemented restrictive 
entry policies for Syrians (Ababsa 2015). The opening of the Zaatari refugee 
camp in July 2012 can be considered a first turning point to regulate entries of 
Syrian refugees. Then more restrictions were imposed. Today, even if the 
border is still officially open, very few Syrian refugees are allowed to enter. 
The main consequence is that the camp of Rukban on the eastern part of the 
border transformed from a transit place into a camp. It now hosts more than 
85,000 Syrian refugees in a no man’s land between the two countries with 
very limited access to humanitarian assistance (UNHCR 2017).
One important element to take into consideration is that there is no clear 
distinction between migration policy and asylum policy in Lebanon and 
Jordan. Like other countries in the region, they are not signatories of the 
Geneva Convention of 1951 on refugees (Zaiotti 2006). Only Palestinians are 
recognised as refugees in the state where they have their permanent 
residency when they are registered with United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Thus, both 
countries have no national asylum system. It is the UNHCR that establishes 
asylum procedures in cooperation with host governments. Lebanon and 
Jordan have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UNHCR that 
specifies the mandate of the international organisation (Kagan 2011, 9), from 
which Palestinians (covered by another international organisation, UNRWA) 
are excluded.
Palestinians and Iraqis: From Refugees in Syria to Asylum Seekers?
The massive forced migration of Syrians should not conceal the fact that 
other refugee groups who were residing in Syria have also been forced to 
escape war and violence. UNRWA estimated the total number of Palestinian 
refugees displaced inside Syria at just over 250,000 (half of the total number 
registered in Syria), a large portion originating from Yarmouk camp in 
Damascus. More than 70,000 of them were forced to seek asylum in 
neighbouring countries mainly to Lebanon (50,000), Jordan (6,000) and Egypt 
(9,000) (UNRWA n.d.). Those who are still in Syria, reside in safer places than 
their habitual place of residency (some camps, like Yarmouk in Damascus or 
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Handarat close to Aleppo have been subject to heavy destruction and 
blockade). Eight thousand refugees whose homes were destroyed live in 
UNRWA facilities, generally in schools. Some Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) were able to return to their homes, but the number of new refugees 
that moved en masse remains higher.
The current conflict has had dramatic consequences for the Palestinian 
population in Syria. Palestinians were enjoying access to education and the 
labour market without particular discrimination in Syria before 2011 (Shiblak 
1996). The outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011 consigned Palestinians to 
their stateless status. All this seems to replicate a scenario already seen with 
Palestinians from Iraq in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 
(Doraï and Al Husseini 2013). Palestinian refugees are not covered by the 
UNHCR mandate, as they already receive assistance from the UNRWA 
(Feldman 2012). They lack legal protection transforming them de facto into 
illegal migrants subject to potential deportation towards Syria. Palestinian 
refugees tend to be transformed into asylum seekers by conflicts. Jordan 
quickly decided to close its doors to this category of refugees, limiting 
drastically their possibility to escape violence from Syria. As written by Jalal Al 
Husseini (2015),
after a relatively tolerant phase during which some 10,000 
Palestinian refugees have been able to enter the country, 
Jordan has tightened its entry policy since late 2012 on behalf 
of the need to counter the Israeli vision of Jordan as 
Palestinian homeland of substitution. 
Lebanon, until 2013, had adopted a more flexible policy, and hosted more 
than 75% of the Palestinian refugees from Syria. For the same reasons, 
Lebanon also decided in 2014 to close its borders for them (Doraï 2015). 
The absence of a legal framework concerning Palestinian refugees, who are 
forced to leave their country of residence as well as the political treatment of 
the Palestinian refugees by states in the region, raises the problem of 
secondary migration during conflict. Refugees already residing in Syria 
(mainly Iraqis and Palestinians) face several limitations to their mobility and 
protection. Because Middle Eastern countries are not signatories of the 1951 
Geneva Convention, they lack protection when they escape a conflict for a 
second time.
Today, other refugees, such as Iraqis who were in Syria before 2011, can face 
similar problems. Iraqi refugees who sought refuge in Syria, mostly in the 
suburbs of Damascus (Doraï 2014), have also been forced to leave their 
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countries of first asylum. The majority returned to Iraq, despite continuing 
violence. Others were able to continue their journey to Europe, North America 
or Australia. According to UNHCR, around 20,000 are still in Syria because 
they cannot leave the country. These populations, already refugees before 
the Syrian conflict, find themselves therefore forced to new mobility in a 
context where Syrian neighbouring countries are reluctant to give them 
asylum. Not being part of the 1951 Geneva Convention, they do not want to 
be considered resettlement countries. As most of these refugees are unable 
to move, even temporarily, in the Middle East, a growing number of them are 
seeking more sustainable solutions outside the region. Jordan and Lebanon 
consider themselves as only temporary host countries and develop policies 
that incite refugees to immigrate to third countries to settle permanently and 
access a new citizenship (Chatelard 2002).
From Exile to Temporary Settlement: Refugees in Camps and Urban 
Refugees
The Syrian crisis has reopened the debate in the region on the creation of 
new refugee camps. While Middle Eastern states chose not to open refugee 
camps during the last Iraqi crisis in 20032, Jordan and Turkey took a different 
decision after 2011 (Achilli et al. 2017). In Lebanon, no official camps have 
been opened. As a result, a myriad of unofficial refugee camps of small sizes 
mushroomed, where refugees are especially vulnerable due to lack of 
coordination of assistance. Most of the current Syrian refugee population 
settle in urban areas or already existing villages to access resources and 
develop their own social and economic activities in certain localities, thereby 
contributing to urban change and development.
The Palestinian Experience and Its Current Consequences
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, host states in the Middle East are 
reluctant to open new refugee camps. The Iraq wars of 1990–1991 and post-
2003 demonstrated for Jordan, Syria and Lebanon that the absence of 
camps, combined with a relative freedom of entry and residence at the 
beginning of the crises and a fairly easy access to public services and 
employment in the informal labour market, have increased the possibility of 
mobility of refugees and therefore their re-emigration to third countries 
(Chatelard and Doraï 2009). Additionally, the decision not to open refugee 
camps is the result of both state policies that try to avoid the creation of 
camps, and the refugees’ very own reasoning. Most of the refugees prefer to 
2  Only Palestinians from Iraq were denied entry in neighbouring countries after 2003. 
Three refugee camps were created at the Iraqi border with Syria to host them before 
being resettled in third countries.
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settle in urban settings or in agricultural areas where they can find 
employment.
Lebanon, where the Palestinian presence – and therefore the camps – is 
marked by a history of conflict (Sayigh 1991) and a complex relationship with 
Palestinian refugees prevails, has so far refused to officially open camps for 
Syrians on its territory. The fear of creating ‘Syrian’ spaces in Lebanon, which 
could lead to the development of political and/or armed movements, remains 
strong for the Lebanese political leaders. Political parties are also deeply 
divided on the Syrian conflict. Some pro-regime groups not belonging to the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) or Hamas, such as the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-CG), support the 
Assad regime while others, through the creation of ‘organizational 
committees’3, support Syrian opposition groups (Napolitano 2012).
In Jordan, the camp of Azraq, built to accommodate 130,000 people when the 
number of arrivals of refugees was very high, is now largely empty. The 
UNHCR has registered almost 55,000 refugees in August 2016, half of 
Azraq’s capacity. Most of the Syrian refugees, when they have the possibility, 
prefer to settle in urban areas where the opportunities of finding a job are 
higher and where rebuilding a ‘normal’ life is easier.
Unlike Lebanon, that hosts more refugees, Jordan opened refugee camps in 
the north of the country to control the flow of new arrivals. Turkey has also 
opened camps along its border with Syria. Nevertheless, at a regional scale, 
still less than 20% of the refugees live in camps. Most of the refugees prefer 
to settle outside camps to integrate into the local economy and develop links 
with the host societies, while refugee camps recently created cannot 
accommodate such a large number of refugees. Jordan opened three main 
camps. Most of the refugees transited through Zaatari, and to a lesser extent 
Azraq camps. Transit camps (Ruqban and Hadalat) have been opened on the 
border between Syria and Jordan parallel to the gradual closure of the border. 
These transit camps have been created to enable Jordanian authorities to 
make safety checks before allowing refugees to enter their territory. The 
waiting time in these camps varies with profiles of the refugees. Those who 
come from territories controlled by Daesh4 have to go through a long security 
3  lijan al-tansiq in Arabic. On the model created in Syrian cities, these committees 
contribute to coordinating actions and exchange information with other groups 
(Napolitano 2012).
4  Daesh is the acronym in Arabic for the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (Bilad al 
Sham is an Arabic term for Mashrek including Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine). It 
is widely used in Arabic countries for Islamic State (IS), the group controlling a portion 
of the Syrian and Iraqi territories.
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procedure, especially young men without family. Until the spring of 2016, 
most of the refugees spent only a few days in these camps before being 
accepted or rejected. Since then, and following an attack on Jordanian border 
guards in June 2013, only a very limited number of refugees were allowed to 
enter through the camp of Ruqban. Once accepted, they are then directed to 
one of three settlement camps. If they have a Jordanian kafil (sponsor) they 
can move and settle elsewhere in the country. 
The Urban Integration of Syrian Refugees
Despite current conflicts, refugee movements in the region are generally long 
lasting (the Palestinian refugee problem started in 1948 and the Iraqi one in 
the early 1980s), and the end of conflict does not always mean return for the 
entire refugee population. The settlement of these populations generates 
significant changes of entire neighbourhoods. Thus, refugees should not be 
considered only as recipients of humanitarian assistance, waiting for an 
eventual return or resettlement to a ‘third country’, but also as actors who 
contribute, through their initiatives and coping strategies, to the development 
of the cities that host them. In an unstable Middle Eastern political context, 
the settlement of different refugee populations demonstrates the importance 
of forced migration in urban development and its articulation with other forms 
of migration such as internal migration and international labour migration.
In Jordan, the physiognomy of the northern villages and cities has been 
deeply transformed by the settlement of refugees. The coexistence between 
Jordanians and Syrians is facilitated by the historical ties that bind the south 
of Syria and the north of the Kingdom. In some border areas, as in the 
northwest of Jordan or in the Beqaa valley in Lebanon, the effects of the 
protracted settlement of a large number of refugees had major effects for the 
local population. The poorest and the most marginalised populations suffer 
from the pressure on the rental market. In the northern cities, such as Irbid, 
Mafraq or Ramtha, rents have increased significantly and are inaccessible to 
the poorest households. Some services, such as schools or the medical 
sector, are also affected. For example, according to the United National 
Development Programme (UNDP), 
with Syrian arrivals, many school classrooms are overcrow-
ded. Many schools have adopted double schedules, which 
entails shortening classes to 35 minutes from 45, and means 
that teachers are now working overtime that they are not 
compensated for (UNDP 2014).
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Syrian Refugee Camps in Jordan
Since mid-2012, three official refugee camps have been opened in Northern 
Jordan (Zaatari, Azraq and Mrajeeb Al Fhood) that host around 140,000 
refugees (22% of the total registered population at the UNHCR). Zaatari camp 
in Northern Jordan, which has nearly 80,000 inhabitants today, is the best 
known for the settlement of Syrian refugees, and today is a makeshift city 
where prefabricated constructions and a few tents are juxtaposed. This area 
concentrates all the paradoxes of the Syrian presence in Jordan. 
Humanitarian organisations (such as UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, Save the 
Children, MSF, etc.) are omnipresent, symbolising the vulnerability of an 
exiled population deprived of resources. Unlike Iraqi refugees who arrived in 
Jordan after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, mostly from the urban 
middle classes, and who had settled in the Jordanian capital, a large 
proportion of Syrian refugees today are from rural areas and therefore more 
vulnerable. They have limited access to the labour market, although 
measures to facilitate obtaining a work permit were made before the summer 
of 2016.
Today it is quite difficult to characterise the Syrian refugee camps, as their 
demographic development has been rapid due to the mass arrival of refugees 
in a short time. Most of the refugees arrived between mid-2012 when 50,000 
were registered, and mid-2013 with more than 500,000 registered. The 
morphology of the camps has changed substantially, from a densely 
populated area where tents and prefabricated housing were situated closely 
next to each other to more urban areas where refugees have built small 
courtyards or small gardens in-between prefabricated housing structures 
growing vegetables. Initially, the camp of Zaatari was a settlement area for 
Syrian refugees. Until 2013, they had the possibility to go back and forth 
without particular control. Exile extending, and the number of refugees 
increasing significantly, the Jordanian authorities gradually started to control 
the camp’s entrances and exits. Today it is a closed space, and refugees 
wishing to leave must obtain a temporary permit that allows them to go to a 
medical appointment in an embassy or see relatives. Similarly, foreigners who 
wish to enter the camp must obtain prior authorisation from the Jordanian 
authorities.
The progressive closure of Zaatari refugee camp aims to better control the 
Syrian refugee population. This process directly impacts the socio-spatial 
organisation of the camp. Despite the constraints linked to strict regulations 
imposed by the host state in coordination with the UNHCR, the camp became 
an area of social and economic life. The refugees are divided by family and 
sometimes by village of origin. Prefabricated housing and tents have been re-
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arranged to create new forms of housing that allowed the creation of private 
spaces. Small shops (such as groceries, hair salons, or restaurants) and 
other small income-generating positions (such as carpenter or electrician) 
developed in the camp. The refugees have tried, whenever possible, to 
recreate a normal life in a highly constrained situation. The camp is shaped 
by international organisations and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs) 
but also by the dynamics generated by the refugees themselves. Despite the 
strict control of the camp, a city has emerged, completely shaped by its 
inhabitants. As soon as the camp opened, an informal economy developed 
throughout the different neighbourhoods of the camp. At the entrance, a 
shopping street – the Souk Street, referred to as ‘Champs Elysées’ by the 
inhabitants of the camp – has emerged. Shops of all kinds mushroomed: 
mobile phone shops, groceries, bakeries, small restaurants, hair salons, 
among others. Street vendors stroll around the camp selling all kinds of 
products. This street has become a central living space symbolising the 
economic dynamism of the refugees.
Controlling the Border: From Transit Camp to Temporary Settlement Place?
The reality of the camps is itself multiple. In the Middle East, alongside the 
main official camps run jointly by humanitarian organisations (local and 
international) and host states, there are also many other forms of 
encampment. In October 2016, more than 80,000 Syrians were trapped in the 
Ruqban transit camps east of the Syria-Jordan border, in a no man’s land 
between the two countries. From crossing points to enter Jordan, these 
spaces have become transit camps where the refugees initially were 
spending between one to ten days. They are now becoming places of 
temporary settlement where refugees spend several weeks or months. The 
tightening of the entry policy in Jordan has turned this entry points into a de 
facto camp at the border. Despite the intervention of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, the humanitarian situation is extremely difficult. 
The question of the camps is intrinsically linked to that of asylum policy and 
border management. As the conflict continues, the tightening of entry policies 
in the territories of Syria’s neighbouring countries jeopardises the possibility 
of circulation for refugees with two main consequences. On the one hand, it 
challenges the role of transnational networks developed by refugees to adapt 
in their host societies. On the other hand, it contributes to the emergence of 
new camps at the borders of the host states, where refugees who are trying 
to leave the violence gather. This situation has created an incentive for 
refugees to seek asylum outside the Middle East, contributing to the 
‘European migration crisis’. At a regional level, given the protracted nature of 
the Syrian refugee crisis, host states face a new dilemma: they have to 
facilitate their economic and social integration to avoid the development of 
poverty pockets while preserving the temporary nature of their presence.
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Conclusion 
The Syrian crisis has deeply transformed the Middle Eastern migration 
system. Syrians were mostly migrant workers, especially in Lebanon. Since 
2011, they constitute one of the most important refugee populations since 
World War II. The large influx of refugees had one main consequence: the 
development of restrictive migration policies in the neighbouring countries. 
The mass arrival of forced migrants concentrated in certain areas (such as 
border cities and villages, or poor neighbourhoods in the main cities of the 
host countries) has significant local impact on host societies. The 
consequences of the influx of refugees in the global South – where most of 
the world’s refugees find asylum – are manifold. The settlement of hundreds 
of thousands of refugees put pressure on the rental market and can lead to 
the deterioration of security in some areas. In most cases, the role of the 
refugee population in these processes has not been evaluated. Middle 
Eastern countries are not an exception. The arrival of refugees, currently 
Syrians, often leads to this type of controversy. The development of new 
refugee camps has given a new dimension to the debate on the forms of 
settlement for refugees in the Middle East. But this reflection on the role of 
refugee camps is no longer confined to the Middle East region, and the 
Syrians have had to go through many camps throughout their quest for 
asylum. The camps will therefore come in different forms throughout the 
trajectories of refugees, oscillating between transit camps to settlement 
places.
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Forced Migration and Security 
Threats to Syrian Refugee 
Women
ÖZLEM ÖZDEMIR
There are many reasons why people are forced to migrate, including conflict, 
natural disasters, famine or unemployment. In Syria’s case the main reason 
for people’s forced migration is the country’s conflict which, since its 
beginning in 2011, has forced people to migrate to other countries or be 
internally displaced. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) 6.5 million were displaced within Syria and 4.8 million 
have fled to neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and 
Iraq (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2016). 
Despite the fact that the largest number of Syrian refugees moved to 
countries in the Middle East such as Iraq (245,022), Egypt (117,658), 
Lebanon (1,069,111), Jordan (637,859) and Turkey (2,620,553) (UNHCR 
2016), thousands of Syrians are on the move to European countries seeking 
protection, asylum and safety. However, their journey to European countries, 
either by land or sea, is often not safe. The route through Turkey into Greece 
is highly risky for refugees. They mostly travel in unseaworthy boats and 
dinghies across the Mediterranean. These overcrowded boats could sink in a 
matter of minutes and coast guards for rescue may not arrive in time 
(International Rescue Committee 2015, 7; Dearden 2016). Similarly, the land 
routes pose danger (see, for example, Navai 2015).
Not only the migratory routes1 but also transit camps can be unsafe for 
1  There are six main migratory routes that Syrian refugees are using to enter the 
European countries. These are the Eastern border routes (crossing the border between 
Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and its eastern Member States 
such as Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania and 
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refugees. A survey carried out by the Refugee Rights Data Project (2016) in 
nine refugee camps in Greece focused predominately on individuals over the 
age of 18. Many respondents mentioned they had witnessed others being 
hurt or killed during their journey to Europe. Rather than finding safety and 
security in camps in Greece, many refugees continued to face risks to their 
lives on a daily basis. According to the report, 31.6% of respondents knew of 
at least one death having taken place inside their camp. Causes for  the 
deaths  ranged  from  violence  between  residents  to  chronic  disease  and 
lack  of  adequate   medical  treatment. Almost half of all respondents (45.3%) 
replied that they ‘don’t feel safe at all’ or ‘don’t feel very safe’ in camps. On 
the other hand, countries such as Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria and Macedonia 
built fences to prevent the refugee flow as refugees are perceived as a threat 
to national security (Baczynska and Ledwith 2016). 
Countries are mostly concerned that armed elements among civilian refugee 
populations may spread conflict into neighbouring countries (UN Report of the 
Commission on Human Security 2003). Balkan countries such as Serbia and 
Macedonia, due to the sudden closure of European borders, had to deal with 
an unprecedented situation as hundreds of people were blocked inside transit 
camps – either official or unofficial. Refugees were pushed back by auth-
orities in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Spain. There were also 
allegations of access to asylum procedures being denied and violence 
(UNHCR 2017). At several borders between Balkan countries refugees were 
subjected to excessive force and harsh treatment by police (Amnesty 
International 2015). Some of the European States have taken steps to 
investigate allegations of human rights abuses at borders (UNHCR 2017).
Violence, however, is gendered during this process. Refugee women’s 
perception and experience of violence, and their vulnerability are crucial for 
human security. A ‘bottom-up’ security approach addresses the gender 
specific insecurity for individuals during displacement (Rosenow-Williams and 
Behmer 2015). Many women experience numerous traumatic events and are 
exposed to sexual and gender-based violence2 at every stage of their refugee 
Slovakia), the Eastern Mediterranean route (from Turkey, Greece, southern Bulgaria or 
Cyprus), the Western Balkan route, the Apulia and Calabria route (from Turkey, Greece 
and Egypt), the Central Mediterranean route (from Northern Africa towards Italy and 
Malta through the Mediterranean Sea) and the Western Mediterranean route (from 
North Africa to the Iberian Peninsula, as well as the land route through Ceuta and 
Melilla), according to the Frontex Migratory Routes Map (https://frontex.europa.eu/
along-eu-borders/migratory-map/)
2  ‘Sexual violence, gender-based violence and violence against women are terms 
that are commonly used interchangeably. They refer to physical, sexual and 
psychological harm that reinforces female subordination and perpetuates male power 
and control’ (UNHCR 2003, 10).
129 Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century
journey (Pittaway and Bartolomei 2004; Women’s Commission for Refugee 
Women and Children 2006).
This chapter discusses the risks that Syrian refugee women have to deal with 
during forced migration, and examines what kind of insecurities they face in 
situations of displacement in the context of human security. International 
media coverage, NGO and UN reports referencing migrated Syrian refugee 
women were analysed by using feminist critical discourse analysis to reveal 
different kinds of threats. Feminist critical discourse analysis (FCDA) 
investigates how gender ideology is produced in social practices, in social 
relationships between individuals, and in individuals’ social and private 
identities through written and oral sources (Sunderland 2004; Lazar 2007, 
151). 
This chapter aims to contribute to feminist studies and international security 
studies in three ways. Firstly, by investigating the vulnerability of Syrian 
refugee women during and after forced migration. Secondly, by showing the 
gendered nature of forced migration. Thirdly, by illustrating the security 
threats to Syrian refugee women in the context of human security.
Forced Migration and Human Security 
Not only traditional state-centric perspectives but also more recent critical 
approaches to security studies have been applied to address the side effects 
of forced migration (Betts 2009, 60), and forced migration of refugees and 
their displacement became an important research area of international 
security studies (Newman 2003, 4; Gasper and Truong 2010). According to a 
state-centric traditional security studies approach, national security is con-
sidered as the core of international security, and forced migration is seen as a 
source of insecurity to the state (Betts 2009, 62). Methodologically, traditional 
security studies literature on forced migration and security examines the 
empirical relationship between migration and military threats to the state 
(Betts 2009, 62; Vietti and Scribner 2013).
However, by the 1990s intra-state conflicts were no longer considered as only 
a threat to security of the state, but to humans (Betts 2009, 62–66). Thus, 
human security as a concept was included as a policy in the 1990s in The 
United Nations Human Development Report (UNHDR 1994). The report 
classifies security in seven categories: economic security; food security; 
health security; environmental security; personal security; security of the 
community; and political security. In addition, population growth, economic 
disparities, migration pressures, environmental degradation, drug trafficking 
and international terrorism were considered as threats (Booth 2007, 321). 
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These classifications of security and variations of threats are crucial for 
people to realise what security means (MacFarlane and Khong 2006, 11). 
According to the Report of the United Nations Commission on Human 
Security in 2003 (UN Report of the Commission on Human Security 2003), 
the fear and experience of threats changes from person to person. 
Consequently, human security is related to the protection of individuals’ vital 
freedoms. This human-centred definition is related to security, protection and 
survival of forced migrants. They must be considered as a vulnerable group 
that needs protection from threats. Refugees suffer from being displaced and 
they suffer while being displaced. During their displacement, flight or 
movement, they experience specific vulnerabilities (Newman 2003, 16) such 
as rape, persecution, social exclusion or detention (Women’s Commission for 
Refugee Women and Children (WCRWC) 2006). According to Freedman 
(2016, 3), ‘when listening to the stories of forced migrants and studying their 
experiences, it does seem clear that migration does entail considerable 
threats to human security […]’. Poku and Graham (2000, 3–4) also 
emphasise the link between human security and forced migration in the 
context of threat. Forced migration is no longer the by-product of war, but a 
goal in its own right such as ethnic cleansing, genocide, human rights abuses 
or unemployment (Poku and Graham 2000).
However, in the case of Syria, conflict is the reason for forced migration. 
Currently, Syrian refugees are considered one of the biggest refugee 
challenges of European and bordering countries (UNHCR 2016). For some 
states, they are treated as a threat, for others they are considered people in 
need of protection. Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt were the first 
countries to accept large numbers of Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2016). On the 
other hand, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Austria, Germany, France and Britain 
were the European countries that accepted a large number of Syrian refugees 
(UNHCR 2016). However, Hungary, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia 
considered Syrian refugees or asylum-seekers a security threat to their 
nations (Šabić and Borić 2016). The Hungarian government, for example, 
declared a nationwide state of emergency in response to the ongoing refugee 
crisis in Europe, and announced the deployment of additional troops and 
police officers on its border with Serbia following Slovenia’s border crossings 
closure, blocking the Balkan route that refugees used to reach Western 
Europe (Strickland 2016). Consequently, the Syrian refugee crisis has 
become a security issue for states. 
Of all refugees, women are likely the most vulnerable group. Physical, 
environmental, socio-economic and political reasons are the roots of their 
vulnerability. ‘Vulnerability can be seen as a state of high exposure to certain 
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risks and uncertainties, in combination with a reduced ability to protect or 
defend oneself against those risks and uncertainties and cope with their 
negative consequences’ (UN 2001). Types of vulnerabilities may vary in the 
case of migration, journey, flight or displacement. Moreover, vulnerability of 
refugee women increases during this process. 
Security Threats to Syrian Refugee Women
Wars and conflicts pose major risks to people’s survival, livelihoods and 
dignity and thus to human security (UN Report of the Commission on Human 
Security 2003). Therefore, it is not surprising that vulnerability of women 
increases during forced migration due to a lack of security. They are often 
targeted with sexual and gender based violence during flight, displacement 
and migration (WCRWC 2006). Perpetrators, who are mostly unpunished, 
could be gangs, civilians, bandits, border guards, humanitarian workers and 
even peacekeepers (Fowler, Dugan and Bolton 2000; Laville 2015). In this 
sense, it is crucial for international security studies to pay specific attention to 
the threats experienced by women during forced migration. Feminist 
intellectuals are concerned that the gendered dimensions of threats have not 
been analysed adequately (Bunch 2004; Basu 2013; Young and Chan 2015). 
In this sense, feminist studies emphasise the importance of bottom-up 
approaches and micro-level perspectives to analyse the threats that are 
experienced and witnessed by refugee women having different fears and 
threat perceptions. These approaches and perspectives necessitate giving 
importance to each refugee woman individually, as a human-centric approach 
will be more useful to understand their vulnerabilities and also protect them 
from threats. 
According to research conducted by Amnesty International (2016), the 40 
refugee women who were interviewed described feeling threatened and 
unsafe during their journey from Turkey to Greece and then across the 
Balkans. Many reported that in almost all of the countries they passed 
through they experienced physical abuse and financial exploitation, they 
additionally mentioned being groped or pressured to have sex by smugglers, 
security staff or other refugees. 
Furthermore, the UNHCR report (2014) ‘Woman Alone: The fight for survival 
by Syria’s refugee women’ is the result of field work conducted with 135 
female heads of household in order to provide a snapshot of what it means to 
be a refugee woman in Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt. All women who were 
interviewed – aged between 17 to 85, with most being between 26 and 59 – 
said that they have security problems in host countries. After being forced to 
migrate these women faced sexual and verbal harassment and exploitation 
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due to the fact that they were living without an adult male or husband who 
would otherwise provide social and physical protection. Several Syrian 
refugee women also said they experienced harassment or received 
exploitative offers from persons at local charity associations or landlords that 
offer services, assistance and free accommodation to Syrian refugees. This 
insecurity situation, besides bringing feelings of isolation and desperation, 
often leads to mental health issues such as depression, anxiety and suicidal 
thoughts (United Nations Population Fund 2014).
A number of women attributed their experiences specifically to the fact that 
they were living without an adult male, and some said that men made 
inappropriate proposals for intimate relationships, or asked for their telephone 
number in an attempt to be ‘friends’. Several women in Lebanon had even 
been approached for temporary marriages, also because marriage is seen as 
protection from sexual violence (The Freedom Fund 2016).
The vulnerability of Syrian refugee women continues after fleeing from 
conflict. Elizabeth Tan summarised the situation: ‘Women affected by the 
conflict in Syria continue to be easy targets of sexual violence and 
harassment in the countries of asylum, in addition to the plight of leaving your 
own country and being dispossessed of everything’ (UNHCR 2014, 50).
Furthermore, refugee women are afraid to speak of their harrowing 
experiences during their journey as they face the risk of honour killings by 
their relatives; consequently, perpetrators usually go unpunished (Strickland 
2016). At the same time, NGO workers who work with refugee women 
mentioned that some were even forced to work for smugglers or drug dealers 
(Strickland 2016). 
For female refugees, and especially mothers, needs vary from male refugees. 
Many Syrian refugee women are forced to take on responsibilities of family 
members while coping with dwindling resources. For this, they have been 
forced to turn to prostitution to make money for food, rent or other needs. 
Some of them engage in ‘survival sex’ taking lovers in exchange for food, 
clothing and shelter (The Freedom Fund 2016). They are mostly afraid of 
sexual harassment from male guards, police or other male refugees (Van Der 
Zee 2016). For those with children specifically, their primary concern for the 
protection of their children places a double burden on their shoulders. To 
stress this situation, Van Der Zee (2016) mentions the experiences and fears 
of Syrian refugee women in a European transit camp. For example, a Syrian 
refugee mother of three and pregnant with her fourth child, who had travelled 
for two weeks crossing the Mediterranean in a rubber boat and walking for 
kilometres, explains: 
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There is also the threat of rape and sexual assault by 
smugglers, security guards, policemen and fellow refugees. 
Some smugglers try to coerce the women into having sex with 
them in exchange for a shorter waiting time or a lower price for 
the crossing.
According to the Women’s Refugee Commission, transit camps fail to offer 
women adequate basic services or protection from violence or exploitation. 
This is mostly due to the lack of female-specific shelters. In such places, 
sexual and verbal harassment or assault occur. Therefore, women take their 
own precautions such as sleeping outside of the tent shared with other male 
refugees (Van Der Zee 2016).
Shower facilities in transit camps are also of concern. Refugee women 
reported having to use the same bathroom and shower facilities as men. For 
example, according to refugee women in a transit camp in Germany, some 
men would watch women as they went to the bathroom. Some women took 
measures such as not eating or drinking to avoid having to go to the toilet 
where they felt unsafe. Seven pregnant women described lack of food and 
basic healthcare. A dozen of the women interviewed told that they had been 
touched, stroked or leered at in European transit camps (Amnesty 
International 2016). 
Moreover, the geographical location of a refugee camp increase the risk of 
sexual violence, especially when the camp is located in a high crime area. 
The design and social structure in camps are also a problem for refugees. 
Unrelated families share communal living and sleeping space due to 
overcrowding. This is a great security problem for women refugees. On the 
other hand, poor design of services such as poorly lit toilet facilities may also 
contribute to risk of insecurity. The lack of police protection in some camps is 
another security problem for refugee women. Police may accept sexual 
intercourse in exchange for food or services (UNHCR 1995).
In a 2015 study, I explored the various forms of sexual and gender-based 
violence which take place in refugee camps. Five major British daily 
newspapers (Guardian, Independent, Daily Telegraph, Times and Sun) were 
used for research purposes. According to newspaper coverage, the most 
common forms of sexual and gender-based violence in Syrian refugee camps 
are forced marriage, early marriage, dowry and polygamy. In many cases, 
these different forms of sexual violence are in fact interrelated. For example, 
parents are afraid of their young daughters being raped or sexually abused at 
the camps, which brings shame to the family. Therefore, parents force their 
daughters to marry in favour of dowry or protection. The most frequently 
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mentioned words related to Syrian refugee women discourses at refugee 
camps are: afraid, scare, victim/survivor, at risk, in danger, isolation, shame, 
weak, morality, honour, vulnerable, submission, femininity, passive, 
defenceless, dependent and alone (Özdemir 2015).
As it is seen from the aforementioned reports, mostly qualitative data-
gathering methods were practiced on sexual violence in the context of Syrian 
refugee women. The use of qualitative rather than quantitative research 
methods makes it difficult to evaluate the number of Syrian refugee women 
exposed to violence and risks. Additionally, survivors are usually reluctant to 
talk about their experiences during migration due to cultural and social 
pressures, as it is seen as shameful (MacTavish 2016). Syrian refugee 
women face the risk of honour killings by their relatives and hence prefer to 
remain silent, which leads to perpetrators going unpunished. 
On the other side, refugee-receiving countries have been unprepared for the 
large number of refugee influx and are failing to protect the refugees during 
migration adequately. According to research conducted by the Women’s 
Refugee Commission (2016), there is no consideration of gender-based 
violence along the migration route to ensure safe places. Refugee women are 
unable to access basic services in transit centres. The lack of clear informat-
ion and inability to access interpreters to talk about their vulnerability hinders 
refugee women from accessing services and leaves them vulnerable to 
smugglers and other opportunists. 
Human security includes not just protecting people but also empowering 
them. In his article called ‘Security and Emancipation’, Booth (1991, 319) 
states that: 
Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and 
groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop 
them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do. 
War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together 
with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. 
Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. 
Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. 
Emancipation, theoretically, is security. ‘Security’ means the 
absence of threats.
Syrian refugee women will be more emancipated if they are far from the 
threats when they migrate. Their security should be considered at all phases 
of a refugee cycle. Absence of the threat of pain, fear, hunger and poverty 
during their migration is an essential element in the struggle for emancipation 
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(Jones 1999, 126). To prevent Syrian refugee women from sexual and 
gender-based violence, humanitarian actors should increase knowledge of 
sexual and gender-based violence programmes. It will also help to develop 
recommendations for future sexual and gender-based violence programmes 
(UNHCR 2001). 
On the other side, most organisations’ leadership dealing with refugees are 
male dominated. In this situation, female interests are rarely recognized. 
Organizations should support women as equal decision-makers. Inclusion of 
refugee women in leadership structures has increased the level of women’s 
involvement in decision-making process. More precisely, in situations where 
there are refugee women representatives, their appreciation as leaders and 
their inclusion in leadership structures has led to increased presentation of 
sexual and gender-based violence issues. They will ensure that gender 
issues are not left aside (UNHCR 2001). For example, the Women’s Learning 
Partnership (2017) is adapting programmes to realize the Empowering Syrian 
Refugee Women for a Better Future project with local partner organizations. 
They provide Syrian refugee women with leadership participation and support 
a number of young Syrian women to develop their advocacy skills in decision-
making processes. Hence, refugee women will have the skills to make their 
voices heard. 
Another project carried by Sawa Association for Development in Lebanon 
targeted 30 Syrian women aged between 25 and 45 years. The main goal of 
the project is to empower Syrian refugee women in Lebanese camps by 
raising their awareness to their civil and social rights, and provide awareness 
on rights to reduce the vulnerabilities of Syrian women refugees subjected to 
sexual and gender-based violence, stress and trauma resulting from war. At 
the economic level, the project aims to ensure women’s ability to provide for 
themselves and their families, and at the legal level, education about the legal 
aspects of their rights will empower them to stand up against violence. The 
project will contain workshops that aim to raise women’s awareness of their 
rights, and trainings on empowering women with professional skills to improve 
their economic situation (Sawa Association for Development 2016).
The United Nations, Governments, NGOs and humanitarian authorities in 
general should define the kinds of threats Syrian refugee women face during 
migration. Gender-based analysis, interviews and research programmes 
should be made to understand the gender-based human security perspective 
of refugee women. A gender-based human security perspective, during and 
after forced migration, will empower refugee women. Putting refugee women 
at the centre of a human security approach will help to decrease their 
vulnerabilities and number of threats to their individual security (UNHCR 1995 
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and 2001). Besides, creating awareness via mass media will help to 
disseminate information on available services, rights of refugees and host 
country laws. This advocacy work emphasizes how to prevent sexual and 
gender-based violence incidents at individual, family and community levels, 
and how to support would-be survivors (UNHCR 2001). 
Conclusion 
This chapter tried to illustrate the vulnerability of Syrian refugee women and 
the need of gendering human security during migration. Because of their 
gender roles, needs and status, refugee women are differently affected and 
particularly vulnerable. In that, forced migration creates specific threats and 
insecurities for Syrian refugee women throughout their journeys to their final 
destinations and while in transit areas. Therefore, gender sensitivity and 
gender awareness are important issues for the human security of refugee 
women, enhancing not only the protection of refugees from violence but also 
their health and livelihoods. A ‘gendered human security’ concept will not see 
the refugee women as victims or marginalized groups. Instead, they will be 
considered as people with different experiences and facing diverse insecur-
ities during migration. 
Host governments’ collaborations with the UN and NGOs should reveal the 
kinds of threats that refugee women come across. First of all, priority should 
be given to the voices of refugee women. Wherever possible female experts 
from the host community should be engaged to provide sexual and gender-
based violence training and service delivery. Funding should be given to 
experts to institutionalize plans and protocols to address the violence. 
Females should be actively recruited to international security or security 
forces to enable women refugees to freely talk about their witnesses. 
When refugee women are empowered economically, socially and politically, 
they will have the ability to play a key role in preventing the spread of 
violence. On the other side, security forces should improve their monitoring of 
personnel who may directly or inadvertently contribute to coerced or forced 
prostitution, sexual exploitation, trafficking and other forms of sexual and 
gender-based violence (Ward 2002).
Host governments and NGOs, and humanitarian agencies should establish 
sexual and gender- based violence cases databases. A strong methodology 
for addressing the needs of women refugees will be available for adoption in 
future crises (Ward 2002). Of course, it is not easy for authorities and 
researchers to collect or gather the data on these different types of 
vulnerabilities and threats that Syrian refugee women face during migration, 
137 Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century
as they are mostly reluctant to talk about their experiences due to cultural and 
social pressures such as honour killing or exclusion, which creates an 
important limitation for research on women and migration. This is a critical 
difficulty, because qualitative rather than quantitative data-gathering methods 
are mostly employed. 
As emergent and short-term policies, easy access to health services, gender 
specific security precautions, paying attention to cleaning facilities and 
hygiene, accommodations for unaccompanied women, and trusted service 
providers will help to decrease the number of threats. More important than 
this, international organizations such as the United Nations, NGOs and official 
authorities should develop a gender-based perspective paying more attention 
to the specific needs of refugee women. Therefore, besides the official 
emergent efforts on the ground to elevate the status of refugee women, 
careful analysis of the practices, experiences and needs of female refugees 
should be undertaken to determine long-term policies to maintain safer 
environments for refugee women during and after their journeys. 
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Australia’s Extraterritorial 
Asylum Policies and the 
Making of Transit Sites
SALLY CLARK
Developed nation-states are pursuing aggressive border security policies 
designed to exclude forced migrants from territories where the rights of 
asylum are enshrined. In many instances these policies reach beyond the 
sovereign state into extra-territorial regions, blurring the traditional and 
functional elements of the national borders they seek to protect. One of the 
implications of this is that developed states of the Global North now protect 
themselves from unwanted migration through direct incursions on the 
sovereignty of less powerful neighbours. These policies are designed to 
impede access to protection spaces and foster the creation of transit zones 
where asylum seekers become immobilised. While there is extensive liter-
ature that charts this process across the Global North, less attention has 
been paid to this phenomenon in Southeast Asia, despite the insights such a 
comparison provides.
This chapter explores the effects of these exclusionary practices on forced 
migrants and the transit countries that host them. It will begin by providing an 
overview of the European literature, drawing attention to the significant 
pattern of state behaviour and its effects on asylum flows across the region. A 
consideration of how similar processes can be witnessed in the relationship 
between Australia and Indonesia will then be enunciated. It is argued that 
Australia’s border security policies designed to reduce the number of asylum 
seekers with whom it must deal have played an instrumental role in 
reconfiguring the search for asylum in Southeast Asia through policies that 
shift the burden of protection onto regional neighbours – replicating the 
discernible European pattern of human rights avoidance. One consequence 
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of this is that in recent years Indonesia has become the prime processing 
centre for asylum seekers otherwise destined for Australia. 
The Refugee Convention and State Responsibility
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is the primary legal 
instrument relating to the protection of refugees, and provides the most 
comprehensive codification of the rights of refugees at the international level. 
The document outlines the responsibility of all signatory states towards 
asylum seekers and refugees and provides states the framework for the 
assessment of protection claims. The Convention is one of the most active 
and drawn upon pieces of international human rights law to date, with aspects 
such as Article 33 prohibition of expulsion or return (refoulement) taking on 
the status of customary international law (United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) 2001, 16–18). Yet, despite its successes in dev-
eloping a near universal architecture of protection, there are deficiencies in 
the legal framework that have been exploited by powerful states. Of concern 
here is the narrow interpretation and application of the geographical limitation 
at the heart of the Convention. In recent years, this geographical limitation 
has been erroneously interpreted by states to mean that their protection 
obligations are not activated until an asylum seeker has physically set foot on 
national soil. While this interpretation has been critiqued in the literature 
(Taylor 2010; Francis 2009; Hyndman and Mountz 2008; Brouwer and Kumin 
2003), state practice continues to operate on this basis.  
As a result of this interpretation, powerful states now direct significant 
resources towards ensuring asylum seekers are not able to physically arrive 
in their territories. This is achieved through a series of border control policies 
designed to intercept, interdict and detain potential asylum seekers before the 
border. Thus, states are able to significantly limit the activation of their 
Convention obligations through the implementation of ‘non-arrival regimes’ 
that aim to directly impede access to asylum (Gibney 2005, 4). These 
practices, that are largely invisible to the natural citizen, highlight the oft 
ignored logic of border control in a globalised world – that it rarely takes place 
at or near the border. As Vaughan-Williams notes, ‘states are increasingly 
ephemeral, electronic, non-visible, and located in zones that defy 
straightforwardly territorial logic’ (Vaughan-Williams in Jerrems 2011, 2)
Non-Arrival Regimes across the Global North 
There is a significant body of literature that has explored the creation of non-
arrival regimes across Europe. The key themes that emerge from this body of 
work highlight a substantial pattern of state behaviour that has a significant 
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impact on both neighbouring states and the asylum seekers who become 
entangled in the exclusionary zones these practices create. The examination 
of these patterns is important for our understanding, as they foreshadow a 
similar logic practiced by Australia in regards to the Asia Pacific. 
One of the prime ways the European Union (EU) performs its border control is 
through the paradoxical approach of blurring rather than fortifying its 
boundaries, creating what many have dubbed the EU’s borderlands (Del 
Sarto 2009; Gibney 2005; Papadopoulou 2005; Kirisci 2004; Boubakri 2004). 
These borderlands function as an effective buffer zone between core and 
peripheral states, with the new frontier capable of performing traditional 
border functions, denying access to would be asylum seekers to the EU. 
Importantly, developed states do not guard their borders against unwanted 
incursions through strength of arms or military force, but rather through the 
co-option of economically subordinate states.
Powerful states are able to negotiate cooperation arrangements on border 
control with neighbouring countries in return for favourable treatment in areas 
such as trade, security and development (Del Sarto 2009; Balwin-Edwards 
2007; Gibney 2005). An asymmetric power dynamic is central to the forging of 
these types of agreements, as they are achieved by providing much needed 
economic and political support to peripheral states on the proviso that they 
adopt the preferred migration policies of their benefactors (Klepp 2010; 
Balwin-Edwards 2007; Zhyznomirska 2006; Gibney 2005; Papadopoulou 
2004; Collinson 1996). 
One of the key policy levers Western Europe (and later the EU more broadly) 
has used to export its migration agenda to the region at large has been the 
development of policies such as the European Neighbourhood Program 
(ENP). Through this policy, core EU governments are able to penetrate 
sovereign states through diplomatic, economic, trade, travel and security 
alliances, blurring the traditional borders between powerful EU states and 
their less developed neighbours. This is based on what Del Sarto labels 
‘positive conditionality’, whereby ‘cooperative southern states undoubtedly 
obtain a better deal from Brussels’ (Del Sarto 2009, 11). 
Beyond the exercise of ‘positive conditionality’, the EU has developed a raft of 
policies designed to construct a non-arrival regime that specifically excludes 
would-be asylum seekers from the common Schengen area. This has been 
achieved through a variety of complex and interlocking processes that shift 
the burden for refugee processing and protection onto peripheral states and 
transit countries. These strategies include the ‘Safe Third Country’ policy 
(codified in the Dublin II Regulation), readmission agreements with EU and 
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non-EU states, and the shifting of migration control to the private sector 
through the introduction of carrier sanctions. 
Pre-departure initiatives, such as the requirement that foreign nationals hold a 
valid entry visa prior to arrival in the common territory, transform the nature of 
immigration control away from the physical border to a range of new places 
such as the high seas, consular officers, and foreign airports. These initiatives 
allow the EU to restrict legitimate travel opportunities to people based on 
nationality, economic or character grounds, allowing for the ‘screening out’ of 
undesirable migrants (read potential asylum seekers) before they are able to 
arrive at the border (Francis 2009; Weber 2006; Brouweer and Kumin 2003). 
Coupled with pre-departure initiatives are carrier sanctions, whereby 
commercial airlines and other authorised migration carriers face heavy 
penalties if detected bringing in persons without proper authorisation or 
documentation (Rodenhauser 2014; Francis 2009; Brouwer and Kumin 2003). 
By imposing harsh carrier sanctions, states effectively shift the onus of border 
control away from government regulated borders and government officials to 
private enterprises and their employees in third countries.1 Such targeted 
closure of legal migration channels interrupts linear travel, so that forced 
migrants have little choice but to travel irregularly, either by land or sea, 
crossing multiple frontiers in their search for refuge.
The third major strategy in Europe’s non-arrival regime is the implementation 
of the ‘safe third country’ concept, that allows for the shifting of responsibility 
for claim processing from one EU state to another if it can be proven that the 
claimant transited through that state prior to arriving in the destination state. 
This has led to accusations that developed states are playing a central role in 
the construction of transit migration through policies that funnel forced 
migrants into peripheral regions, while simultaneously demanding that these 
same transit countries do more to stop onward movements to their regions 
(Lutterbeck 2009; Kirisci 2004; Koser 1997; Lavenex 1998; Collinson 1996). 
According to Lavenex (1998) the ‘safe third country’ concept was designed to 
prevent ‘migration shopping’ or the simultaneous lodgement of asylum 
applications across multiple states. Additionally, it was conceived of by the EU 
as a ‘redistributive mechanism’ to ensure appropriate burden-sharing for 
refugee protection across the common Schengen area. Yet in reality, this 
concept has been used to shift the protection burden away from core states 
to the periphery of the EU where asylum seekers are now funnelled into by 
1  While many of these pre-emptive measures appear to perform the legitimate 
function of border control they must be considered problematic when they lack the 
appropriate safeguards to ensure the rights of people with genuine protection claims 
are not violated (see for example Francis 2009). 
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design. 
The ‘safe third country’ concept also includes non-EU member countries 
considered ‘safe’ by the EU. To facilitate this, EU states have sought 
readmission agreements with selected states from Eastern Europe and North 
Africa to ensure asylum seekers who pass through these regions can be 
forcibly returned and that the responsibility to process protection claims is that 
of the first ‘safe country’ which the forced migrant enters (Collinson 1996). In 
short, readmission agreements exist to facilitate the expulsion of 
undocumented ‘third country’ nationals from states in which they are 
unauthorised to reside. 
Unsurprisingly, research has found that these actions have thrust inequitable 
protection responsibility onto transit countries, while simultaneously 
diminishing the protection experienced by asylum seekers due to the 
disparities in processing systems (or lack thereof) across the region (Gerand 
and Pickering 2012; Fekete 2011; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2012; Schuster 2011; 
Lutterbeck 2009; Garlick 2006; Abell 1999; Lavenex 1998; Collinson 1996). 
The European Council itself has recognised the considerable effect the 
intensification of protection responsibilities would have upon peripheral 
regions, stating that ‘the implementation of asylum policies poses severe 
budgetary and operational problems for these countries’ (Collinson 1996, 84). 
This is compounded by the fact that a number of countries labelled ‘safe third 
countries’ by the EU are developing nations, characterised by limited 
resources, porous borders, underdeveloped reception policies, political 
instability and often poor human rights records (Hamood 2008; Chatelard 
2008; Gil-Bazo 2006; Garlick 2006; Legomsky 2003). For example, Libya, 
Tunisia, Morocco, Turkey and Jordan are all classified as ‘safe third 
countries’, and are thus responsible for the processing of a disproportionate 
number of asylum applications each year under this policy (Baldwin-Edwards 
2007). Meanwhile, core EU states such as France, Germany and Belgium are 
safeguarded from the majority of arrivals by these peripheral states and retain 
the ability to forcibly return those who do make it through these exclusionary 
barriers. 
This situation has led to a serious reduction in the safeguards (codified in the 
Refugee Convention) that are essential to the protection of forced migrants’ 
human rights. In his case study of irregular migration in North Africa, Baldwin-
Edwards (2007, 320) details how Italy established readmission agreements 
with Morocco, Tunisia and Libya in 2003 through linking development aid with 
migration policy. Through these agreements, Italy returned thousands of irreg-
ular migrants after denying them the right to apply for asylum. Subsequently it 
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was found that a large number of individuals expelled from Italy to Libya were 
later refouled to Egypt and Nigeria in breach of international law. In response 
to criticism of this practice, Klepp (2010) claims Italy sought to strengthen its 
extra-territorial controls, particularly in Libyan territorial waters, to reduce the 
number of asylum seekers who may arrive at its border in the future. 
Through the strengthening of non-arrival regimes – operationalised in 
neighbouring regions – Italy was able to secure its own border and shift the 
burden for refugee protection back on to Libya, and was thus able to avoid 
future accusations of refoulement by immobilising migrants before the border. 
A further challenge posed by these policies is the downstream effects they 
have on neighbouring regions. Many peripheral states have been forced to 
make policy changes that mimic their powerful neighbours. This is due to 
rising fears that they would be left to deal with disproportionate levels of 
asylum seekers, as was the case for many Central European states 
immediately following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia (Papadopoulou 
2005). Amnesty International has argued that this process will continue to 
replicate itself, proposing that under increased pressure more states will be 
inclined to follow the agenda set by Western Europe, privileging border 
security over human rights, thereby putting the entire refugee protection 
system in jeopardy (cited in Collinson 1996, 84). Forced migrants, compelled 
to move, find they have less capacity to do so, leading to the paradoxical 
situation whereby ‘Western states now acknowledge the rights of refugees 
but simultaneously criminalize the search for asylum’ (Gibney 2005, 4).  
Furthermore, research has found that these transit sites are encountering 
new social and political issues resulting from the rapid increase in the number 
of irregular migrants in their jurisdiction. According to the former Assistant 
High Commissioner for the Protection of Refugees, Erika Feller, ‘large scale 
arrivals are seen as a threat to political, economic or social stability and tend 
increasingly to provoke hostility and violence’ (Feller 2006, 514). Numerous 
studies have looked at the impact of this process on newly transformed transit 
countries (Gerard and Pickering 2012; Lutterbeck 2009; Baldwin-Edwards 
2007; Zhyznomirska 2006; Papadopoulou 2005 and 2004; Kirisci 2004). 
Turkey is considered a prime example of this trend. The challenges it faces in 
trying to balance its international responsibilities to protect refugees whilst 
reforming its immigration policies as a condition of membership into the EU 
demonstrates the competing interests acting on the country. While Member 
States now have the power to return irregular migrants to Turkey, the lack of 
bargaining power has left Turkey unable to secure such agreements with its 
neighbouring countries such as Iraq, Iran and Egypt, whose citizens are 
transiting through Turkey en route to Europe. Kirisci (2004, 12) concludes that 
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without adequate burden-sharing mechanisms in place, Turkey could become 
a buffer zone, rather than a Member State that shares benefits and 
responsibilities equitably.  
Similar themes can be found in Papadopoulou’s (2004) analysis on transit 
migration in Greece, and Johnson’s (2013) study on the borderland between 
Morocco and Spain, both of which highlight the inequitable conditions forced 
onto these states and the negative impacts that follow. Papadopoulou (2004, 
167) claims Central and Eastern European countries have come under 
extreme pressure in the past to reform their immigration policies in line with 
the desires of core EU states, arguing that ‘to a large extent, the institutional 
framework of migration and asylum in the EU Member States is one of control 
and restriction’. 
Yet perhaps the most pertinent example of how migration policies of the 
Global North can impact upon peripheral regions is in the case of Malta. Prior 
to 2001, the main entry point into Europe was through the Adriatic route 
between Albania and Italy (Lutterbeck 2009, 122). Yet efficient border control 
in this area diverted forced migrants through Malta, which has since 
witnessed a rapid increase in irregular migration. According to Lutterbeck 
(2009 123):
This diversion effect shows how migration into Malta is also 
profoundly affected by the immigration control measures of 
other Southern European countries, and how plugging one 
hole in the EU’s outer perimeter quickly leads to enhanced 
pressure on other parts of its external borders.
As a result, Malta – once a country of emigration – has quickly been 
transformed into a transit country, leading to claims that Malta is the victim of 
Italy’s successful border closure (Lutterbeck 2009, 123). Due to Malta’s new 
position as a prime transit route into Europe, it has come under increased 
pressure regarding border patrol. Unsurprisingly, Malta has been one of the 
most outspoken opponents to the Dublin II regulation and the principle of the 
‘safe third country’, given the massive increase in their own protection role as 
a result of these agreements and its transformation into an asylum seeker 
buffer zone (Gerard and Pickering 2012).
One final consequence of the EU’s non-arrival regime is the impact on 
irregular migration. Since the late 1990s, scholars have been examining the 
correlation between restrictive asylum policies and the growth of people 
smuggling operations that subvert them. Mounting research suggests that at 
least in regards to Europe, non-arrival regimes coupled with the dismantling 
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of traditional migration routes has resulted in the growth of people smuggling 
operations, accessed by both economic migrants and asylum seekers alike 
(see for example Koser 2001 and 1997). As Morrison and Crosland (cited in 
Koser 2000, 92) state, ‘the fear is that the social construction in policy 
agendas of all asylum seekers as illegal migrants is becoming a social reality 
as asylum seekers are forced to turn to traffickers in order to enter Europe 
and apply for asylum’. 
The following section will examine a similar impulse in Australia’s approach to 
border security, demonstrating how it has externalised its border controls to 
minimise the arrival of asylum seekers. In a fashion similar to the EU, the 
outcome of this approach can be witnessed in a multitude of negative ways: 
burden shifting leading to the intensification of protection responsibility thrust 
onto regional neighbours (in this case Indonesia), through the increase in 
irregular migration as asylum seekers attempt to overcome exclusionary 
barriers erected in transit sites, and through the decline in protection more 
broadly as human rights standards are avoided or curtailed in morally and 
legally dubious ways. 
Australia’s Non-Arrival Regime and Architecture of Exclusion 
A review of Australia’s migration and border control policies since 2001 shows 
that it has been engaged with the production and maintenance of its own non-
arrival regime, elements of which reflect the European model. One direct 
parallel, for example, is the strict implementation of pre-departure screenings 
and carrier sanctions that have proven so effective at closing down legitimate 
migration pathways for potential asylum seekers. However, faced with a 
unique geopolitical setting and lacking the broader bargaining power of 
enticements such as membership into the EU, Australia has instead had to 
innovate creative strategies for gaining the cooperation of regional neigh-
bours in order to suit its migration agenda. The most recognisable of these 
uniquely Australian tactics is the policy bundle known as the ‘Pacific Solution’. 
Implemented in 2001 by the Coalition government, the Pacific Solution 
possessed all the hallmarks of a non-arrival regime; the primary architecture 
of exclusion being the annexation of Australia’s island territories and the 
development of an intercept and detain model of offshore processing. The 
Pacific Solution allowed the government to physically intercept boats on the 
high seas and transfer the asylum seekers on board directly to offshore 
processing centres in third countries or specially designated areas outside 
Australia’s migration zone, thus destroying people’s ability to lodge protection 
claims in Australia. 
Australia can be understood as drawing heavily on the notion of ‘positive 
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conditionality’ when negotiating with third countries, in order to establish 
arrangements to intercept and transfer asylum seekers to Australian funded 
detention centres in these sovereign states. For example, Nauru and Papua 
New Guinea have both received handsome financial compensation for their 
cooperation (Grewcock 2014), while in 2014 Australia and Cambodia reached 
a controversial resettlement deal that would see Australia provide more than 
AU$40 million in aid funding on the quid-pro-quo that Cambodia permanently 
resettle Convention Refugees who had been processed offshore in Australian 
funded detention centres (University of New South Wales 2014). In each of 
these cases there was considerable backlash from citizens in these states, 
yet the economic and political capital governments gained through their 
acquiescence to Australia’s requests proved hard to refuse, exposing an 
asymmetrical power relationship that echoes that of core and peripheral 
states across Europe.2 Much has been written about this particular aspect of 
Australia’s response to asylum seekers, and therefore will not be revisited 
here (for detailed accounts see: Briskman, Latham and Goddard 2008; 
Burnside 2008; Hyndman and Mountz 2008; Gordon 2007; Mares 2002 and 
2007; Crock, Saul and Destyari 2006; Howard 2003). 
Attention will instead be directed towards Australia’s less examined 
interactions with Indonesia. In the Australian media, Indonesia is rarely 
presented as a willing partner due to it being the prime departure point for 
asylum seekers looking to reach Australia. Yet this framing appears ignorant 
of the crucial role Indonesia has played in Australia’s migration agenda, which 
at times appears in stark opposition to its own interests. 
Since the late 1990s, Australia has sought to implement a readmission 
agreement with Indonesia similar to those practiced across Europe. However, 
Indonesia has been uncompromising on its stance that it will not readmit 
undocumented foreign nationals into its territory, insisting that once asylum 
seekers pass into Australian territorial waters the responsibility for their 
protection is Australia’s alone.3 This position has led the Australian govern-
ment to pursue extraterritorial strategies that contain asylum seekers within 
Indonesia, removing their ability for onward migration. This is despite the fact 
that Indonesia is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention, nor can it be 
considered a ‘safe country’ of first asylum given the lack of human rights 
protections (Kneebone 2015). According to Goodwin-Gill a minimum standard 
2  Many have viewed Australia’s engagement with its Pacific neighbours through a 
neo-colonial lens, arguing that the Pacific Solution functions through the exploitation of 
aid dependent, impoverished, island nations (see for example Hayden 2002; Grewcock 
2014).
3  The Oceanic Viking and Jaya Lestari incidents serve as prime case studies of 
Indonesia’s refusal to readmit ‘third country’ nations to its territory. For more 
information, see Missbach and Sinanu 2011.
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of protection ‘would appear to entail the right of residence and re-entry, the 
right to work, guarantees of personal security and some form of guarantee 
against return to a country of persecution’ (Goodwin-Gill cited by UNHCR 
2004, 1); factors that are currently lacking in Indonesia at present. Despite 
this, Australia has pursued a number of arrangements that shift the burden of 
refugee processing and protection onto Indonesia. Similar to the EU, Australia 
has used diplomatic channels (covered in a veneer of international 
cooperation) alongside more overtly coercive levers to achieve this goal.  
Since early 2000, Australia and Indonesia have been party to a bilateral 
regional cooperation agreement (RCA) in partnership with the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) and their local partners, World Church 
Services (WCS) and the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) (UNHCR Indonesian 
Factsheet, September 2014). Under this agreement, the Australian govern-
ment funds large scale projects in Indonesia in return for Indonesia’s co-
operation in preventing the flow of irregular migration to Australia. This is 
achieved by monitoring and intercepting suspected asylum seekers and 
referring them to the IOM for case management and care in Indonesia 
(Howard 2003). This arrangement was designed to prevent asylum seekers 
from moving irregularly from Indonesia to Australia by providing a processing 
system in Indonesia where individuals could have their refugee claims 
assessed. Since Indonesia is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention and 
lacks a legal framework to process these claims, the UNHCR fills this gap 
through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Indonesian govern-
ment (UNHCR South-East Asia 2013, 1). In accordance with regulations 
outlined by the Indonesian Director General of Immigration, those migrants 
who indicate their desire to lodge a refugee application are referred by IOM to 
UNHCR who ‘assess these claims pursuant to its own international mandate’ 
(Taylor and Rafferty-Brown 2010, 138). Through the RCA, Australia has also 
played a key role in reshaping Indonesia’s immigration detention system. 
According to Taylor (2010), before Australia’s intervention the Indonesian 
government’s preferred policy practice was to allow people who fell within the 
scope of the RCA to live freely in the community, yet this penchant for using 
alternatives to detention was steadily replaced with a drive to detain asylum 
seekers in Australian funded detention centres across the archipelago. 
Significantly, neither government, nor the contracting partners, have revealed 
the cost of this agreement (Kneebone 2015; Taylor 2009). Nonetheless, 
occasional indicators suggest that the sum of money invested in this process 
is high. In May 2014, the Australian government announced that it will provide 
Indonesia with a further AU$86.8 million to support stranded refugees and 
asylum seekers over the following three years (SUAKA 2014). 
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Australia has also used other multilateral forums to push for changes to 
Indonesia’s domestic law to further its containment agenda. Under sustained 
economic and political pressure from Australia, Indonesia has introduced a 
raft of new legislation in recent years that criminalises people smuggling, 
increases surveillance and interceptions operations, and rapidly expands 
immigration detention systems (Human Rights Watch 2013; Missbach 2012; 
Taylor 2010; Taylor 2009). 
Beyond efforts that leverage Australia’s economic and political clout for 
cooperation in this area are a number of practices that are far more coercive 
and legally dubious. Prime among these is the reintroduction of the 
controversial ‘turnback’ policy in 2013, where Australian Navy and Customs 
officers intercept suspected asylum seekers to turn back, or physically tow 
boats into international waters – an action that is akin to forced readmissions 
to Indonesia. Shrouded in secrecy, this militarised response operating under 
the codename ‘Operation Sovereign Borders’ has been widely criticized by 
Indonesia, who sees it as an attack on its sovereignty, a claim boosted by 
revelations that Australian Navy ships were operating in Indonesia’s territorial 
waters without authorisation (Bourke 2014). The UNHCR also objected on the 
basis that Australia has breached its obligations under international law to 
assess the protection claims of asylum seekers in its territory (Refugee 
Council of Australia 2014). 
Further techniques used to dissuade asylum seekers from attempting onward 
migration from Indonesia include, the removal of all rights to apply for 
Protection Visas for any irregular maritime arrival, ‘unless the Minister for 
Immigration personally intervenes to lift the bar’ (Refugee Council of Australia 
2017). The removal of this protection means that for many asylum seekers 
the UNHCR office in Jakarta is their last hope of accessing international 
protection despite its clear deficiencies. This move has been accompanied by 
a widespread advertising campaign ‘No Way. You Will Not Make Australia 
Home’ (Laughland 2014). This ‘reverse tourism’ advertisement was designed 
to psychologically disincentivise asylum seekers from pursuing protection 
claims in Australia. 
While far from exhaustive, the above discussion attempts to highlight just 
some of the extraterritorial strategies Australia pursues in order to protect 
itself from unwanted migration and minimise its protection obligations by 
shifting these to Indonesia. The consequence of this is that Australia has 
removed all feasible ways for asylum seekers to legally access protection in 
its territories. Simultaneously, these policies have contributed to the increased 
protection responsibility felt by Indonesia, as it is slowly transformed into one 
of the last places in the region where asylum seekers can have their 
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protection claims accessed. 
On the individual level, Australia’s non-arrival regime is experienced by 
asylum seekers as a further assault on their human rights (in a manner 
reminiscent of the European literature). This truncation comes about through 
their effective immobilisation in transit states that lack the appropriate 
framework for their protection. In this liminal state, asylum seekers reside for 
many years without legal status, without government support, without civil 
and political rights and, most significantly, without hope of a durable outcome. 
Their deliberate exclusion from protection zones and relegation to areas that 
fall outside the international protection system means the only hope of 
resettlement must come through selection to a voluntary ‘third country’ 
humanitarian program – the kind responsible for the resettlement of less than 
one per cent of the world’s refugee population annually. Unsurprisingly, it is 
this reality that has given rise to irregular migration between Indonesia and 
Australia, directly echoing the border pattern established across Europe as 
desperate people search for ways to seek protection. In Australia this 
situation has then precipitated a further ‘securitised’ response by the state 
looking to exclude asylum seekers through increasingly punitive and 
militaristic efforts, contributing to the further destruction of human rights. 
What becomes apparent through case studies such as these is that despite 
the brevity of human rights legislation – recognised across most of the 
developed world – states are now implementing pre-emptive measures that 
effectively neutralise their obligations. The result of this is that the architecture 
of international refugee protection appears intact, despite the purposeful 
dismantling of almost all legal ways for asylum seekers to access such rights, 
delegitimising the search for asylum and exposing people to increasingly 
vulnerable situations in legally ambiguous spaces in the process. To 
overcome this situation it is imperative that states implement migration 
policies that reflect the unique status of asylum seekers. Furthermore, the 
Convention states must recognise that their duty of care stretches beyond the 
border of the nation-state, beginning whenever state apparatus interacts with 
forced migrants, be it in foreign embassies, third countries or on the high 
seas. This will prevent the uncoupling of deterritorialised border control and 
the flouting of state responsibility.   
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Immobility in Greece
ANDRIANI FILI
Huysmans (2006) argues that the process of securitising migration is 
comprised of three themes: internal security, cultural identity and welfare. 
These three themes are not only evident internationally (Bosworth and Guild 
2008) but have been central to Greek immigration (detention) policy since the 
early 1990s, when the sudden influx of – mostly undocumented – migrants 
sparked the adoption of restrictive state policies and a rapid increase in anti-
immigration attitudes (Karyotis 2012). The public discourse on mobility in 
Greece has become marked by a toxic combination of internal securitisation 
and racism, as politicians of all parties raise concerns about links between the 
undocumented, rising crime, urban degradation and widespread hardship.1 
Immigration, moreover, is characterised as a challenge to conceptions of 
Greek national identity in public perception, too, thus explaining the 
continuing rise of xenophobia and anti-immigrant rhetoric (Voutira 2013). 
Immigration, finally, has traditionally been seen as threatening the welfare of 
Greek citizens in austerity-ridden Greece (Karamanidou 2016). In tandem 
with hostile representations of immigrants and refugees has been the 
evolution of Greek immigration policies, which have mainly been dealing with 
immigration as a necessary evil (Triantafyllidou 2009). Hence it is clear that 
‘the securitisation of migration has both explicitly and implicitly made borders 
more selective and targeted in their policing of irregular migrants’ (Gerard and 
Pickering 2013). In this context, irregular entry in Greece is a crime in itself, 
punishable with at minimum a three-month imprisonment and a fine of no less 
than 1,500 euros [Greek Law 3386/2005, Art. 83(1)]. 
However, this form of punishment is rarely enforced. Instead, the blanket 
1  For a discussion on how the securitisation of immigration was hijacked by the far 
right see Lazaridis and Skleparis 2015. 
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administrative detention of all irregular migrants that have either crossed 
irregularly or remained in Greece without a legal status has taken place 
across the country for a number of years (Triantafyllidou et al. 2014); 
punishment in relation to border control is not explicit but is enacted through 
administrative policies and practices (Bosworth and Guild 2008; Gerard and 
Pickering 2014). This goes hand-in-hand with Greece’s policy of deporting 
unwanted population from its territory. Indeed, for far too long, Greece has 
sought to reduce rates of irregular immigration by relying increasingly on 
detaining and deporting the immigrant ‘other’ (Furman et al. 2016).2 Despite 
growing evidence that these policies have never borne the intended results, 
they have been excessively employed to the detriment of human lives (Angeli 
et al. 2014) with the pretence of these policies being the result of the 
hospitable feelings of the Greek people. 
The Greek notion of hospitality (filoksenia) has more than often appeared in 
official rhetoric as a national virtue and a generous offer to irregular migrants 
in order to refute numerous accusations regarding the conditions in the 
country’s detention centres (Rozakou 2012). ‘[This is] a project that makes us 
proud of the level of filoksenia (hospitality) that our country offers to illegal 
immigrants who stay here until their return to their country of origin’, said then 
Minister of Public Protection, Prokopis Pavlopoulos, at the inauguration of a 
detention centre on the island of Samos (Rozakou 2012). In the same line of 
thought, pre-removal detention centres have been euphemistically called 
‘closed hospitality centres’ (Hellenic Republic 2012). More recently, the Greek 
government has built hotspots on five islands (Samos, Chios, Lesbos, Kos, 
Leros) at the sea border between Turkey and Greece, which deal with large 
influxes. The hotspots were ordered by the European Union (EU) to manage 
exceptional migratory flows. However, when the Greek Defence Minister, 
Panos Kammenos, announced their long-stalled creation, he claimed that 
they were ready to ‘function and welcome refugees’ (Ekathimerini 2016). 
Refugees and migrants, though, feel nothing like welcome. Instead, there are 
a number of human rights organisations’ accounts that report hopelessness 
and despair (Human Rights Watch 2016; Amnesty International 2016). Does 
this constitute a hospitality crisis? Or has the rhetoric around hospitality been 
employed purely to reaffirm state sovereignty through the ultimate control of 
the ‘other’ in immigration detention centres? Prompted by these questions, 
this chapter will attempt to lay out the primary characteristics of the Greek 
2  In the study of people who cross borders extra-legally, defining ‘the immigrant’ is a 
process of exclusion or inclusion enacted by states, often involving racial ‘othering’ 
(Kofman et al. 2000, 8; Mountz 2010). There have been a number of studies in 
Australia (Grewcock 2009) and in the US (Bosworth and Kaufman 2011), that point to 
the fact that the treatment of immigrants and asylum seekers reflects entrenched 
cultural and political xenophobic othering. 
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detention system over the past few years (for more on this see Bosworth and 
Fili 2015). In doing so, it will claim that detention practices have been 
legitimated through interlinked discursive strategies: a narrative of deterrence; 
the rationalisation of deportation as an opposition to the imagery of invading 
hordes and hungry masses; and the denial of both policies’ racialised nature.  
The Politics of Detention
For a number of years, detention was Greece’s main policy in the manage-
ment of irregular arrivals (Triantafyllidou et al. 2014). It was predicated upon 
two simple ideas. The first one was the narrative of deterrence, signalling at 
the same time an investment in safeguarding Greece’s porous borders and a 
focus on ‘humanely acceptable deficiencies in detention centres’.3 
Internationally, the securitisation of migration applies theories of deterrence in 
attempts to control and influence the mobility of irregular migrants. Migration, 
in this context, is constructed as a rational choice to be ‘deterred by rapidly 
expanding preventative infrastructures’ (Bosworth and Guild 2008, 711). 
Indeed, in 2012, the Greek government completed a 10.5km fence along the 
most transited part of its land border with Turkey,4 and deployed almost 2,000 
additional border guards (Pallister-Wilkins 2015). The measures proved 
effective in discouraging immigrants or smugglers. However, it redirected the 
flows back to the Greek islands increasing the death toll in the Aegean. In 
addition to hardening the external border, resourceful Greek police and 
coastguard have employed over the years, a number of pre-emptive 
measures to control movements across the borders with neighbouring Turkey, 
including illegal deportations and pushbacks. 
Required to secure its border with Turkey on behalf of all of Europe, Greece 
did so under conditions of financial privation and surging xenophobia, without 
contravening the human rights standards expected of EU members. ‘We have 
to make their lives miserable, otherwise they will be under the impression that 
coming to Greece they will be free to do what they want’, the Head of Greek 
Police advised his officers (Demetis 2016). From this view, faced with the 
prospect of prolonged stays inside a Greek detention centre under deplorable 
conditions, irregular migrants will be discouraged from making the perilous 
3  When asked about the living conditions of Amygdaleza detention centre, Mr. 
Dendias, the Minister of Public Protection was clear: ‘We make sure we follow 
European standards. However, conditions are not ideal, this is not a hotel. The logic is 
that ‘humanely acceptable deficiencies’ will force irregulars out of Greece’ (Autopsia 
2012).
4  At a time of severe cuts in public spending, Greece completed the construction of 
the fence with national funds because the European Commission denied money and 
support for the project. 
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journey to Greece. Indeed, as a number of legal rulings and non-
governmental organisation (NGO) reports made quite clear, many of the 
Greek facilities fail to meet basic standards of care and are mainly defined by 
arbitrariness, sheer overcrowding and poor conditions (European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 
Punishment (CPT) 2012; Human Rights Watch 2008; Amnesty International 
2010 and 2012; Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 2014). The current so-
called ‘refugee crisis’5 that has played out in the Aegean as the main gateway 
to Europe, however, proves that any focus on deterrence, either in the form of 
fencing and gatekeeping (Triantafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011) or by making 
detention facilities unliveable, is wilfully ignorant of the kinds of factors 
propelling people to move in the first place and, thus, completely ineffective.
The second legitimating basis for detention was deportation. As former 
Minister of Citizen’s Protection, Nikos Dendias, stated: ‘Our aim is that every 
illegal migrant, unless the competent authorities decide that he is entitled to 
international protection, will be detained until he is returned to his home 
country’ (Ministry of Citizen Protection 2013). In this line of thought, the 
detention infrastructure formed the linchpin for the successful implementation 
of returns. This was further supported by an advisory opinion of the Greek 
Legal Council that allows authorities to prolong detention beyond the 
18-month limit until the detainee has consented to be returned (European 
Council on Religion and Ethics (ECRE) 2014). Under this framework, Greece 
launched a massive operation to arrest and detain all irregular migrants in the 
Greek territory, ironically labelled ‘Operation Xenios6 Zeus’, referring to the 
ancient Greek God Zeus to once again symbolise hospitality to and patronage 
of foreigners (Human Rights Watch 2013). Once the number of arrestees 
started exceeding the number of places available, the government engaged in 
a large-scale investment in pre-removal detention establishments to increase 
the return rate.7 Nonetheless, the policy proved to be far from successful. In 
fact, between 2008 and 2013, Greece issued 491,411 orders to leave, of 
which only 24.5 per cent on average were enforced. These orders are rarely 
enforced with a judicially approved deportation proceeding because most 
irregular migrants lack the travel documents to leave the country legally. In 
2014, in the midst of its worst economic crisis and given the extreme costs of 
forced returns (Ageli et al. 2014), the Greek government ceased all 
deportations. However, this was not accompanied by a reduction in the 
number of detainees as one would expect; in fact, the detainee population 
continued to increase (Asylum Information Database (AIDA) 2015).
5  In 2015 the UN refugee agency declared an emergency inside the EU, and the EU 
deployed its own humanitarian response unit inside Europe for the first time. 
6  Xenios refers to the ancient Greek concept of hospitality. 
7  See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Mission to 
Greece, 18 April 2013.
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Arguably, then, the Greek detention policy has been based on a flimsy 
foundation, as the Greek state has managed neither to curb arrivals nor 
remove the undesirable population. Nevertheless, detention practices, 
employed in the most capricious and arbitrary manner (Majcher and Flynn 
2014), remained unchallenged, highlighting their deeply racialised nature 
(Bosworth et al. forthcoming). ‘The migrant from the ex-Soviet Union that 
goes to Sweden has some kind of level. Greece gets migrants from 
Bangladesh, Afghanistan who have a different culture; they belong to a 
different world. That’s our misfortune’ (Ekatihimerini 2014), exclaimed former 
Minister of Public Protection, Nikos Dendias, about the quality of detainees. 
Similarly, a detention officer at Petrou Ralli detention centre claimed in 
response to a question about women detainees: ‘They are not able to freely 
move around, they can’t talk to anyone, they just come to Greece and 
become slaves. So in a way in here [detention centre] they have a better life, 
because we feed them and provide them with accommodation.’8 Hence, 
detention is heavily invested in ‘civilising’ tropes and gendered moralities. It 
provides another, potent opportunity not only to reject, but to demean and 
diminish racially othered peoples. 
In this kind of discourse, the provision of ‘shelter’ to undocumented migrants 
by the Greek state was considered as a marker of a civilised state (us) pitted 
against uncivilised masses (them) (Bosworth et al. forthcoming 2018), a 
timeless persuasive technique that helps define any issue in security terms 
(Karyotis 2012). In this context, there were frequent announcements about 
pending reforms aimed at increasing the detention estate, which all the same 
was not a small one to begin with. Up until 2015, there were 9 pre-removal/
detention centres, two screening centres in Samos and Chios in the Aegean, 
two first reception centres in Orestiada on the mainland border with Turkey 
and Lesbos at the sea border with Turkey, in addition to a number of border 
guards and police stations, with a known capacity for around 5,000 (Majcher 
and Flynn 2014). 
The growing activist movements against detention, racism and fascism, 
though strong, could not reach beyond their own circles, which did not yet 
have any political capital. The paradox of the Greek detention policy was not 
lost on detainees either. ‘We are buried alive here. This is like a mass grave 
… but we are not animals, we are humans and we have human rights, no?’ 
male detainees at the Athens International airport detention facility 
pronounced firmly (Fili 2013). In this framework, forms of resistance 
flourished. In some instances, it was spontaneous, triggered by an incident of 
violence, and in others it was organised in advance. Detainees often engaged 
8  The interview was conducted by the author under the project ‘Border Policing: 
Gender, Human Rights & Security’ funded by the Australian Research Council.
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in hunger strikes and self-harm. Others issued statements, with the support of 
human rights organisations, against detention practices (Infomobile n.d.). The 
voices that demanded a change in the detention system grew stronger every 
day.  
Resistance to Change 
In February 2015, the new left-wing government assured Greek citizens that 
immigration detention centres belonged to the past, committing to its election 
pledge to reverse anti-immigrant policies of the previous right-wing 
government (AIDA 2015). To this effect, it formed a new Immigration Policy 
Ministry under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At a visit to the infamous 
Amygdaleza pre-removal detention centre (Angeli and Triantafyllidou 2014), 
following the suicide of a Pakistani detainee, then Deputy Minister of Citizen’s 
Protection, Yannis Panousis, said ‘I am here to express my embarrassment. 
We are done with detention centres’ (Ekathimerini 2015). Indeed, in March 
2015, the government started evacuating this centre at a rate of 30 migrants 
per day (Chrysopoulos 2015), amid great fanfare about the humanitarian face 
of the new era and, to its credit, despite fervent opposition not only by other 
parties but also by local residents. The aim was to close down the centre 
within 100 days, and other centres as soon as possible. It was a moment 
much celebrated by NGOs and human rights organisations, as this was the 
first time a member of a Greek government spoke openly about what was 
going on inside detention facilities (Kathimerini 2015). 
The Greek government’s plan was further accompanied by the announcement 
of a range of measures that presented an important step towards reducing 
the use of immigration detention in Greece (Ministry of Citizen Protection 
2015). The announcement included the revocation of the Ministerial Decision 
allowing for detention beyond 18 months, and the immediate release of 
persons concerned. Furthermore, action would be taken in order to put in 
place open reception centres instead of detention facilities. The announ-
cement also noted that alternatives to detention would be implemented for the 
first time, the maximum period of detention would be limited to six months, 
and persons belonging to vulnerable groups as well as asylum seekers would 
be immediately released. 
Indeed, in the following months, the detained population shrunk from around 
7,000 to a few hundred (Aitima 2016). A year later, in March 2016, pre-
removal detention centres were back again reaching their full capacity, and 
Greece was fast becoming a containing space of the thousands of refugees 
trapped in its islands and mainland (Aitima 2016). How can this turnaround be 
explained? 
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Containing Immobility  
In June 2015, at the same time as the Greek government was negotiating a 
new bail out deal with Europe, there was a general understanding that the 
boats would not stop coming. Indeed, over the summer of 2015, the numbers 
escalated, reaching their peak in October with 218,394 new arrivals (United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) n.d.a.). However, the 
government did not have the resources to deal with the enormous task of 
registering and managing the incoming population. For example, during the 
summer there were only four representatives of the First Reception Service to 
register new arrivals on Lesbos, the island which received thousands per day 
(UNHCR n.d.c.). In an attempt to put more pressure on the EU to pour in 
more funds, members of the government threatened to unleash a wave ‘of 
millions of economic migrants’ on Europe unless the EU helped Greece 
financially (Waterfield and Bruno 2015). Unofficially, though, the wave-through 
approach had already started. Operating in a state of legal limbo and with an 
overwhelmed system, due to severe staff shortages, Greek officials neither 
registered nor fingerprinted most of the new arrivals (Greek Council for 
Refugees 2015). Near the end of the summer, the police that were 
responsible for managing the closed reception centres on the islands opened 
the gates due to their incapability to provide food to all the detainees9. 
Rather than trying to impede movement like in the past, the focus was now on 
speeding up the flow to avoid congestion on the islands. Hence, the number 
of immigrant and asylum seeker detainees remained very low. The Greek 
government did not just turn a blind eye to this practice, but was actively 
involved by chartering ferries to take people from the islands where they land 
(Spathopoulou 2016), to Athens and buses to take them to train stations so 
they could continue their journey to Northern Greece. The idea was that they 
would eventually leave Greece to reach their desired destinations. However, 
in lack of a sustainable plan, this resulted in refugees and migrants 
congregating in squares in Athens, where the number of people sleeping 
rough swelled dramatically. The huge makeshift camp in Idomeni, Greece’s 
border with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), which the 
Greek Interior Minister, Panagiotis Kouroumblis, called ‘modern-day Dachau’ 
(Worley and Dearden 2016), was constructed by the Doctors Without Borders 
(Médecins Sans Frontières) and other NGOs to hold those who were waiting 
to cross the border to continue their journeys through the Balkans to Northern 
Europe. However, the idea of people being waved through was not welcomed 
by the countries on the receiving end of the flow (European Commission 
2016b), isolating Greece from its neighbouring countries, as evidenced by its 
9  This is mainly based on anecdotal evidence drawn from my experience as an NGO 
worker at the time.  
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exclusion from the Visegrad and Austria summit which were convened to 
discuss the handling of the ‘refugee crisis’ (Deutsche Welle 2016). The 
message from this summit was clear: Greece is responsible to stop the flow, 
otherwise plans will be enforced to tighten border controls, including closing 
borders, on the Balkan route.
The European agenda for immigration, thus, focused on deterrence at all 
costs, and greater mobilisation of border control. Drawing on this, the 
European Commission developed the idea of the ‘hotspot approach.’ 
(European Commission n.d.). The aim was to help slow the flow of migrants 
heading to the north, and mitigate security risks by swiftly identifying, 
registering, and fingerprinting all arrivals in Italy and Greece, as ‘hotspots’ 
were considered key to securing the EU’s external borders (European 
Commission 2016c). Furthermore, in late January, the EU gave Greece a 
three-month ultimatum to stop migrants crossing from Turkey, or else the 
country would be banned from the borderless Schengen area (European 
Commission 2016b). Austria and several Balkan countries were determined to 
stop migrants passing through by building rows of fences, and FYROM 
sealed its southern border with Greece. With the end of the wave-through 
approach, thousands of migrants were stranded in Greece. 
Amid EU pressure to deal with mass mobility, and with just few of the 
resources pledged by the EU actually coming through, the available evidence 
shows that confinement and detention are once again employed as an 
accommodation strategy for the rising number of refugees and migrants10. In 
the beginning of 2016, the government started detaining nationals of North 
African countries followed by nationals of Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
separating once more between bona fide refugees and economic migrants 
(Aitima 2016). At the same time, the authorities started to arrest nationals of 
other countries, including Afghans, holding expired police documents. In a 
just a few months, the number of detainees increased significantly (Aitima 
2016). In February 2016, the five long-delayed ‘hotspot’ centres opened on 
the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Leros, Samos, and Kos in order to cope with a 
relentless flow of people landing from Turkey (Antonakaki et al. 2016). 
Under the EU-Turkey deal, which came into force on 20 March 2016, people 
arriving on the Greek islands are immediately detained for 20 days in these 
hotspots in order to be individually assessed by the Greek authorities. 
Following the 20 days’ period, they are released but have to remain on the 
island, thus further restricting their movement. Anyone who does not apply for 
10  It is important to note that the borders for nationalities other than Syrians, Afghans 
and Iraqis closed on December 2015 and the borders for Afghans closed on February 
2016. 
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asylum will be sent back to Turkey, as will anyone whose claim is rejected. 
Implementation of the deal has presented Greece with two challenges: first, 
the legal challenge of presenting Turkey as a safe ‘third country’ in order to 
expedite returns. Second, to separate between those already trapped in 
Greece and new arrivals, as the fate of the former group is not addressed by 
the deal. As for the former, the Greek government amended its asylum 
legislation in a fast-track legislative procedure to modify the structure of the 
Asylum Appeals Committees, raising concerns about the independence and 
impartiality of the new body (for more on this see Gkliati 2016). The latter 
challenge was addressed by emptying Greek islands of all those who crossed 
over from Turkey prior to the deal and transforming the much vaunted open 
hotspots into massive police-run detention centres to host newcomers. The 
amended legal framework of first reception procedures (3907/2011) further 
clarifies that migrants are subject to restriction of freedom of movement within 
the premises of these centres.  
Within a few months, Greece was transformed from a fast lane to a grim 
waiting room. At the moment, there are more than 50 emergency reception 
sites11 and five hotspots, as well as a number of informal sites, spread all over 
Greece, operating with capacity for around 60,000 people (UNHCR n.d.a). In 
addition to these new facilities, Greece continues to use a number of pre-
removal detention centres, older dedicated detention facilities, and numerous 
border guard and police stations. For example, pre-removal detention centres 
like Amygdaleza and Corinth, the closure of which was celebrated in the 
presence of the media at the beginning of the government’s term of office, 
have now been re-opened. According to a report released in October 2016 
(Aitima 2016) drawing on a project that involved monitoring visits to detention 
centres in Greece, there are still long-standing systemic problems, no 
different to what human rights organisations have castigated Greece for in the 
past. In fact, they arise from a well-known mixture of pleasing the EU, 
appeasing their native citizens, and attempting to deter prospective arrivals. 
Based on 31 monitoring visits to detention centres conducted over one year, 
the analysis of 277 individual cases and interviews with competent authorities 
the research team observed, among others, the use of inappropriate 
detention areas, lack of outdoor time, recreational activities and interpretation 
services, inadequate healthcare, social and psychological support, detention 
of minors and seriously ill persons and the sheer lack of information regarding 
the case. Furthermore, Amnesty International at a press meeting in October 
2016 claimed that detention conditions on the islands are purposefully bad to 
deter prospective arrivals, alluding to former practices described above 
(Huffington Post Greece 2016).
11  Migration ministry bulletins list 39 camps, some of which are empty; others are 
mothballed and others still are in the planning phase but do not appear on the list 
(Howden and Fotiadis 2017).
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Refugee camps, too, are full or host to a range of problems. Almost half of the 
new sites were created in under ten days, some in very remote locations with 
little to no access to legal aid, limited access to services and support, and 
hardly any information offered about their status. Conditions in most open 
centres fall below international humanitarian standards, to the point where 
some have been characterised as even ‘unfit for animals’ (Human Rights 
Watch 2016). What is more, access to asylum is severely impeded. The 
Greek army12 has played a lead role in setting up most of the facilities 
covering mainly catering services, receiving complaints not just about the 
quality of the food but also due to the rumours of corruption following the 
deals made with the catering companies.13 
All the above have long been a source of intense criticism from both domestic 
and international observers, as well as the subject of numerous cases at the 
European Court of Human Rights. What is relatively new, however, is the 
level of advanced confusion that is taking shape on the ground, reflecting the 
confused and improvised nature of reactive (EU) immigration policies and 
their implementation. Who is detained, where, for what reasons, and for how 
long, are issues that no one knows. Your quality of life depends on where you 
have been placed, and where you have been placed is down to luck. It is also 
unclear as to which part of the government is responsible for running open 
and closed facilities. Even the Action Plan presented by the Greek authorities 
in the beginning of March 2016 lacks information on the authorities 
responsible for the implementation of certain actions and for monitoring the 
implementation of those actions (European Commission 2016a). 
While not all facilities used to confine people at the moment are detention 
centres per se, the line between open accommodation and confinement often 
becomes difficult to draw in practice. The spatial logic of refugee camps being 
as remote as possible (Zeveleva 2017), together with severely restricted 
access to the asylum process in these places, render most people inside 
them immobile14 in overcrowded and unhygienic conditions. Still, refugees are 
not only stuck inside camps; under the EU-Turkey deal and in view of walls 
being literally and metaphorically built across Europe they are also physically 
prevented from leaving Greece15. As this form of containment is neither 
reasonable nor proportionate to a government objective, because these 
12  $74 million was added to the defence ministry budget for refugee support. 
13  Internal NGO migration brief. 
14  This is not to say that people are discouraged from finding ways to move but that 
this is now more time-consuming and riddled with a number of challenges.
15  In stark opposition to this framing refugees and migrants across Greece find ways 
to circumvent containment practices and, albeit in smaller numbers, manage to leave 
Greece. However, this means that they increasingly depend on smuggling networks 
and attempt risky journeys.  
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people cannot be expelled, it can be argued that, in essence, the government 
resorts to arbitrary and illegitimate detention of refugees on Greek soil.  
As a recent report by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles argues, 
there is little official clarity as to what can be presented as detention facilities 
or reception structures in Greece (ECRE 2016). It is explained that the highly 
misleading representation of the country’s reception capacity, including 
detention places, can be attributed to the effort to reach the EU target of 
30,000 reception places and satisfy other Member States. At the same time, 
the number of detainees is wrongly presented as smaller than the actual one, 
failing to include the number of people detained in hotspots. This is further 
reflected in another report by the Global Detention Project (2015), which 
aimed to obtain a true picture of the number of migrants and asylum seekers 
being held in detention around the world. Greece failed to provide complete 
information on the names and locations of detention centres and offered 
invalid answers to questions about the number of (asylum seeker) detainees 
and the number of minors in detention. Greek authorities did not include the 
many police stations, where migrants are known to be detained, thus, 
invisibilising a great number of detainees and directed the researchers to a 
website that contains limited information in order to avoid directly responding 
to questions (Hellenic Police n.d.). In effect, Greece’s detained migrants are 
going uncounted and hence unaccounted for.
Conclusion
For a number of years, the Greek government blamed the lack of infra-
structure, organisation, capital and the intrinsic pressures of its geographical 
position for Greece’s difficulty in managing borders and effectively dealing 
with migrant populations. The narratives of crises, which have been employed 
since 2009, only grant moral legitimacy to Greece’s continued political, legal, 
and financial margin within Europe (Mantanika 2014). In this context of yet 
another crisis, Greece soon became a space of humanitarian intervention 
where governmental and nongovernmental, security, humanitarian and 
human rights actors co-operate to respond to ‘humanitarian crises’. In a 
situation of endless emergency, people on the move were kept apart and out 
of sight, while the care dispensed was designed to control, filter and confine.  
With a floundering political leadership, unable to find solutions to anything at 
all, and with a downward spiralling economy and pressure from the EU to 
employ mechanisms of repressive immigration control, it comes as no 
surprise that the Greek government succumbed to models of encampment 
and abandoned its humanitarian and leftist ideals that were its flagship for 
almost a year ago. While some remodelling has been observed recently, this 
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chapter argues that containment practices of immobility in Greece are 
enduring in time and employed by all governing parties. ‘This refutes a left-
right dichotomy and points to the racialised dynamics of immigration control, 
informed by dominant and shared discourses of securitization and illegaliz-
ation of migrants’ (Karamanidou 2016). As the Minister of Immigration Policy, 
Giannis Mouzalas, asserted ‘there can be no immigration policy without 
closed hospitality centres’ (Georgiopoulou 2016) allegedly to reduce criminal 
rates among immigrants and asylum seekers. What lies ahead for the 
migrants and refugees who arrive on Greece’s shores remains to be seen; 
yet, the reality on the ground points to a looming bleak future that will focus 
on the expansion of containment practices. In January 2017, the government, 
in the spirit of the EU-Turkey deal, announced the construction of new closed 
detention centres for the arriving population that does not conform to a 
refugee profile. The multiple crises that Greece is dealing with have fallen 
from view in the rest of Europe. It is now time to raise our voices for the 
people who have an inalienable right to live somewhere safely. 
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The contemporary migration regime is highly unequal, leaving the majority of 
people in the world without real access to official channels of migration. Over 
the past years, asylum has been attested as being in crisis (see for example 
Zetter 2015; Väyrynen et al. 2017, 9). The increased number of asylum 
seekers that arrived in Europe in 2015 concretely demonstrated this political 
crisis (Kynsilehto 2017), leaving thousands to struggle over basic rights and 
to exercise the very right to ask for asylum that is endorsed in various human 
rights treaties. Undocumented or irregular migration in particular is perceived 
as a problem by established society. Irregularity is also a severe problem for 
people who are themselves in an irregular situation due to their lack of access 
to basic rights such as accommodation, healthcare, education and work. 
Moreover, uneven practices by states to provide basic services for people on 
the move create a necessity for civil society in a large sense – comprising not 
only non-governmental organisations but also more informal groups – to 
engage in diverse forms of everyday solidarity. Many associations including 
registered organisations with paid staff, those operating on a voluntary-work 
basis, as well as formal and informal networks of organisations and individ-
uals across local, national and transnational scales engage with people on 
the move in order to provide greatly needed everyday assistance, information 
and human contacts. I call these people and organisations ‘solidarity actors’.
In this chapter, I discuss examples of different types of solidarity action, both 
those with more humanitarian orientation and those geared towards advocacy 
and making political claims that seek to challenge the status quo. The latter 
are often also further divided between legalistic human rights argumentation 
and more explicitly political claims. However, I argue that these distinctions 
are becoming increasingly difficult to uphold due to the striking inequalities 
that actors at all levels witness on a daily basis, and the radical undermining 
of human rights frameworks. Most of these forms of activism comprise links 
across localities and countries, even continents. Solidarity networks are thus 
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transnational and translocal. Moreover, individual solidarity actors often 
engage in different types of parallel and overlapping networks, formal and 
more informal ones, and interlinked networks exchange information, best 
practises and critiques of the status quo at different levels.
This chapter has a two-fold aim. Firstly, it discusses diverse forms of acting 
together in solidarity for, with and by migrants. Secondly, it will address the 
question of politics within these forms of acting together. These politics 
concern access to information, knowledge production and the possibilities of 
being mobile in order to engage in solidarity action. The chapter draws on 
insights from my own on-going multi-sited ethnographic research at different 
borders around the Mediterranean Sea, and my long-term engagement in 
transnational migrants’ rights advocacy. The chapter begins by addressing 
variegated spaces and times of solidarity activism and includes the issue of 
sustainability of movements. It introduces an example and innovative 
mechanism that combines technical academic knowledge to activist practice, 
and then moves to critical practices and politics of movements. A final section 
will address the tendency of criminalising solidarity action that seeks to 
impede contact between privileged actors and people on the move.
Spaces and Times of Solidarity Activism
The phenomenon of solidarity activism is by far not new: many locations, 
such as the Sonoran desert between the US and Mexico (see for example 
Doty 2006; Cabrera and Glavac 2010; Squire 2014), and the town of Calais 
(Laacher 2002; Rygiel 2011) by the English Channel are well-known 
examples of border locations where solidarity actors have engaged for years 
to provide food, water and clothes for people transiting these sites. In some of 
these sites, more or less permanent forms of dwelling are established in the 
margins of towns, in the fields or forests, where shelters can be built before 
journeys are to continue. Based on long-term observations at different 
refugee camps and informal sites, Michel Agier argues: 
Other spaces emerge, in this age of globalization and local 
interventions by the “international community”, and these 
become sites of political expression of a new type, which are 
invented and acted out in and on the limits (Agier 2011, 155).
‘Enforcement archipelago’ (Mountz 2011) refers to the use of islands to enact 
border control at a distance, with Nauru and Christmas Island as well-known 
cases for the Australian externalisation efforts, and Guam as one example of 
similar practice by the United States. In the Mediterranean, Lampedusa has 
become a highly symbolic site (Friese 2010; Cuttitta 2014) together with the 
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Aegean Islands, of which Lesbos became the most mediatised in 2015 – 
even though these forms of mobilities and parallel solidarities are far from 
being new there either (Trubeta 2015). As the islands are located at a 
distance from the mainland, being stuck on an island does not always need to 
denote being locked into a detention unit, though this is often an additional 
measure used. The remote location already necessitates some form of help, 
usually a written document, so that the person who entered irregularly can 
leave the island. In the Greek context, it was for a long time impossible to 
even apply for asylum on the islands, leaving the capital city Athens as the 
only location where an asylum claim could be lodged. As a peculiar practice, 
one needed a removal order to leave an Aegean island, take a ferryboat to 
Athens, and figure out whether applying for asylum in Greece could be an 
option (Worldwide Movement for Human Rights (FIDH), Migreurop and Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) 2014, 75–77). While waiting, 
immediate assistance and human contacts by solidarity actors were highly 
needed.
For many people seeking asylum in the European Union (EU), Greece did not 
seem a feasible option. Many decided to continue their journeys towards 
other EU Member States, which turned the harbour city of Patras into a hub 
for people who sought a possibility to cross to Italy (Yaghmaian 2006; Lafa-
zani 2013). Over the course of 2015, with the spotlight turned on the so-called 
Balkan route, the tiny village of Idomeni at the border between Greece and 
Macedonia became known to the wider public. Since mid-November 2015, it 
became a stage for successive closures and openings of the border, first with 
only people of Afghan, Iraqi and Syrian nationalities allowed to cross, then 
closing to everyone (based on the author’s on-site visit to Idomeni, 21 
November 2015; see also Amnesty International 2016). 
With the gradual closing of the border, Idomeni began to host an increasingly 
permanent form of a makeshift camp that was never established and opened 
as a refugee camp in a formal sense, despite the presence of several int-
ernational organisations such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and 
Médicins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders [MSF]) since early on. 
After the border was closed completely, during the spring months of 2016, 
some 14,000 people ended up blocked in Idomeni (Al Jazeera 2016). The 
UNHCR issued a call saying that the situation was escalating day by day into 
a full-blown humanitarian crisis, and tension escalated as people grew 
increasingly frustrated for being blocked in the middle of fields and on the 
railroad linking the two countries (UNHCR 2016a). On Monday, 14 March 
2016, hundreds if not thousands of people grew tired of waiting at the border. 
They decided to go past the border construction consisting of barbed wire 
fences and Macedonian military onto the other side of the border. Walking 
through woods and crossing a river, they made their way into the territory of 
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Macedonia. Many ended up detained once in Macedonia, and some eighty 
journalists and solidarity advocates who had accompanied them were 
arrested for illegal border crossing. Three people from Afghanistan drowned 
in the river, one of them a pregnant woman. The people were returned to the 
Greek side of the border and the frustration caused by the uncertainty 
continued to grow (BBC 2016). As one result of the mounting tension, on 10 
April 2016 police forces from the Macedonian side fired tear gas and rubber 
bullets at refugees protesting at the border, leaving not even young children 
unaffected (Reuters 2016).
The unrest at the border in Idomeni was happening while the EU leaders 
were hastily preparing the second summit with Turkey to complete the deals, 
especially the deal from the week before, the week of 7 March 2016, by which 
Turkey accepted that the EU would return people arriving irregularly to the 
islands. If there were Syrians among the returnees, the EU states would 
readmit another Syrian via legal avenues (BBC 2016). A legal framework was 
not disclosed that would formally render the push-backs possible, nor was it 
revealed how these exchanges would be organized in practice. In monetary 
terms, the EU would pay an additional 3 billion euros to Turkey in addition to 
the already agreed 3 billion in support, for Turkey to continue to host refugees 
and to cooperate in impeding them from leaving the country by irregular 
means. Human rights groups and solidarity advocates have called these 
deals the biggest concerted operation of human trafficking ever seen.
Twists and turns of European border politics and overall 
approach to migrants and refugees is closely followed by 
people on the move. One of these twists, negotiations 
concerning the deal between the EU and Turkey, was subject 
to many questions at Elleniko camp in the outskirts of Athens, 
Greece. The camp is a combination of a former airport terminal 
and sports grounds constructed for the 2004 Olympic Games, 
namely a basketball hall and an ice hockey rink. These 
facilities host some 5000 people of diverse nationalities with 
new people arriving from the islands on a daily basis. It is an 
open facility with a police presence and private security 
outside, with people able to come and go, the minimum of 
structured activity by voluntary groups and a couple of formal 
organisations. There is a lack of security especially in the 
night-time. The people staying here are waiting for something 
to happen, being blocked from continuing further, uncertain of 
what might happen while waiting, and terrified of the possible 
outcome of the deal that is being negotiated with Turkey. 
Serious faces, posing questions that no-one can answer, at 
least for now. (Extract from field notes, Athens, March 2016)
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In Europe, with increased numbers of arrivals coupled with the further 
tightening of access to asylum and other forms of legalising one’s residence, 
as well as curbing legal channels of access to territory such as via family 
reunification, it is likely that there will be more people than ever in need of 
regularisation and other means for day-to-day survival, such as accom-
modation, food and sanitation. Much of the daily assistance to both new 
arrivals and those who arrived some time ago is provided by associations and 
individuals in a voluntary, sometimes ad hoc manner as has been manifested 
in 2015 and onwards, with the country case of Greece continuing as the most 
exposed arena of the desperate need for help. As the unrest at the border 
between Greece and Macedonia illustrates, the lack of official response to the 
plight of the people on the move calls for an enhanced response by differently 
positioned civil society actors – not only to respond to immediate needs, but 
to maintain relations as peaceful as possible. This engagement is thus 
indispensable, both in terms of accessing basic rights as well as for the 
contribution of this work towards societal peace. Yet it can be very tiresome 
and consuming for those who are engaged in such work, especially in 
contexts where the need for such engagement is already known to be long-
term.
In many of the most exposed ‘hubs’, there is a need for ensuring sustain-
ability of activities that often signifies a need for long-term commitment. In 
long exposed ‘hubs’ such as Calais, Lesbos or Oujda at the border between 
Algeria and Morocco, six to seven years of experience in the local context 
count as a short-term commitment for some actors in the field. As an exam-
ple, I met a middle-aged woman at a food delivery point for migrants in Calais 
in January 2010 and asked whether she had been volunteering for a long 
time with people on the move. She replied: ‘No, not for a long time, just for 
six, seven years’. I have heard similar remarks at each site I have visited, 
from people for whom engagement with people on the move has become a 
part of their everyday life. Indeed, it has become such a naturalised part of 
everyday life that one does not even recognise the time that passes. There is 
a need to learn from these longer-term experiences while developing new 
practices and ways of engagement.
For those who come to help for either shorter or longer periods of time, 
appreciating local knowledge and remaining sensitive to learning local 
dynamics and practices of working in the local context are important. This is a 
recurrent theme, both as a modality of critique and as something to be 
highlighted in more neutral terms that I have encountered at various sites 
where both locals and internationals are working on similar issues. An 
abundance of critiques have addressed the dynamics between big intern-
ational organisations and international non-governmental organisations that 
employ and import expatriate staff in a particular context (Harrell-Bond 1985). 
186Solidarities in Migration
This is a theme that more informal groups and engaged individuals also seek 
and need to remember when engaging in a context they – or we, as I 
consider my own positionality as much as that of any other – are not fully 
familiar with: to listen and learn from local dynamics, and to fully appreciate 
the knowledge and skills of those already present, including foremost those 
whose fate is at stake.
Innovative Practices of Alert
Solidarity networks create innovative practices in all areas where states are 
constantly failing their connected responsibilities. One of these areas is the 
on-going tragedy at sea borders. As a well-known example, the 
Mediterranean Sea has been a stage for increasing numbers of deaths at sea 
over the years, in particular since the signature of the Schengen Accords and, 
consequently, the establishment of a strict visa regime (European 
Commission n.d.) that has sought to separate the two shores since the early 
1990s. The mobility of citizens from the northern shore of that sea is enabled, 
whilst that of a large majority of the southerners, both from coastal states as 
well as further on south- and eastwards, is in actual fact blocked via official 
venues. This uneven access to mobility has forced many to use very 
dangerous means for crossing the border that have resulted in ever 
increasing numbers of deaths. At the same time, there has been a 
multiplication of surveillance mechanisms at sea that have not been able to 
bring down the number of casualties which continue to increase (International 
Organisation for Migration 2017). In the midst of developments of what was 
labelled as the Arab Spring in 2011, a famous event took place. The ‘Left to 
die’ case concerned a vessel that had departed from Libya and was drifting at 
sea for 14 days with all eyes watching, including international media, a NATO 
operation that was going on against the Gaddafi regime, and all the existing 
surveillance in place by the European Border Agency Frontex and national 
coast guards of the Mediterranean coastal states. Sixty-three people died on 
board (see Forensic Architecture n.d.).
Awareness of these tragedies and the failure of states to respond adequately 
triggered a response by concerned individuals around the Mediterranean Sea 
and further in Europe. The Watch the Med initiative is one of the results from 
this concern. This initiative has created an alarm phone that provides an 
emergency number that functions 24/7, is ran by volunteers, and covers the 
Central, Eastern and Western Mediterranean ‘corridors’. The idea is to 
localise the migrant boat in distress and contact the coast guard responsible 
to come and perform a search and rescue operation for the passengers. 
Thus, the idea is to give such specific details that the coast guards can no 
longer claim that they were not aware of the boat in distress. If they fail to act, 
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the case is rendered public and disseminated widely in the media. Through 
this practice, the activists are using new technologies to perform a ‘disobe-
dient gaze’ (Pezzani and Heller 2013) to the maritime areas that have 
become increasingly lethal over the past years. This disobedient gaze refuses 
to remain silent when obvious abuses and neglect happen and, instead, the 
constant search for information is used to render responsible those officials 
that are not fulfilling their search and rescue (SAR) responsibilities. 
Critical Practice and the Politics of Acting in Solidarity 
Solidarity acts are often enacted by people endowed with various degrees of 
privilege compared to those in a less privileged position (see for example 
Rozakou 2016). These positionalities and privileges are far from being fully 
static: they are somewhat fluid, and they may concern the legal status in a 
given country, socio-economic means, or access to information and funding. 
Increasingly, people on the move also take ownership of their struggles by 
engaging in new forms of solidarity (also Bredeloup 2013). In Morocco, for 
example, sub-Saharan migrants’ groups and associations began to emerge in 
2005. First they were largely established and promoted by people without a 
residence status, and not officially recognised as organised civil society by 
the Moroccan state. By claiming their space and gaining visibility through sit-
ins and public marches, especially in the capital city, Rabat, they made 
themselves heard. Different ethnic and national groupings organised in 
nation-wide Councils. Parallel to these developments, and to a large extent 
with the same people involved, a migrant section was established as a part of 
the trade union Organisation Démocratique du Travail (ODT) in 2012. The 
regularisation campaign in 2014 that theoretically targeted people living in 
migrant ‘ghettos’ but in fact enabled a wide category of people, such as 
foreign students, to regularize their statuses, in parallel with the enabling of 
foreign residents to legally establish associations in Morocco, contributed to 
creating a firm ground for migrant organisations to begin formal operations, 
including competition over funds.1 
Diversely positioned noncitizens acting in solidarity often advance even more 
diverse claims compared to those advocated by, say, undocumented migrants 
identifying as such, or other movements that are geared towards the claim for 
a general legalisation (Nicholls 2010; Robertson 2015). In other words, 
migrant groups may remain even more respectful of state sovereignty and the 
state’s ensuing claim of protecting its borders and territory, and choosing 
those it allows to enter and stay, than groups that advocate for solidarity with 
everyone, including the right to free movement. Moreover, based on her work 
with Bulgarian migrants’ associations in Turkey, Zeynep Kaşlı (2016) reminds 
1  This part draws on the author’s fieldwork in Morocco.
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us that migrants’ networks helping the newly arrived and undocumented 
migrants are not free from the power struggles and profit-making that exploits 
the vulnerability of those co-ethnics without access to accurate information 
and legal status.
The central paradox in humanitarian work that Ilana Feldman calls its 
endemic challenge; that is, the requirement to abstain from taking a political 
stance and to push ‘to keep people alive but entirely incapable of changing 
the conditions that have put them at such great risk’ (Feldman 2008, 139). 
This internalised requirement for being apolitical is more and more overtly 
challenged, even by organisations that have thus far kept relatively silent or, 
to say the least, have been more ambiguous in their critiques of state actions. 
One example could be the UNHCR’s refusal to transport people to detention 
centres in the Aegean islands, explained by the Refugee Agency’s 
unwillingness to be party to practices that breach international human rights 
commitments (UNHCR 2016b).
Well-intended humanitarian action and solidarity engagement includes difficult 
questions that need to be resolved in the course of action. Much critique has 
been written on the actions of international organisations (see for example 
Harrell-Bond 1985; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005; Agier 2011), 
international non-governmental organisations (Terry 2002; Fassin 2011), and 
researchers as activists amongst other forms of participation (see for example 
Askins 2009; Darling 2014). Critical engagement is emerging also on and 
within social movement-types of responses to humanitarian crisis situations, 
even if this is again more difficult, knowing that the individuals in question 
invest their own time and money to alleviate the suffering of those considered 
‘beneficiaries’ in the organisational jargon or ‘friends’ to highlight the shared 
humanity. All these responses embody divergent political stances with 
regards to the right to mobility and with regards to the takes on state action; 
that is, whether the role of the state is seen as something to be supported, or 
as something the very existence of which is to be put into question.
In 2015, in the midst of what has been labelled a refugee crisis, more people 
than before woke up to the catastrophic conditions at many border sites, and 
deficiencies in the official reception of the newly arrived. They felt compelled 
to do something concretely. Many engaged in solidarity groups in their own 
countries and neighbourhoods, whereas others travelled long distances to 
come and help in the most exposed sites where help was needed, such as 
the Aegean islands in Greece, at different ‘hubs’ along the so-called Balkan 
route, or in Calais on the shore of the English Channel. These acts of 
solidarity became highly visible in traditional and social media alike. Alongside 
celebrating the drive of people to contribute their time and skills for the sake 
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of others in need, these movements have triggered many questions which are 
being answered in the midst of events. Some of these questions concern the 
need for organising the acts in the best possible way to respond to multiple 
needs. Drawing on his work with ad hoc volunteer groups and more 
established organisations in Rome, Nando Sigona gives the example of 
donations: ‘it was all too easy to end up with millions of Xmas jumpers in a 
warehouse, when that positive energy should have been channelled else-
where’ (Sigona and Bechler 2016). Similar examples have been echoed 
throughout the peak months of 2015, and networks that organise collections 
seek to specify the needs in terms of sizes and kinds of clothes, shoes and 
other items to orientate those giving donations.
Other questions, in line with critical humanitarianism, concern the parallel 
phenomena created along the way, such as ‘holidarity’ and ‘voluntourism’ 
(see ReflActionist Collective 2016). This refers to the fashionable act of 
engaging in movements during one’s vacations, and the different capabilities 
of differentially positioned people to engage in solidarity activities, especially 
further away from home. That is, the necessity to address the inherent and 
complex inequalities embedded in the system where some have the suitable 
identity documents, necessary financial means and flexibility with time 
schedules to engage in different types of solidarity acts, and others not. In the 
accelerating speed of political developments that in many ways has started to 
resemble a third world war, it may be difficult to take the distance needed to 
reflect upon and analyse the actions undertaken (see for example Coleman 
2015). However, as much as this reflection could be integrated into the course 
of action, not as a paralysing idea but as something that would be helpful in 
making the practices more equitable, it is likely to benefit the solidarity 
movements’ work in the long run.
Criminalising Solidarity
An important and worrying phenomenon is the harassment of solidarity actors 
and other activists in many contexts. In France, for example, solidarity actions 
have been sought to be criminalised for years under the pretext of fighting 
human smuggling, as ‘facilitating irregular movement and stay’ (Worldwide 
Movement for Human Rights (FIDH) and World Organisation Against Torture 
(OMCT) 2009; Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) 2011, 
14). Fear is a well-known way to control others (see for example Koskela 
1997), and fear is a means by which governments that are unfriendly, even 
hostile to migrant causes and civil disobedience, seek to exert control over 
people willing and committed to this struggle. These authorities do it following 
a logic that is not quite so distant from violent factions that seek to challenge 
this authority, using these means to maintain an illusion of control (Brown 
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2010) in a global context that is beyond anyone’s control.
The requirement for each person who comes to the Greek islands to help 
refugees to register (Secretariat General for the Aegean and Island Policy 
2016) was introduced in order to have an idea of who actually came and 
worked with refugees. The continuing arrival of boatloads of people over the 
summer, autumn and winter months incited many people across the globe to 
engage with the plight of refugees. Some eighty non-governmental organ-
isations arrived on the island of Lesbos, together with more informal groups 
and countless individuals for different periods of time (Nianias 2016). While 
each was willing to help, and their engagement and contribution valorised, the 
public authorities needed some organisation to these comings and goings. 
The registration process then introduced is to be done with municipal 
authorities, to get a global idea of who is present and engaging with people in 
a vulnerable position. This requirement was not fully innocent either. Early on, 
there were rumours about the border agency Frontex being involved in 
registering solidarity actors in the Greek islands.2 An obvious question in this 
regard is what their involvement exactly is and why they are implicated? For 
what purpose are they involved in registering people who come to do 
voluntary work? Given the security-focused mandate of the agency, the 
purpose of likely intelligence-gathering. This rang the bell of criminalising 
solidarity, as has been the case in different locations, notably in Northern 
France where charges have been raised for years against those who consider 
it their moral duty to help others in need.
Concluding Words
Differentially positioned solidarity actors – associations, networks, individuals 
– are in a very problematic situation. Fundamental rights that were imagined 
as already shared values, at least by the state parties that have signed and 
ratified legally binding commitments such as the Convention of 1951 and its 
additional protocol at full, are put into question from different directions. Thus, 
commitments that have been imagined as givens, on the rhetorical level at 
least if not in practice, are being violated more and more openly. Moreover, 
solidarity actors need to ask themselves – indeed, we need to ask ourselves, 
as I feel implicated in this framework through my various academic and non-
academic commitments – with whom do we solidarise and how do we 
express this in practice, in a volatile context where networks and movements 
are in a constant process of movement? These questions go beyond the 
impact analyses in the humanitarian and development industries’ project 
logics. What moves us towards acting in solidarity and, consequently, what 
does this do to the various formations, temporary or more permanent ones, 
2  Drawing on the author’s exchanges with solidarity groups.
191 Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century
thus constituted? Also needed is alertness towards the impact of the solidarity 
acts in the lives of those towards whom these acts are geared. It is not a 
schematic understanding of impact in quantifiable terms we need, we must 
assess this question more broadly, accounting for the qualitative ‘changes’ or 
‘moves’, however temporary and volatile they might be. Solidarity ties form 
and sometimes dissolve with new information and new urgencies. Not 
everyone can physically go and work for weeks or months in order to provide 
help where it is needed the most, be it for financial reasons, family commit-
ments, emotional capacity or other reasons. For this reason we need to 
acknowledge these are not the only available ways to ‘do something’, to act in 
solidarity. Every encounter counts. Everyone is needed.
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VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS
The increase in the flows of asylum seekers towards the European Union 
(EU) in recent years has re-awakened the discussion over the meaning, 
extent and limits of the principle of solidarity in European asylum law. In view 
of this politically sensitive and ongoing discussion, this contribution aims to 
assess the legal meaning of solidarity in the Common European Asylum 
System. I will attempt to demonstrate that the evolution and content of the 
principle of solidarity in both EU primary and secondary law is predominantly 
state-centred, with claims of solidarity being advanced primarily with states as 
reference points and as beneficiaries. I will aim to demonstrate the limits of 
this state-centred approach to solidarity, both in terms of ensuring effective 
protection of the rights of asylum seekers and refugees and in terms of 
achieving an efficient and well-functioning European asylum system. I will 
advocate in this contribution a paradigm change: moving from a concept of 
state-centred solidarity to a concept of solidarity centred on the individual. I 
will demonstrate how the application of the principle of mutual recognition in 
the field of positive asylum decisions can play a key part in achieving this 
paradigm change. I will argue in particular that positive mutual recognition – if 
accompanied by full equality and access to the labour market for refugees 
across the European Union – is key towards addressing the lack of 
effectiveness in the current system. I will end this contribution by looking 
boldly to the future, and exploring how refugee-centred solidarity can be 
achieved by moving from a system of inter-state cooperation based on 
national asylum determination to a common, EU asylum procedure and 
status.
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State-Centred Solidarity in European Asylum Law – A Constitutional 
Perspective
An examination of European constitutional law reveals a concept of asylum 
solidarity, which is state-centred, securitised and exclusionary (Mitsilegas 
2014). This view of solidarity has been prominent in the debates on allocation 
of responsibility for asylum seekers across the EU way before the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, with the use of the term ‘burden’ to describe 
increased pressures imposed upon the state – with asylum seekers thus vie-
wed implicitly as a burden to national systems. Solidarity here thus takes the 
form of what has been deemed and analysed as ‘burden-sharing’ (Betts 2003; 
Boswell 2003; Noll 2003; Thielemann 2003a and 2003b) and in particular 
from a legal perspective, the sharing of the responsibility for increased flows 
of asylum seekers. The logic of burden-sharing in effect securitises asylum 
flows by viewing asylum seekers and asylum-seeking in a negative light (Noll 
2003). While the term ‘burden-sharing’ does not appear in EU constitutional 
law, one could argue that it has been replaced in the Treaties of the European 
Union1 by a state-centred, securitised and exclusionary concept of solidarity. 
The emphasis on the interests of the state is confirmed by the provisions of 
the Lisbon Treaty on solidarity in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
According to Article 67(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), the Union shall ensure the absence of internal border controls 
for persons and shall frame a common policy on asylum, immigration and 
external border control, based on solidarity between Member States, which is 
fair towards ‘third country’ nationals. 
Article 80 TFEU further states that the policies of the Union on borders, 
asylum and immigration will be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the 
Member States. Solidarity is also securitised: as with other areas of European 
Union law, solidarity in European asylum law reflects a crisis mentality 
(Borgmann-Prebil and Ross 2010) and has led to the concept being used with 
the aim of alleviating perceived urgent pressures on Member States. This 
view of solidarity as an emergency management tool is found elsewhere in 
the Treaty, in the solidarity clause established in Article 222 according to 
which the Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity 
if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or 
man-made disaster. The concept of solidarity here echoes the political 
construction of solidarity in European asylum law, in responding to perceived 
urgent threats. It is framed in a way of protecting the state and requires 
cooperation not between the state and the individual but between the state 
1  The Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union.
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and the European Union. State-centred securitised solidarity in the field of 
asylum echoes Ross’s assertion that the political power of security can 
attempt to appropriate solidarity for its own ends (Ross 2010, 39). This view is 
confirmed by the growing trend towards the securitsation of migration and 
asylum in EU law and policy (Guild 2009; Mitsilegas 2012a).
Placed within a state-centric and securitised framework, solidarity is also 
exclusionary. The way in which the concept of solidarity has been theorised 
and presented in EU constitutional law leaves little, if any space for the 
application of the principle of solidarity beyond EU citizens or those ‘within’ 
the EU and its extension to ‘third country’ nationals or those on the outside. In 
a recent thought-provoking analysis on solidarity in EU law, Sangiovanni 
argues for the development of principles on national solidarity (which define 
obligations among citizens and residents of Member States), principles of 
Member State solidarity (which define obligations among Member States) and 
principles of transnational solidarity (which define obligations among EU 
citizens as such) (Sangiovanni 2013, 217). ‘Third country’ nationals are 
notably absent from this model of solidarity. This exclusionary approach to 
solidarity appears to be confirmed by the Treaties, with the Preamble to the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) expressing the desire of the signatory 
states ‘to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their 
history, their culture and their traditions’ (Preamble, recital 6, emphasis 
added). 
Solidarity functions thus as a key principle of European identity which is 
addressed to EU Member States and their ‘peoples’ (see also Art. 167, TFEU 
on Culture), but the extent to which such European identity based on 
solidarity also encompasses ‘third country’ nationals is far from clear 
(Mitsilegas 1998). This ambiguity remains after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty. One of the few provisions of the TEU which may be seen as 
leaving the door open to a more human-centred concept of solidarity, is Article 
2 on the values of the European Union, which states that these values are 
common to the Member States in a society in which…solidarity… [must] 
prevail. The inclusion of asylum seekers and refugees in this concept of 
solidarity is unclear. Although asylum law is centred on assessing the 
protection needs of ‘third country’ nationals, and in this capacity they must 
constitute the primary ‘recipients’ of solidarity in European asylum law, the 
application of the principle of solidarity in this field appears thus to follow the 
exclusionary paradigm of solidarity in other fields of EU law where issues of 
distributive justice arise prominently. Writing on the position of EU social 
welfare law concerning irregular migrants, Bell has eloquently noted that ‘third 
country’ nationals lack the ties of shared citizenship, whilst the extension of 
social and economic entitlements to them cannot easily be based on a 
reciprocal view of solidarity (Bell 2010, 151). Asylum seekers seem to be 
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included in a continuum of exclusionary solidarity in this context.
Dublin as the Embodiment of State-Centred Solidarity: The Failure of 
Negative Mutual Recognition
In order to understand the issues arising from the discussion regarding 
solidarity in the context of the allocation of asylum seekers and refugees 
across the European Union, it is essential to point out that the Common 
European Asylum System currently in place is based on the development and 
interaction of national asylum systems. The European Union has not 
developed a unified EU-wide asylum procedure and refugee status. While a 
key element of the evolution of the European Union into an Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice has been the abolition of internal borders between 
Member States and the creation thus of a single European area where 
freedom of movement is secured, this single area of movement has not been 
accompanied by a single area of law. Already in 1999, the European Council 
Tampere Conclusions stated that ‘in the longer term, Community rules should 
lead to a common asylum procedure and a uniform status for those who are 
granted asylum throughout the Union.’ (European Council Tampere 
Conclusions, para. 15). While there has been ongoing harmonisation of 
national rules on asylum procedure, reception conditions and refugee 
qualifications since Tampere, more than 15 years after this statement, asylum 
applications in the EU are still examined by individual Member States 
following a national asylum procedure and leading to a national refugee 
status and ensuing rights. In this context, governance of asylum flows within 
the European Union and allocation of responsibility for asylum seekers and 
refugees has been designed within a system of interaction between national 
legal systems rather than under a system of centralized allocation in a single 
area. A key mechanism of governance of asylum flows within the European 
Union has been the application of the principle of mutual recognition in 
European asylum law.
Mutual recognition creates extraterritoriality (Nicolaidis 2007) and pre-
supposes mutual trust (Mitsilegas 2006): in a borderless Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, mutual recognition is designed so that the decision of an 
authority in one Member State can be enforced beyond its territorial legal 
borders and across this area speedily and with a minimum of formality. As 
with other areas of EU law, most notably EU criminal law, in the field of EU 
asylum law automaticity in the transfer of asylum seekers from one Member 
State to another is thus justified on the basis of a high level of mutual trust. 
This high level of mutual trust between the authorities that take part in the 
system is premised upon the presumption that fundamental rights are 
respected fully by all EU Member States across the European Union 
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(Mitsilegas 2009 and 2012b). The presumption of mutual trust is inextricably 
linked with automaticity in inter-state cooperation. Automaticity in inter-state 
cooperation means that a national decision will be enforced beyond the 
territory of the issuing Member State by authorities in other EU Member 
States across the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice without many 
questions being asked and with the requested authority having at its disposal 
extremely limited – if any at all – grounds to refuse the request for coop-
eration. 
In the field of EU asylum law, mutual recognition based on automaticity and 
trust has been introduced by the Dublin Regulation, which sets out a system 
of automatic inter-state cooperation which has been characterised as a 
system of negative mutual recognition (Guild 2004). Recognition can be 
viewed as negative here in that the occurrence of one of the Dublin criteria 
creates a duty for one Member State to take charge of an asylum seeker and 
thus recognise the refusal of another Member State (which transfers the 
asylum seeker in question) to examine the asylum claim. The Dublin Regul-
ation thus introduces a high degree of automaticity in inter-state cooperation. 
Member States are obliged to take charge of asylum seekers if the Dublin 
criteria – including notably the criterion of irregular entry via one of the EU 
Member States – are established to apply, with, at least initially, only limited 
exceptions (Mitsilegas 2014). In this system of inter-state cooperation based 
on automaticity and trust, there is little place for the individual situation and 
rights of asylum seekers to be taken into account. Transfers take place 
speedily and almost automatically, on the presumption that the receiving state 
will provide an equivalent human rights protection to asylum seekers as the 
sending state. Mutual recognition in Dublin thus reflects a model of state-
centred, securitised and exclusionary solidarity: Dublin has been designed 
predominantly with the interests of [certain] states in mind, and is a system 
that aims to deflect undesirable asylum seekers from Member States’ territory.
The Dublin model of automatic mutual recognition has been challenged by 
the judiciary. Following the finding by the European Court of Human Rights in 
M.S.S. that both the sending and the receiving Member State (in that case 
Belgium and Greece respectively) were in breach of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in their implementation of the Dublin 
system regarding a specific transfer (M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, judgment 
of 21 January 2011, Application No. 30696/09), the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in the cases of N.S. and M.E. (Joined Cases C411/10 and 
C493/10) set limits to automaticity in EU law. It did so by finding that an 
application of the Dublin Regulation on the basis of the conclusive 
presumption that the asylum seeker’s fundamental rights will be observed in 
the Member State primarily responsible for his application is incompatible with 
the duty of the Member States to interpret and apply the Regulation in a 
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manner consistent with fundamental rights (para. 99). Such presumption is 
rebuttable (para. 104). The Court’s rejection of the conclusive presumption 
that Member States will respect the fundamental rights of asylum seekers has 
been accompanied by the establishment of a high threshold of incompatibility 
with fundamental rights (Mitsilegas 2012b). A transfer under the Dublin 
Regulation would be incompatible with fundamental rights if there are 
substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum 
procedure and reception conditions for asylum applicants in the Member 
State responsible. This is the case if it results in inhuman or degrading 
treatment (within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter on the prohibition of 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) of asylum 
seekers transferred to the territory of that Member State (para. 85). 
The EU legislator has attempted to incorporate the Court’s ruling in the re-
casting of the Dublin system in the so-called Dublin III Regulation, adopted in 
2013 and currently in force (EU Regulation No. 604/2013 OJ L180/31; for a 
commentary, see Maiani 2016a). According to Article 3(2) of the Regulation, 
second and third indent,
Where it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the Member 
State primarily designated as responsible because there are 
substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws 
in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for 
applicants in the Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman 
or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the 
determining Member State shall continue to examine the 
criteria set out in Chapter III in order to establish whether 
another Member State can be designed as responsible.
Where the transfer cannot be made pursuant to this paragraph to any 
Member State designated on the basis of the criteria set out in Chapter III or 
to the first Member State with which the application was lodged, the 
determining Member State shall become the Member State responsible.
Notwithstanding these developments, Dublin III has maintained essentially a 
state-centred model of solidarity. The Regulation maintains the system of 
allocation of responsibility for the examination of asylum applications by EU 
Member States under the same list of hierarchically enumerated criteria set 
out in its pre-Lisbon predecessor (see Chapter III of the Regulation, Arts. 
7–15). Moreover, the Regulation attempts to translate a version of the 
principle of solidarity into legal terms. Article 33 of the Regulation introduces a 
so-called mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis management 
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in cases where the Commission establishes that the application of the Dublin 
Regulation may be jeopardised due to either a substantiated risk of particular 
pressure being placed on a Member States’ asylum system and/or to 
problems in the functioning of the asylum system of a Member State. In these 
cases the Commission would invite affected Member States to draw up a 
preventive action plan, without states being bound by the Commission’s 
request (Art. 33(1)). The early warning mechanism established by the Dublin 
III Regulation is considerably weaker than an earlier Commission version. 
Under this version this mechanism would be accompanied by an emergency 
mechanism which would allow the temporary suspension of transfers of 
asylum seekers to Member States facing disproportionate pressure to their 
asylum systems. This has not been accepted by Member States (Conclusions 
of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 22 September 2011, Council 
document 14464/11, 8). 
The outcome has been a mechanism that again views the asylum process 
largely from the perspective of the state and not of the affected individuals. 
The Preamble to Dublin III confirms this view by stating that an early warning 
process should be established in order to ensure robust cooperation within 
the framework of this Regulation and to develop mutual trust among Member 
States with respect to asylum policy. It is further claimed that solidarity, which 
is a pivotal element in the Common European Asylum System, goes hand in 
hand with mutual trust and that early warning will enhance trust (Preamble, 
recital 22). Solidarity and trust are viewed in reality from a traditional ‘burden-
sharing’ perspective involving negotiation of support by the Union to affected 
Member States (and with the European Asylum Support Office emerging as a 
key player). Notwithstanding the case-law of the European courts and the 
findings of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
civil society, the position of the asylum seeker appears to still be considered 
as an afterthought (Mitsilegas 2014).
Towards a Paradigm Change: Mutual Recognition of Positive Asylum 
Decisions as Refugee-Centred Solidarity
A way in which the current conceptual and human rights limits of solidarity in 
the Common European Asylum System can be transcended is to think 
differently about the application of the mutual recognition principle and focus 
on the establishment of a system of mutual recognition of positive asylum 
decisions, which will then carry with them the rights granted to refugees at the 
national level throughout the European Union. I have advocated the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions 
in a Report I prepared for the Open Society Foundation in 2014 (Mitsilegas 
2014b), which I presented at the Italian Presidency of the Council of the EU 
203 Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century
conference on asylum in November 2014 (for the main findings,see Mitsilegas 
2015a). My proposal for adopting a model of mutual recognition of positive 
asylum decisions has since been endorsed by the Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly (Council of Europe 2015) and reflected in a recent 
study prepared for the European Parliament Civil Liberties Committee (Guild 
et al. 2015). I have argued that the application of mutual recognition, in order 
to achieve the extraterritorial reach of rights, has already been applied in the 
European criminal justice area by Directive 2011/99/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the European 
Protection Order (OJ L338, 2). The Directive, which was adopted under a 
legal basis related to judicial cooperation in criminal matters, aims to apply 
the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters to orders issued to 
protect victims in one Member State when these victims find themselves in 
other EU Member States. In other words, it is aimed that the recognition of a 
European Protection Order by the authority in the executing Member State 
will mean that the protection will ‘follow’ the victim to the Member State they 
have moved to. (Mitsilegas 2015b and 2016a).
I have argued that the application of the principle of mutual recognition on 
decisions granting rights to individuals can be applied in the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS). The application of the principle of mutual 
recognition of positive asylum decisions provides five distinct and clear 
benefits:
1. It will create legal certainty regarding the status and rights of refugees 
throughout the EU in an AFSJ without internal frontiers.
2. It is consistent with the Treaty aim of establishing a CEAS and a uniform 
status (TFEU, Art. 78).
3. The necessary harmonisation, which is necessary for the effective 
operation of mutual recognition, exists at EU level, with the adoption of 
the second generation CEAS instruments post-Lisbon. There is a need to 
focus on the implementation of and compliance with these instruments 
across the EU.
4. Mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions is a corollary to 
developments examining possibilities for the pooling of reception 
conditions and join processing of asylum claims. Pooling of reception and 
procedure must be combined with the pooling of protection. Joint efforts 
in procedures and reception before the granting of refugee status will 
create joint ownership and mutual trust which will facilitate the 
subsequent recognition of positive asylum decisions across the EU.
5. Mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions focuses the discussion on 
solidarity specifically on the needs and rights of the refugee.
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But how can the principle be applied? There are three factors, which must be 
considered when examining the precise conditions and modalities for the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to positive asylum decisions:
1. Time. From when will mutual recognition take effect? One option is for 
mutual recognition to kick in from day one, namely from the date of the 
judicial decision granting refugee status. This is the preferable option and 
it could be based on a model granting equal treatment to refugees with 
citizens of the Union (see also Bast 2016). Another option may be for 
mutual recognition to take effect after two years of continuous residence 
in the state that has granted protection in line with the time limits 
established by the European Agreement of Transfer of Responsibility 
(see also, with further conditions, Meijers Committee 2015). A third option 
may be a hybrid model where movement to the second Member State 
happens immediately but equal treatment with long-term resident ‘third 
country’ nationals is granted from day one, whereas equal treatment with 
nationals of the second state is granted after two years.
2. Rights. For mutual recognition to be meaningful, the recognition of status 
should be accompanied by the recognition of rights. The protection and 
rights the refugee is granted in the first Member State should follow her in 
the second Member State. There are different moments in time when this 
can happen (see no. 1. above).
3. Quotas. A possible way forward is to combine mutual recognition with the 
allocation of responsibility between Member States on the basis of 
quotas. However, this option faces two challenges: it may disregard the 
particular situation and wishes of refugees (e.g. in the context of family 
reunification); and it is difficult to enforce in a Union without internal 
frontiers.
The application of the principle of mutual recognition of positive asylum 
decisions was floated by the European Commission some years ago, but the 
idea seems to have been buried since. Already in 2009, the European 
Commission, in its Communication on An Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice Serving the Citizen stated that ‘[a]s part of a detailed evaluation on 
the transposal and implementation of second-phase legislative instruments 
and of progress in aligning practices and supporting measures…by the end of 
2014, the EU should formally enshrine the principle of mutual recognition of 
all individual decisions granting protection status taken by authorities ruling 
on asylum applications which will mean that protection can be transferred 
without the adoption of specific mechanisms at the European level’ (European 
Commission (COM) 2009, 262 final, 27–28). In its Communication informing 
the follow-up to the Stockholm Programme, the Commission noted that 
relocation of the beneficiaries of international protection, which has been 
piloted in recent years from Malta, is one form of solidarity that should be 
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enhanced. It further stated that, 
New rules on the mutual recognition of asylum decisions 
across Member States and a framework for the transfer of 
protection should be developed in line with the Treaty objective 
of creating a uniform status valid across the EU. This would 
reduce obstacles to movement within the EU and facilitate the 
transfer of protection-related benefits across internal borders 
(COM 2014, 154 final, 8).
While the principle of mutual recognition has been used thus far in Europe’s 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in order to increase and extend the 
powers of the state, its potential for enhancing fundamental rights and the 
rights of beneficiaries of international protection is significant. The application 
of the principle of mutual recognition vis-à-vis positive asylum decisions 
would help ensure progress towards the policy and Treaty objectives of 
building a Common European Asylum System including a uniform status, and 
would be a logical next step in a system that aims at eliminating differences in 
protection between Member States. Mutual recognition will further focus 
technical and political efforts upon eliminating the considerable discrepancies 
regarding asylum determination outcomes in Member States and may help 
address some of the solidarity-related concerns raised by certain EU Member 
States. It would, however, need to be designed in a way that would ensure 
that all Member States would be encouraged to establish and maintain their 
asylum systems at optimal levels, in order to provide protection beneficiaries 
with the opportunity to enjoy their rights in the first state that has recognised 
them. 
By focusing on the extraterritorial application and reach of the rights of 
beneficiaries of international protection, mutual recognition of positive asylum 
decisions could be seen as an important step towards intra-EU mobility in line 
with one of the key underlying principles of the EU, providing more flexibility 
to enable protection holders to use their skills and labour where these could 
be needed within the Union. It would also ensure legal certainty for both 
Member States and recipients of international protection vis-a-vis the position 
of the latter in the borderless Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. It may 
also act as a first step towards the establishment of a meaningful uniform 
status for refugees across the European Union, by leading to a centralised 
EU system of asylum determination and relocation, and by focusing on rights 
and granting legal certainty in the field – the current failure of the modest EU 
relocation initiatives. The move to the mutual recognition of positive asylum 
decisions and ultimately to a uniform status poses fewer challenges than 
integration on these terms in the field of criminal justice, as European asylum 
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law is marked by a high degree of harmonisation underpinned by a series of 
detailed human rights standards in European Union and international law 
(Mitsilegas 2016b). A positive model of mutual recognition would thus 
empower refugees, and contribute to a paradigm shift from state-centred 
solidarity towards a model of solidarity centred on the individual.
From Mutual Recognition to Unification: Towards a Uniform Refugee 
Status in the EU
The application of the principle of mutual recognition to positive asylum 
decisions pre-supposes the continuation of the current model of the Common 
European Asylum System, which is based on the interaction of national 
asylum systems and the existence of national asylum determination 
procedures. A bold way forward to strengthen refugee-centred solidarity 
would be to contemplate a move from national to EU asylum determination 
and refugee status. This idea has been discussed recently and included in the 
Commission Communication on the reform of the Common European Asylum 
System published in 2016 (COM 2016, 197 final). One of the options put 
forward by the Commission was the setting up in the longer term of a new 
system transferring responsibility for the processing of asylum claims from the 
national to the EU level. For instance, by transforming European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO) into an EU-level first-instance decision-making agency 
with national branches in each Member State, and establishing an EU-level 
appeal structure (COM 2016, 197 final, 8–9). As seen above in the discussion 
of Dublin III, this proposal has not been taken forward. 
However, the European Union has started examining distributive models – 
albeit with limited political will by Member States and under a model of 
solidarity heavily centred on the needs of states, both in its relocation 
initiatives and in Dublin III. These measures constitute timid but first steps 
towards rethinking the distribution of asylum seekers and refugees across the 
European Union. A centralised, EU-wide system is feasible in view of the high 
level of harmonisation of asylum law in the EU and the international 
protection roots and needs inherent in the system. Such a centralised system 
has the potential to achieve the aim of a uniform refugee status across the 
EU and it can act as a catalyst for the transformation of solidarity under the 
essential condition that it places the agency and preferences of asylum 
seekers at its heart.
Conclusion
The development of Europe’s Common Asylum System has been based on a 
concept of solidarity which is predominantly state-centred. This approach has 
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not served EU Member States, or applicants for international protection, well. 
The Dublin Regulation – notwithstanding its regular revisions – is a highly 
inefficient mechanism of allocation of responsibility for asylum applications 
and it poses significant challenges to the rights of asylum seekers without 
ensuring a high level of compliance with EU asylum law by Member States. 
The recent revision of the Dublin system by the Commission remains 
grounded on a state-centred model of solidarity, and therefore it is predicted 
that it – like its predecessors – will fail if the agency and rights of asylum 
seekers continue not to be taken into account. This contribution has argued 
that the way forward to ensure an efficient and rights-compliant asylum 
system in the European Union is to achieve a paradigm change and move 
from a concept of solidarity centred on the state to a concept of solidarity 
centred on the refugee. 
This paradigm change can be achieved in two ways. In the short term, by 
applying the principle of mutual recognition to positive asylum decisions. The 
contribution has highlighted precedents in the field of criminal justice and has 
demonstrated the potential that positive mutual recognition has in order to 
bring the rights and preferences of refugees into the fore. In the longer term, 
a unified, truly common, European asylum system which will move from 
national to EU determination and status can be the way forward in reversing 
the paradigm of solidarity. This paradigm change can only happen if the 
asylum seeker and the refugee, their agency and choice, are taken into 
account fully in the development of European asylum law.
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European Union Migration Law 
and Policy
BENJAMIN HULME & DORA KOSTAKOPOULOU
The creation and implementation of an area free of internal borders is reliant 
upon three foundations. First, the effective management of the now single 
European Union (EU) external border and its ability to withstand substantial 
external pressures fuelled by political instability and conflict in the EU’s near 
neighbourhood. Second, a high degree of solidarity between the Member 
States, to ensure that those states primarily in the southern Mediterranean 
receive adequate support to protect their borders. Finally, the creation of a 
common EU migration and asylum policy, including a distribution mechanism, 
to ensure that migrants and refugees who enter through the external border 
receive the same standard of treatment across all the Member States. The 
recent ‘migration crisis’, although now abating to a degree, has placed 
substantial pressure on these foundations, and has necessitated the rapid 
creation of new EU policies in order to manage the current situation and also 
prepare for any future large-scale migratory movements. This chapter will first 
examine a number of the broader historical developments and the lenses 
through which the EU’s migration policy has developed. The focus will then 
turn to a number of the more recent policy developments, from the creation of 
a new European Coast Guard to new forms of ‘third country’ agreements. It 
will be argued that although these developments are a shift in the right 
direction, there are still a number of concerns which affect the core of such 
developments.
The European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) – 
formerly known as Justice and Home Affairs Co-operation – has evolved in 
surprising ways. Its origins lie in the so-called third pillar of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) (in force on 1 November 1993) which was partially 
communitarised by the Treaty of Amsterdam (in force on 1 May 1999). The 
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new Title IV EC contained provisions on migration, asylum, ‘third country’ 
nationals and civic law matters while criminal law matters and police 
cooperation remained in the third pillar. The latter became part of Community 
law a decade later when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 
2009.
Although the Member States were initially reluctant to ‘lose’ sovereignty, they 
realised the importance of cooperation and mutual trust in dealing with 
transnational issues, such as policing, judicial cooperation in criminal law and 
migration and asylum policy. But their cooperation was premised on a security 
paradigm. Organised crime, migration and terrorism were placed on a single 
security continuum (Bigo 1992) since they were deemed to pose security 
threats. Therefore, the distinction between these areas was blurred, and 
required the creation of policies which could encapsulate these previously 
distinct concerns. Institutional factors, such as the intergovernmental 
character of the third pillar cooperation and the removal of internal frontiers in 
the European Union were partly responsible for the prevalence of the security 
paradigm (Kostakopoulou 1998 and 2001; Geddes 2001). Official discourses 
in the Member States depicting migration as a threat also played an important 
role. 
Freedom and security became closely aligned following the 9/11 attacks and 
the Hague Programme, which was agreed upon by the Council in November 
2004, and had a strong restrictive and security-based focus. But its 
successor, the Stockholm Programme (Council of the European Union 2010b) 
was more ‘citizen-oriented’ and liberal. In anticipating it, the Commission 
issued a Communication in 2009 that called for ‘a dynamic and 
comprehensive migration policy which consolidates a global approach to 
migration’ (European Commission 2009, 23–4). The latter was anchored on 
developing the external dimension of EU migration policy, the promotion of 
cooperation and dialogue with third countries and the development of an 
innovative and coherent framework (European Commission 2009, 23–4). An 
important aspect of the institutional framework was the drafting of an 
Immigration Code that would incorporate the existing sectoral directives and 
provide a uniform level of rights. The Commission’s and the Stockholm 
Programme’s vision of a ‘dynamic and fair migration policy’ in the twenty-first 
century was interrupted by the economic crisis in the Euro-zone, the rise of 
Eurosceptic and neo-nationalist political parties in Europe and a sudden 
increase in the number of migrants and refugees seeking admission. 
According to the Annual Report on Asylum produced by the European Asylum 
Support Office (2015, 13), more than 660,000 refugees sought protection in 
the EU in 2014. The war in Syria led to an unprecedented exodus of people 
and provided a catalyst for wide-ranging reforms and measures in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. 
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The European Union’s actions in this field have taken place within the 
overarching framework of the European Agenda on Migration, which was 
introduced in May 2015 (European Commission 2015b). The Agenda included 
both immediate measures and medium-long term measures in order to allow 
the EU to transition from gaining an effective handle on the migration situation 
to, in the medium-long term, tackling the root causes and wider issues which 
are contributing to or causing the movement of so many individuals to the 
territories of the Member States. The European Commission proposed six 
different areas in which immediate measures were required, with three of 
these areas being at the external border or incorporating external dimensions 
(European Commission 2015b, 3–6). The first set of measures to be 
introduced immediately are focused on saving lives at sea, including an 
increase in the number of search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean 
and a tripling of the budgets for Frontex’s Triton and Poseidon joint 
operations. The second set included measures to combat illegal smuggling 
into the Member States, including cooperation between Frontex and Europol 
in order to identify and apprehend smugglers. Third, the EU sought to 
strengthen its cooperation with third countries of origin and transit, in order to 
‘intervene upstream’ and tackle the ‘root causes’ of the migration at their 
source, thereby preventing the need for individuals to migrate. Such 
measures included regional development and protection programmes to 
provide support to states with high refugee populations. It is interesting to 
note that the Commission proposed a linkage between these migration 
measures and the Union’s Common Security and Development Policy 
(European Commission 2015b, 5), which is emblematic of the increasing 
blurriness between migration and security in EU policy. It has been argued 
that such ‘blurring’ weakens the human rights afforded to those individuals 
seeking protection in the EU (Amnesty International 2014, 20–25). Such 
blurring affects the mind-set of Member State governments, as they perceive 
an increased need to detain migrants, limit access to initial legal advice and 
ultimately infringe upon basic human dignity by treating all migrants with a 
heightened degree of suspicion and scrutiny.
In the medium term, the Agenda on Migration was separated into four pillars 
in order to effectively manage migration, with measures involving either the 
strengthening of the external borders or cooperation with third countries 
(European Commission 2015b, 6–17). Measures under the external borders 
included the strengthening of Frontex (the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders), particularly 
in light of the need for solidarity between Member States. Concerning the 
external dimension of the European Union Migration Policy, the Commission 
highlighted the need to address the root causes of irregular migration. It 
recognised that the cooperation of countries of origin and of transit would be 
necessary in order to combat people-smuggling and in order for such states 
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to allow the EU to carry out the effective return of individuals who had no 
legal right to reside in the territory of the Union. As with many areas of the 
Common European Asylum System and the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, more harmonisation would be required in order to make the policies 
more effective.
Continuing this vein of harmonisation, the EU has sought to establish a 
European Border and Coast Guard (European Commission 2015a), which 
received approval from the European Parliament in July 2016 (Council of the 
European Union 2016a). The new border and coast guard has been created 
‘in order to ensure a European integrated border management of the EU’s 
external borders, with a view to managing migration effectively and ensuring a 
high level of security within the Union, while safeguarding the free movement 
of persons therein’ (European Commission 2015a, 77). It is envisaged that 
the new border agency will create an overall external border management 
strategy and will cooperate with Member States’ border authorities. The 
border management strategy comprises eight different components, which, in 
part, go beyond the typical understanding of border management (European 
Commission 2015a, Art. 4). The key components of the new border control 
strategy include: fighting trans-border crime; return operations; analysis of 
security threats and facilitating cooperation between the relevant authorities 
of the Member States. Although these are all elements within the remit of 
typical border management, it is also a function of the new coast guard to 
cooperate directly with the border agencies of third countries of origin and 
transit. It is important to recognise that the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency’s activities, known as joint operations (European Commission 2015a, 
Art. 14–15), require shared responsibility with Member State authorities 
(European Commission 2015a, Art. 5). Such shared responsibility is reliant on 
the Member States recognising the need for solidarity, and that the external 
border is now a single Union border and not 28 separate, distinct borders. 
The Agency will further be responsible for establishing a monitoring and risk 
analysis centre to monitor migration flows, create European Border and Coast 
Guard and Rapid Intervention Teams, and provide technical and operational 
assistance to the Member States (European Commission 2015a, Art. 7). The 
Border and Coast Guard Teams are comprised of Member State officials who 
are second to the EU (European Commission 2015a, Art. 2(3)). Once 
deployed, they will receive their instructions from the Member State in 
question (European Commission 2015a, Art. 20). Rapid Intervention Teams, 
on the other hand, are drawn from a pool of border guards from Member 
States and can be deployed within three working days of a request received 
by a Member State, but only for a limited period of time (European 
Commission 2015a, Art. 18(5)). These teams may only be requested in the 
event that a Member State faces ‘a situation of specific and disproportionate 
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pressures’ (European Commission 2015a, Art.14(2)). The creation of these 
specific teams is a significant step in addressing the problem at the external 
borders but risks being undermined by a lack of cooperation from Member 
States. For many Member States, immigration, particularly from non-EU 
countries, is an issue of significant political importance which may prevent the 
diversion of resources to what citizens may perceive as another Member 
State’s problem. Therefore, in order to ensure success, the European Border 
and Coast Guard must be given the necessary resources and expertise from 
the Member States, no matter their geographical location. Furthermore, such 
teams do not operate in isolation, and will rely in the long term on Member 
States ensuring that their own national border and coast guards are 
adequately resourced and trained.
In line with the principle of subsidiarity (Treaty on European Union 2010, Art. 
5(1)), the role of the new Agency is to intervene when requested by the 
Member States. To this end, it may undertake vulnerability assessments of 
the external borders, the results of which will then be passed on to the 
Member State concerned so that it may introduce corrective measures 
(European Commission 2015a, Art. 12). If the Member State then fails to 
implement such measures (European Commission 2015a, Art. 12(6)), the 
European Commission may intervene and deploy Border Guard or 
Intervention Teams, or coordinate operations for that Member State 
(European Commission 2015a, Art. 18).
Operating in conjunction with the new Border and Coast Guard Agency is the 
EU’s hotspot approach, which originates from the Agenda on Migration and 
involves cooperation among Europol, the European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO) and the Border and Coast Guard Agency. These bodies will 
cooperate in Member States to register, identify and fingerprint new migrants 
(European Commission 2015b, 6), with the aim of providing ‘a platform for the 
agencies to intervene, rapidly and in an integrated manner, in frontline 
Member States when there is a crisis due to specific and disproportionate 
migratory pressure at their external borders’ (Council of the European Union 
2015a, 5). Registering, identifying and fingerprinting new migrants is 
necessary for the effective application of the Dublin System, in order to 
definitively establish which Member State should be responsible for an 
asylum application. EASO will consider the asylum claims of any individuals 
in these hotspot locations, with the new agency providing support in the 
return of irregular migrants or those who have not satisfied the criteria for 
protection in the EU (European Commission 2015b, 6). These teams are 
known as Migration Management Support Teams (European Commission 
2015a, Art. 17). This hotspot approach is currently fully deployed in Leros, 
Lesbos, Samos and Kos in Greece, and Lampedusa, Pozzallo, Taranto and 
Trapani in Italy (European Commission 2016a) with significant human rights 
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concerns over reception conditions and access to asylum procedures in the 
hotspots (ECRE 2016). 
The process for the creation of a hotspot begins with the request of a Member 
State facing disproportionate migratory pressures (Council of the European 
Union 2015a, 6). The Commission then coordinates the various agencies that 
are involved, with an EU Regional Task Force coordinating on the ground 
(Council of the European Union 2015a, 6–7). Due to the differences in the 
number of migrants arriving in Italy and Greece, Italian hotspots currently 
have a combined reception capacity of 1600 people, whereas Greek hotspots 
have capacity for 5,450 people (Council of the European Union 2015a, 1–2). 
Despite these various measures, the hotspot approach has yet to be 
effectively implemented, with many areas still not yet completed (European 
Commission 2016b and 2016c). This is in part due to the need to distribute 
migrants from these hotspots across the EU, so Greece and Italy are not 
disproportionally affected. Despite agreements to redistribute 160,000 
migrants from Italy and Greece being concluded in September 2015 (Council 
Decision (EU) 2015/1601 and Council of the European Union 2015b), as of 
December 2016 only 8,162 people have been resettled (European 
Commission 2016d).
EASO itself is currently the subject of a number of suggested reforms in order 
to aid the completion of the Common European Asylum System, with its 
mandate due to be increased from that given in 2010 (Regulation establishing 
a European Asylum Support Office, 2010). It is proposed that EASO will 
become the EU Agency for Asylum, with a focus on the effective 
implementation and functioning of the Common European Asylum System 
(European Commission 2016e, Art. 1(1)). Its specific tasks suggest 
widespread harmonisation between the asylum systems of the Member 
States, not only on reception, qualification and return, but also on the 
development of a core curriculum for the training of the judiciary and public 
authorities, the harmonisation of ‘third country’ information and of ‘third 
country’ cooperation in asylum matters (European Commission 2016e, Art. 2). 
These are significant developments in the EU’s asylum and migration policy, 
particularly harmonisation of ‘third country’ information. This is an area where 
Member States’ judicial and political differences come to the fore, with each 
Member State having different criteria and methods regarding how they 
decide which sources of information to use when assessing the situation in a 
‘third country’. The harmonisation of this area could, in theory at least, lead to 
the overall harmonisation of asylum cases and appeals, and their outcomes, 
in the Member States. Such an argument rests on the assumption that the 
new Agency for Asylum itself will conduct its own thorough research using a 
wide range of sources and subjecting them to the high level of scrutiny that is 
required. However, in practice it will still be left to the competent Member 
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State authorities to make the asylum decisions, and they may be affected by 
the internal political situation in the Member State. 
Apart from reforms at the external border and of EU agencies, developments 
have taken place with respect to the procedures required for the effective 
return of ‘third country’ nationals who do not qualify for protection or legal 
residency in the Member States. One of the most significant, and most 
controversial, has been the EU – Turkey Statement (Council of the European 
Union 2016b) for the return of all individuals who have entered the Union 
irregularly from Turkey and a new ‘One-for-One’ system, where the EU 
returns Syrian nationals who entered irregularly from Turkey in exchange for 
the resettlement of Syrian nationals who qualify for international protection 
(European Commission 2016f, 2). The legal underpinning of this arrangement 
is the EU – Turkey Readmission Agreement, which entered into force in 2014 
and allows for the return of Turkish nationals and those of third countries who 
have no legal right of residency in the EU (Agreement between the European 
Union and the Republic of Turkey, 2014). Typically, EU readmission agr-
eements contain a three-year delay between the return of a state’s own 
nationals and the return of ‘third country’ nationals and stateless persons who 
have transited through the ‘third country’ in question. 
However, in the case of Turkey, the ‘third country’ national element has been 
brought forward from 2017 to June 2016 (Council of the European Union 
2015c). Concerns have been expressed about the ability of individuals to 
effectively claim refugee/asylum protection in Turkey, and whether Turkey 
may be classed as a safe country for such individuals (Amnesty International 
2016). Furthermore, there are concerns about the effectiveness of the EU-
Turkey deal, particularly regarding the reforms, which the agreement requires 
of Turkish domestic policy (Nielsen 2016). Such concerns are valid in light of 
the recent political crackdown and allegations of widespread, systematic 
human rights abuses committed by state officials (Human Rights Watch 2017, 
600–607). Most significantly for individuals seeking protection, Turkey still 
applies its geographical limitation under the Refugee Convention, meaning 
that non-Europeans are unable to claim refugee status (Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, in force on 4 October 1967)
The EU has further deepened its relations with third countries on migration 
through the new Partnership Frameworks, announced in June 2016 
(European Commission 2016f). These frameworks are targeted in the short 
and long-term at: Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Libya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Afghanistan, Iran, Morocco and Algeria (European 
Commission 2016g, 13–16). Like the European Agenda on Migration, the 
frameworks are comprised of immediate, short- and long-term objectives and 
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measures. In the short term, the aim is to increase the number of successful 
returns to such states, as well as saving lives in the Mediterranean and taking 
action to reduce the number of people making the journey to the EU. These 
aims are to be achieved in the immediate future by improving capacity in 
border and migration management through increased economic resources 
and training, as well as offering improved legal routes for migrants to the EU 
(European Commission 2016g, 5–6).
In the field of return and readmission, the Commission proposed five areas of 
focus ranging from the identification of irregular migrants, to assisting 
individuals in voluntary returns and the provision of the appropriate 
documentation, which is required for an effective return (European Com-
mission 2016g, 7). It may be noted that readmission agreements have not yet 
been agreed upon with any of the target states, with negotiations currently 
taking place with Jordan and Nigeria. Concluding a readmission agreement is 
difficult for the EU due to the inclusion of ‘third country’ nationals and 
stateless persons. For example, Morocco is primarily a transit state for 
migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa. If Morocco assumed legal responsibility 
for such individuals, and even facilitated their return from the EU, it would 
come at a significant economic and political cost in terms of reception and 
processing facilities and relations with neighbouring countries (Carrera et al. 
2016, 5–6). 
In contrast to these states, the Partnership Framework communication 
provides a separate list of 16 states including Eritrea, Somalia, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Sudan and Ethiopia, which Member States have discussed for the 
conclusion of country packages that include cooperation on readmission and 
return (European Commission 2016g, 8). The human rights situation in many 
of these states is at best questionable, with many of them receiving particular 
attention from the United Nations (United Nations Human Rights Council 
2015) and the European Court of Human Rights (Sufi and Elmi v. The United 
Kingdom 2012) for state sanctioned torture, inhumane and degrading 
treatment or punishment of citizens. The human rights situation in such states 
may operate to prevent the return of nationals where they are able to 
substantiate a claim that they face a real risk of being subjected to such 
treatment. The long-term aim of the Partnership Frameworks is to tackle the 
‘root causes’ of migration, with a large focus being placed on financial 
investment into the third countries in question – €3.1 billion being provided for 
the period until 2020 under the External Investment Plan (European 
Commission 2016g, 11).
Aggregating these various policy developments, we can now observe the next 
stage of a truly Common European Asylum System, at the internal and 
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external levels. The evolution of Frontex into the European Border and Coast 
Guard, in combination with the mooted reforms of EASO suggest that the EU 
and Member States are beginning to recognise that ‘more Europe’ is 
necessary in order to ensure the functioning of an area free of internal 
borders. However, in order to ensure the success of such policies the 
Member States must continue to recognise the importance of solidarity in the 
area of migration, not only on paper but in practice. These policies will require 
all the Member States to contribute more resources and expertise to the new 
agencies. The external dimension is one in which we may observe greater 
concern. Although we can recognise the political need to do more in order to 
ensure that irregular migrants who do not qualify for protection in the EU are 
returned, the shift towards political arrangements with third countries with 
questionable records on human rights raises concerns as to the EU’s own 
commitment to protecting human rights. External cooperation is further 
complicated by each ‘third country’ having its own economic and political 
concerns to balance with those of the EU. As demonstrated by states such as 
Morocco, future developments in the policy will rely not only on the political 
goodwill of the ‘third country’, but also the EU being able to reconcile the 
often opposing interests at play in such a politically-sensitive area.
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14
Legal Responses to the EU 
Migrant Crisis: Too Little, Too 
Late?
JENNY POON
The Syrian war has brought the massive influx of asylum claimants and 
refugees across the European Union (EU) into sharp relief. Despite the 
humanitarian crisis, the international and regional EU responses to the 
migrant crisis have been inadequate and much too late. First, international 
organisations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) have proposed an approach which seems to undermine the original 
object and purpose of the Refugee Convention by recognising refugees in 
groups instead of allowing for individualised refugee status determination. 
Second, the EU approach of trading Syrian refugees one for one from those 
traveling through Greece to Turkey undermines international protection such 
as non-refoulement for asylum claimants. It is argued that in order to properly 
safeguard the rights of asylum claimants, proper substantive and procedural 
safeguards need to be in place, as well as an enlarged role for the regional 
courts in the EU in adjudicating asylum decisions. 
On international legal responses, the UNHCR’s attempt to resolve the 
difficulty of processing massive asylum applications through Guidelines on 
International Protection, No. 11 (hereafter Guideline) on the ‘prima facie (in 
Latin means, ‘on the face of it’) recognition of refugees’ is inadequate 
(UNHCR 2015). The ‘prima facie recognition of refugees’ allows states to 
grant refugee status to a collective group of asylum claimants rather than 
granting refugee status based on individual assessments of a ‘well-founded 
fear of persecution’. The problem inherent with a system that permits group 
recognition of refugee status rather than the processing of asylum 
applications on a case-by-case basis is that it increases the likelihood of 
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abuse of process by claimants. For instance, those undeserving of 
international protection such as asylum claimants who have committed crimes 
of mass atrocities, may circumvent the system by claiming for international 
protection. Group recognition of refugees such as the recognition of those 
fleeing from the Syrian civil war, it is argued, may potentially undermine the 
original object and purpose of the Refugee Convention.
On regional legal responses, the EU’s attempt has been inadequate and 
much too late. The recent EU-Turkey Deal (hereafter Deal) reveals the 
importance of adhering to the principle of non-refoulement (Refugee 
Convention 1951, Art. 33(1)) and the necessity of states to ensure adequate 
safeguards are accorded to asylum claimants and refugees. Non-refoulement 
is a central tenet in international refugee law and it is the right of the asylum 
claimant or refugee to not be sent back to his or her country of origin to face 
persecution (Refugee Convention 1951, Art. 33(1)). As of 20 March 2016, the 
Deal effectively returns asylum claimants who travel from Turkey to Greece 
back to Turkey, and for every asylum claimant returned to Turkey, the EU 
promises to take back one refugee from Syria. Essentially, the Deal swaps 
one human being for another, treating them as commodities, and promotes 
violation of non-refoulement due to the deficient asylum system in Turkey and 
the likelihood of subsequent rejected applications (Anderson 2016). 
The anticipated finding is that the current international and regional legal 
responses to the EU migrant crisis are anything but adequate and timely. In 
order to properly safeguard the rights of asylum claimants and refugees, 
proper substantive and procedural mechanisms must be in place, including 
the enlargement of the role of regional courts in the EU and the curtailing of 
state sovereignty to champion the rights of individual claimants. The 
examples of the Syrian massive influx of asylum claimants and the Deal will 
illustrate how these responses are inadequate and much too late.
This chapter will begin by exploring the international and EU law governing 
refugees and refugee status determination. Then, it will turn to examining the 
international response from the UNHCR on the EU migrant crisis, and then 
turn to the regional response from the EU. Next, the importance of adequately 
addressing the current crisis in a timely manner is explained. It will be 
demonstrated that the UNHCR and the EU responses to the migrant crisis are 
too little and too late. Finally, the chapter will end with recommendations and 
a prediction of what is to come in international and regional responses. 
The Law on Refugees and Refugee Status Determination
This section explores, very briefly, the law on refugees and refugee status 
225 Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century
determination procedures at both the international and the EU level.
International Law 
International law provides the bare minimum rules for Refugee Convention 
contracting parties to follow. It is then up to the contracting parties to 
transpose the international law requirements to their domestic legislation and 
establish national procedures to carry out their international law obligations. 
Under international law, a refugee is defined as someone who is fleeing from 
a ‘well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ (Convention 
Grounds), who is outside of his or her country of origin, and who is unwilling 
or unable to avail him or herself to state protection (Refugee Convention 
1951, Art. 1A). The asylum claimant has the burden of proof to establish, on 
the threshold of a ‘reasonable likelihood’, the above-mentioned elements 
(UNHCR 1998). The asylum official, in assessing the credibility of the 
applicant for international protection, should give the applicant the benefit of 
the doubt (Gorlick 2002). Benefit of the doubt means that the applicant need 
not prove every part of his or her case as long as the applicant makes a 
genuine effort to substantiate his or her story (Gorlick 2002). The test is met 
when the asylum official is satisfied with the applicant’s general credibility, 
and the coherence and plausibility of the applicant’s statements, which do not 
run counter to generally-known facts (Gorlick 2002). In establishing a ‘well-
founded fear of persecution’, both subjective (fear) and objective (well-
founded) elements must be proven by the asylum claimant (UNHCR 1998). 
Factors for the adjudicator to consider when evaluating objective well-
foundedness of persecution include: a) factual considerations; b) personal 
circumstances of the claimant; and c) situation in the country of origin 
(UNHCR 1998). 
It should be noted that the term ‘persecution’ is not defined under 
international refugee law or in the Refugee Convention, nor is there a 
universal definition of ‘persecution’. However, the UNHCR, in its commentary, 
has stated that ‘persecution’ may comprise of: ‘a threat to life or freedom on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion’ or ‘serious violations of human rights’ (UNHCR 1992). 
What constitutes ‘persecution’ is determined on a case-by-case basis 
(UNHCR 1992). Severe discrimination may also result in ‘persecution’ if the 
measures of discrimination lead to consequences of a substantially prejudicial 
nature for the person concerned, such as: ‘serious restrictions on the 
applicant’s right to earn his or her livelihood; or serious restrictions on the 
applicant’s right to practice his or her religion’ (UNHCR 1992). Persecution 
may also occur on cumulative grounds, where various elements, taken 
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together, produce an effect on the mind of the applicant that can reasonably 
justify a claim of ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ on cumulative grounds 
(UNHCR 1992). For example, the combination of adverse factors such as 
‘general atmosphere of insecurity in the country of origin’ may constitute ‘well-
founded fear of persecution’ on cumulative grounds (UNHCR 1992). Whether 
‘well-founded fear of persecution’ is established on cumulative grounds is 
determined based on the circumstances of the case (UNHCR 1992).
In adjudicating the truthfulness of the asylum claimant, the adjudicator should 
take into consideration the following: a) the reasonableness of the facts 
alleged; b) the overall consistency and coherence of the claimant’s story; c) 
the corroborative evidence adduced by the claimant in support of his or her 
statements; d) the consistency with common knowledge or generally known 
facts; and e) the known situation in the country of origin (UNHCR 1998). 
After a brief overview of the international law governing refugees and refugee 
status determination, it follows to examine the EU system for processing 
asylum applications. 
EU Law
International law provides the bare minimum rules for Refugee Convention 
contracting parties to follow. Even though the EU has its own regional 
interpretation and implementation of international standards, EU Member 
States nonetheless are bound by international law obligations. In fact, 
international law obligations prevail over EU obligations (Treaty Establishing 
the European Community, Art. 307 2002). The EU has established the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which aims to establish a 
harmonised, fair and effective asylum procedure to process asylum claims 
across EU Member States, while complying with international law obligations 
to protect asylum claimants fleeing persecution (European Commission 
2016a). Although the EU is itself not a contracting party to the Refugee 
Convention, EU law has provided that the CEAS must comply with the 
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012, Art. 78). 
EU Member States are therefore bound by the principle of non-refoulement. 
The CEAS is comprised of the Dublin System, which consists of the Dublin 
Convention, Dublin II Regulation and Dublin III Regulation, and which 
determines the mechanism and criteria for establishing state responsibility 
with regards to the processing of asylum applications among EU Member 
States (Dublin Convention 1990; Dublin II Regulation 2003; Dublin III 
Regulation 2013). Together with key directives including the Qualification 
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Directive (2011), Asylum Procedures Directive (2013), and Reception 
Conditions Directive (2013), the Dublin System determines the responsibility 
and burden-sharing of asylum application processing among EU Member 
States. The EU Commission has proposed to recast the three key Directives 
mentioned prior in July 2016, including a proposal for Dublin IV. This chapter 
will not comment upon these new proposals because they fall outside the 
scope of this chapter.
Under EU law, a Regulation is a binding legislative act that must be applied in 
its entirety across the EU (EU 2016). A Directive, on the other hand, is a 
legislative act that sets out a goal to be achieved by all EU Member States, 
but is based on the implementation of national law to achieve those 
objectives (EU 2016). It follows that the provisions found in the Qualification 
Directive, Asylum Procedures Directive, and Reception Conditions Directive 
are discretionary and will be dependent upon the Member State in question to 
transpose into domestic law. 
The Qualification Directive gives EU Member States guidance on the 
standards for qualifying ‘third country’ nationals or stateless persons for 
international protection and subsidiary protection and the content of the 
protection granted. The Asylum Procedures Directive, on the other hand, 
provides guidance on the procedures utilised by Member States to grant and 
withdraw international protection. Finally, the Reception Conditions Directive 
lays down for Member States the standards for the reception condition of 
applications for international protection.  
The Dublin III Regulation is important because it is the current legislation 
determining which EU Member State is responsible for examining individual 
asylum applications (European Commission 2016b). If an asylum claimant 
arrives in a Member State, the asylum official will first determine the category 
which the applicant for international protection falls under – whether he or she 
is a minor or has family member(s) in another Member State, for example – in 
order to determine the Member State responsible for processing the asylum 
application (Dublin III Regulation 2013, Arts. 8–10). Next, the asylum official 
will consider whether the applicant is in possession of a visa or residence 
permit in a Member State, and whether the applicant has entered the EU 
irregularly or regularly (European Commission 2016b). In processing the 
asylum application, the asylum official will also determine if the criteria for 
transferring the applicant to a ‘safe third country’ apply pursuant to the 
Asylum Procedures Directive (Dublin III Regulation 2013, Art. 3(3)). If the 
criteria for ‘safe third country’ does not apply, and the applicant for 
international protection does not qualify for refugee status, then the asylum 
official will consider granting protection under subsidiary protection pursuant 
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to the Qualification Directive (2011, Art. 15). The definitions for ‘safe third 
country’ and ‘subsidiary protection’ are found under the respective 
instruments describing them.
International and Regional Responses
This section examines the current international and regional responses to the 
EU migrant crisis and explains why the responses thus far are too little and 
too late. 
The UNHCR Response
The UNHCR exercises a supervisory role over contracting parties’ compliance 
with the Refugee Convention (Statute of the UNHCR 1950, Art. 8(a)). While 
the commentaries and interpretations by the UNHCR are considered ‘soft law’ 
and therefore are non-binding, they are nonetheless considered authoritative 
and have been interpreted by states as such (UNHCR 2007). Accordingly, 
UNHCR commentaries should be regarded with the strictest scrutiny given 
the implications they have on contracting parties’ compliance with the 
Refugee Convention. The UNHCR’s response to the EU migrant crisis is, of 
course, not restricted to the release of the Guideline. Given the limited scope 
of this chapter and the relevance of this particular Guideline to the EU migrant 
crisis, an analysis of other actions or commentaries released by the UNHCR 
will not be made. The purpose of focusing the analysis on the Guideline is 
twofold. First, the Guideline is current, as of 24 June 2015. Second, the 
context behind the Guideline is the EU migrant crisis, since the Guideline only 
applies to situations of massive influx of refugees where individual interviews 
may not be feasible. 
A prima facie approach to refugee status determination is not the main focus 
of this chapter. Rather, this chapter explains the concerns with group 
recognition of refugee status, and discusses how group recognition of refugee 
status, in contrast with individual status determination, may undermine 
international protection for asylum claimants and refugees, and potentially 
contradict the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention. According to 
the Guideline, prima facie recognition of refugees or, a prima facie approach, 
means ‘the recognition by a state or the UNHCR of refugee status on the 
basis of readily apparent, objective circumstances in the country of origin or, 
in the case of stateless asylum seekers, their country of former habitual 
residence’ (UNHCR 2015). A prima facie approach may be applied to 
individual refugee status determination circumstances, but is most often used 
in group situations, where ‘individual status determination is impractical, 
impossible or unnecessary in large-scale situations’ (UNHCR 2015). 
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A Brief Overview of the EU Response 
This section focuses upon the Deal as one of the many responses utilised by 
the EU in an attempt to prevent secondary movements, such as smuggling, 
and to improve on the failed attempts by the Dublin III Regulation to ensure 
an efficient and fair method of allocating responsibility-sharing among EU 
Member States in determining the Member State responsible for processing 
asylum applications. As a result of its currency and implications for asylum 
claimants moving from the Syrian armed conflict towards Turkey, this section 
will focus upon the Deal to analyse the EU’s response to the migrant crisis. 
Before moving on to a discussion of the Deal, a brief overview of the 
concerns related to the Dublin III Regulation will be explored. 
The Dublin III Regulation is the current framework legislation used by EU 
Member States to determine the Member State responsible for processing 
asylum applications. However, the Dublin III Regulation is not without its own 
problems. For instance, in the European Court of Human Rights case of MSS 
v. Belgium and Greece, where the court examined the Dublin II Regulation 
(predecessor to Dublin III) and its compatibility with the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), the court held that Belgium cannot send asylum 
claimants back to Greece under the Dublin transfer procedure because of 
Greece’s deficient asylum system, which may potentially lead to indirect 
refoulement (European Database of Asylum Law 2016). Belgium was held to 
have violated Article 3 of the ECHR which provided for the prohibition against 
torture, for sending asylum claimants to Greece, where there were substantial 
grounds for believing that there would be a real risk that the asylum claimant 
would be exposed to detention and living conditions in breach of that Article 
(European Database of Asylum Law 2016; ECHR 1950, Art. 3). This case 
therefore illustrates that Member States such as Belgium were able to 
circumvent their non-refoulement obligations by using the Dublin transfer 
procedure to their advantage.
Besides the problems of the Dublin III Regulation, the EU response to the 
migrant crisis as evidenced by the Deal is also troublesome. The purpose of 
the Deal is to tackle the issue of irregular migrants as well as to address the 
migrant crisis (Europa 2016b). The EU and Turkey agreed to a joint action 
plan on 7 March 2016, where Turkey agreed to ‘accept the rapid return of all 
migrants not in need of international protection crossing from Turkey into 
Greece and to take back all irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters’ 
(Europa 2016b). It should be noted that Turkey is not currently a Member 
State of the EU, and it is therefore not bound by EU law (Europa 2017). The 
two main components of the Deal which this chapter will focus on are: 1) all 
new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 
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March 2016 will be returned to Turkey, 2) for every Syrian being returned to 
Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the 
EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria (Europa 2016b). 
According to the EU-Turkey Statement, ‘migrants not applying for asylum or 
whose application has been found unfounded or inadmissible in accordance 
with the [Asylum Procedures Directive] will be returned to Turkey’, and, 
priority will be given to those Syrian migrants ‘who have not previously 
entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly’ to be resettled from Turkey to the 
EU (Europa 2016b). 
Failures of International and Regional Responses
After a brief overview of the UNHCR and EU responses, this section 
discusses why the responses are too little and too late.
Failures of the UNHCR Response
The UNHCR response to the EU migrant crisis as suggested by the Guideline 
through group recognition of refugees may potentially contradict the object 
and purpose of the Refugee Convention. Pursuant to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), ‘a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose’ (Art. 31(1)). The object 
and purpose of the Refugee Convention are found in its preamble (Art. 31(2)). 
The object and purpose of the Refugee Convention, according to a UNHCR 
2001 commentary, is ‘to ensure the protection of specific rights of refugees, to 
encourage international cooperation in that regard, including through UNHCR, 
and to prevent the refugee problem from becoming a cause of tensions 
between states’ (UNHCR 2001). Moreover, the UNHCR itself has stated that, 
considering the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention, the asylum 
official ‘needs to have both a full picture of the asylum-seeker’s personality, 
background and personal experiences’ (UNHCR 2001). It would be difficult to 
assess an individual applicant’s ‘personality, background and personal 
experiences’ in the circumstances of group-based recognition. Group-based 
recognition also takes away the opportunity for the individual applicant to 
have a right to be heard, whether oral or written, which is a right guaranteed 
under the Refugee Convention in the case of expulsion orders (Refugee 
Convention 1951, Art. 32(2)). Having regarded the UNHCR’s commentary 
then, group-based recognition makes individualised assessment of the 
claimant’s ‘personality, background and personal experiences’ nearly 
impossible, thus potentially contradicting the object and purpose of the 
Refugee Convention. 
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Further, in contrast with individual refugee status determination, which is a 
common practice among states, where the asylum official needs to assess 
the subjective fear and objective well-foundedness of that fear of the 
individual applicant on a case-by-case basis, a prima facie approach removes 
the individual component to that assessment, and applies the assessment 
uniformly, across the board, to a group of individuals on the basis of ‘readily 
apparent, objective circumstances in the country of origin’, as reiterated 
above. It is suggested that a group-based recognition of refugee status, as 
opposed to individualised assessments takes away the individual applicant’s 
ability to truly demonstrate his or her subjective fear based on the applicable 
circumstance. 
For instance, although the Syrian armed conflict has produced a mass influx 
of asylum claimants across the EU, it is not necessarily the case that all such 
asylum claimants are able to meet the threshold of the refugee definition, 
since not all asylum claimants fleeing from the Syrian armed conflict may 
experience a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ on the basis of the Convention 
Grounds on both subjective and objective assessments. Further, group-based 
recognition increases the possibility of asylum claimants who are not 
legitimately fleeing from a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ to circumvent the 
institution for asylum by not needing to meet the onus of proof to establish 
subjective fear and objective well-foundedness to the threshold of a 
‘reasonable likelihood’. The onus of proof requirement is removed from the 
individual applicant because group-based recognition of refugee status 
presumes that the individual applicant, as part of a group of applicants, is a 
refugee unless there is evidence to the contrary (UNHCR 2015). A leading 
academic and practitioner in refugee law agrees that group-based recognition 
of refugees is problematic, in that it systemically applies discriminatory 
measures upon a group of asylum claimants, while not every claimant within 
the group will be able to individually meet the threshold of persecution 
(Durieux 2008). Moreover, Durieux asserts that group-based recognition of 
refugees, although efficient in massive influx situations, may nonetheless be 
detrimental to asylum claimants because efficiency is achieved at the 
expense of certainty, because of an overly broad definition of groups at risk 
(Durieux 2008). 
While some may argue that the burden of proof for asylum claimants is 
slightly lower in a group-based recognition system rather than an 
individualised assessment of refugee status, so that more individuals may be 
protected as a result, more individuals having an ‘easier’ time being 
recognised as refugees does not necessarily conform with the spirit and letter 
of the Refugee Convention. For instance, the object and purpose of the 
Refugee Convention, as stated above, is its humanitarian objective – which is 
to ensure that human beings can enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms free 
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from discrimination (Weis 1990). In order to achieve its humanitarian 
objectives, it is necessary then, to exclude those who are undeserving of 
these fundamental rights and freedoms, so that those who are deserving of 
these rights do get protected. An example of when an asylum claimant may 
be deemed undeserving of the rights enumerated under the Refugee 
Convention occurs when an asylum official deems there to be ‘serious 
reasons for considering’ that the asylum claimant has committed ‘a crime 
against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity’ (Refugee Con-
vention 1951, Art. 1F(a)). In a group-based recognition system, it would be 
more difficult for the asylum official to determine, on the threshold of ‘serious 
reasons for considering’, whether the asylum claimant in question has indeed 
committed the crimes listed under Article 1F(a). Further, the threshold of 
‘serious reasons for considering’ is necessarily a high one, due to the 
significant potential impact a rejected application would mean for the asylum 
claimant having committed the enumerated crimes. It is therefore submitted 
that, without an individualised assessment, it would be difficult, in some 
circumstances, to determine whether the asylum claimant in question is 
indeed deserving of international protection.
Based on these reasons, it is suggested that the UNHCR response to the EU 
migrant crisis by proposing the group-based recognition approach to 
determining refugee status is inadequate. The UNHCR proposal for group 
recognition of refugees is not only inadequate, but also much too late. The 
Syrian armed conflict began in or about 2011, as a result of anti-government 
protests (Amnesty International 2016). The Syrian armed conflict in the past 
five years has produced the displacement of an estimated 4.8 million persons 
of concern, including asylum claimants, refugees, and internally-displaced 
persons (UNHCR n.d.). However, despite these statistics, the UNHCR failed 
to suggest a proposal for group recognition of refugees, or take action, until 
June 2015. Moreover, group recognition procedures deviate from commonly 
practised individualised interview procedures, meaning EU Member States 
will have to make changes to their internal procedures and guidelines, which 
may increase the overall time required to have an efficient and effective 
asylum system in place. Under international law, states have an obligation to 
provide an asylum claimant access to fair and efficient asylum procedures, 
which is derived from the right to seek and enjoy asylum found under the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), an international instrument 
that is reflective of international custom (1948, Art. 14).
Failures of the EU Response
Next, this chapter turns to the failures of the EU response to the migrant 
crisis.
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The principle of non-refoulement is violated when a state sends back the 
asylum claimant or refugee to massive violations of human rights amounting 
to persecution, or to death, torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966, Arts. 6 and 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984, Art. 3). The definitions for these 
enumerated terms can be found in the respective instruments describing 
them. Refoulement may occur directly or indirectly. Direct refoulement occurs 
when a state sends back an asylum claimant or a refugee to his or her 
country of origin to face persecution (Refugee Convention 1951, Art. 33(1)). 
Indirect refoulement occurs when a sending state sends back the asylum 
claimant or refugee to a recipient state where the recipient state does not 
have adequate procedures to process the asylum claimant or refugee 
(UNHCR 2007). The Deal violates the principle of non-refoulement because it 
proposes to send asylum claimants or refugees back to Turkey, where there 
will not be adequate asylum procedures to process them. The fact that Turkey 
has an inadequate asylum processing system and lack of procedural 
safeguards to ensure adequate protection for asylum claimants and refugees 
due to a poor human rights record has been recognised by leading 
academics (Peers 2016). Turkey’s poor human rights record makes it more 
likely for asylum claimants or refugees returned to Turkey to be subjected to 
death, torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
or otherwise massive violations of human rights amounting to persecution. 
Therefore, sending asylum claimants or refugees back to Turkey, where the 
asylum system is deficient and the human rights record is poor, increase the 
chances of violations of non-refoulement obligations. 
Further to the above-mentioned problems, the Deal violates international law 
because it promotes collective expulsion of asylum claimants or refugees, 
when massive numbers of asylum claimants or refugees are being returned to 
Turkey (Refugee Convention 1951, Article 32). Collective expulsion of aliens 
is also against established EU law (ECHR 1950, Protocol 4, Art. 4). Moreover, 
the EU presumes Turkey to be a ‘safe third country’, which, in theory, should 
permit asylum claimants to access proper asylum procedures after they are 
sent to Turkey (Poon 2016a). However, in reality, Turkey does not have 
proper asylum procedures in place to be regarded as a ‘safe third country’ in 
the first place (Poon 2016a). These and the above reasons suggest that the 
EU’s response to the migrant crisis is inadequate. 
The EU response to the migrant crisis is not only insufficient, but also much 
too late. The Syrian armed conflict has been ongoing for over five years. 
Moreover, the failures of the Dublin System in handling the massive influx 
have been apparent and emphasised by the UNHCR since 2008 (UNHCR 
2008). However, the EU’s response to the failures of the Dublin System has 
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been slow. The Dublin System has been in place since the inception of the 
Dublin Convention of 1990; however, the proposal to improve the system did 
not take place until the Dublin II Regulation of 2003, and the subsequent 
Dublin III Regulation, ten years later, in 2013. Based on these reasons, the 
EU response to the migrant crisis has been anything but adequate and timely. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
As demonstrated, both the UNHCR and EU responses to the migrant crisis 
have been anything but adequate and timely. The UNHCR’s proposal to 
establish group-based recognition of refugees appears to be problematic, 
given that the individualised interview and, therefore, the right to be heard 
would be curtailed. The EU’s proposal to return asylum claimants or refugees 
back to Turkey where the asylum system is deficient violates non-refoulement 
obligations and the prohibition against collective expulsion. 
To properly safeguard the rights of asylum claimants and refugees, it is 
recommended that regional courts such as the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) and the ECHR play a larger role in the adjudication 
of asylum decisions and to ensure that proper substantive and procedural 
safeguards are in place to allow for maximum protection of asylum claimants 
and refugees. The enlargement of the role of the ECHR, for instance, can be 
done by defining what constitutes a ‘margin of appreciation’, which is a 
creation of the ECHR, to show deference to Council of Europe Member 
States when they interpret and apply their international law duties such as 
non-refoulement obligations (Shany 2006). A better defined ‘margin of app-
reciation’ may strengthen Member States’ compliance with non-refoulement 
while at the same time champion the rights of individuals by curtailing state 
sovereignty (Poon 2016b). 
To ensure that international law obligations are adhered to by EU Member 
States in their asylum application processing, the CJEU may grant the asylum 
applicants a ‘benefit of the doubt’ so that well-resourced Member States are 
not granted discretion, or a ‘margin of appreciation’, so wide, that they decide 
asylum applications according to their own state interests, sometimes at the 
expense of asylum claimants. Further, since the role of the CJEU is primarily 
to ensure that EU law is interpreted uniformly and applied in the same way 
across EU Member States, the CJEU has a duty to adjudicate asylum 
decisions in a way that ensures substantive and procedural safeguards are 
accorded to asylum claimants across all Member States, such as the right to 
be heard (CJEU 2016). Now more than ever, the protection against refoule-
ment for asylum claimants and refugees must be safeguarded.
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Conclusion
Observations on Migration in the Twenty-
First Century: Where to from Here?
MARIANNA KARAKOULAKI,  LAURA SOUTHGATE  
& JAKOB STEINER
Migration studies is an incredibly wide field, with multiple strains of research 
associated with a number of different research fields, from Anthropology and 
Sociology to International Relations and Development. Jorgen Carling (2017) 
recently compiled a list of 36 different nexuses between migration and other 
topics found in academic literature. A list that is likely to expand in the future, 
it showcases the way different fields of study interconnect and intersect with 
migration studies. This makes compiling a collection that explores migration a 
challenging task, and it results in many aspects being left uncovered. This is 
no less true for this book and it should be kept in mind when assessing the 
book’s scope.
Migration is trapped in the triangle between controversial scholarly, popular 
and political debate, with decisions affecting the lives of thousands directly 
and often immediately. Peter Scholten, Han Entzinger and Rinus Penninx 
(2015) note how the field of migration studies has fragmented increasingly in 
recent years. They hypothesise that its politicisation has played an important 
role in that. They also find that while the number of studies has mushroomed, 
this has not translated into more evidence-based policies being implemented 
on the ground at the European level. In the same book, Ann Singleton (2015) 
frames it even more starkly, stating that academic research commissioned by 
governments or government related institutions is used as a justification for 
certain pre-ordained policies or ‘policy-based evidence making’. Mired in this 
web of controversy, scholars must ask themselves how their work affects and 
is affected by the two remaining corners of the triangle – media coverage and 
popular perception, as well as policy and political decisions. What is missing 
from the current scholarly debate on migration? Is research shaping narrat-
ives, and are they helpful? Can research better inform popular opinion and 
policy approaches, and if so, how? While data driven research on migration is 
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still undeniably important, these questions ask for critical reflections on 
migration on a number of levels beyond numerical data. 
In an attempt to address these questions, we sought chapters from scholars 
and practitioners from different fields of study, in order to give a more critical 
and interdisciplinary overview of migration in the twenty-first century. 
Influenced by our own work in the field, as well as coverage of what has been 
dubbed ‘the migration crisis’, we wanted to create something that provides 
and explores a variety of aspects so that readers of this book can see 
migration from different perspectives. The book therefore connects migration 
to political and social theory, security and critical security studies, human 
rights and legal studies, criminology and media studies, with anthropological 
and sociological notions.
At the very root of these reflections sits the migrant. As highlighted in the 
introduction, the terminology to address this topic still remains an unresolved 
issue. Nando Sigona (2017) argues that the way we categorise the migrant or 
the refugee has important legal and political implications. Michael Collyer, 
Franck Düvell, and Hein de Haas (2012), note that terminology relating to 
migrants has often been used to mean what is politically desirable, rather 
than represent an actual state of affairs. And while the importance of the 
inclusion of civil society in the development of policies and narratives has 
been emphasised here and elsewhere (Singleton 2015; Banulescu-Bogdan 
2011), migrants themselves, as part of civil society, should also be involved – 
in public discourse as well as academia. Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh 
Stephenson and Vassilis Tsianos (2008, 202–221) discuss the centrality of 
the migrant in political and public discourse in their development of the notion 
of the autonomy of migration. They argue that contrary to popular belief of the 
invisibility of the migrant, the migrant actually has a role in the formation of 
sovereignty, as they form a variety of activities and realities while they are on 
the move, despite their lack of papers. If we consider the migrant as a 
politically active subject, then those voices within the migrant community 
currently prevented from being heard need special attention. 
Although it is only partly accounted for in the current volume, migration is 
quickly equated with what is currently framed as a ‘crisis’ in Europe. This 
includes refugees and migrants moving towards Australia, which is often used 
in European policy debates as an example. Other migrations and their 
associated drivers, motivations and narratives, including movements within 
the African continent without Europe as the final target (de Haas 2008), 
migration between Central Asia and Russia (Marat 2009) or migration of 
Chinese migrants abroad and internally (Mallee and Pieke 2013), remain 
largely side-lined. This makes it easier to frame the current ‘migration crisis’ 
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as a singular event that can be dealt with, detached from a larger context.
This book is published at a time when migration still dominates our media 
headlines. The exodus of Rohyngya from Myanmar, the deaths in the 
Mediterranean and the ordeal of refugees stranded on its islands, as well as a 
US president who has vowed to build a wall to keep migrants out, are just a 
few stark examples. A critical debate on migration will therefore need to be 
sustained. At the same time, we need to consider that with migration comes 
integration, and a strong impact on a country’s social structure, economy and 
relations between home and host countries. This has been dealt with in 
literature before, especially for the case of migrants from Turkey to Germany 
(Oestergaard-Nielsen 2003), and less so for migrants from Pakistan to the UK 
(Shaw 2000). What was regarded as a brief influx of ‘foreigners’ then turned 
into something that changed the social fabric and history of – among other 
regions – the two largest cities of Western Europe. What is discussed as an 
imminent ‘crisis’ today for Europe will eventually be seen through the lens of a 
long lasting process of change.
Exemplified by the many questions arisen here, this book also remains a first 
step towards different pathways of critical approaches towards migration. As 
such, for the time being, it is effectively without conclusion. We hope instead 
that it will be the beginning of a fruitful debate.  
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